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EDITORIAL BOARD

The Atlanta Review of Journalism History is particularly thankful for the expertise of the scholars of American media history listed below. Their devotion to the field of study and their generous donation of time and talent have been essential contributions to the quality of the essays in the Review.

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AN EDITORIAL COMMENT

The authors of the four well-research historical essays in this issue were all students whose work so excelled that they were selected to present their papers at prestigious scholarly conferences in the field of communication history. Subsequently their essays also passed the rigorous review process of our Editorial Board comprised of outstanding media history scholars.

All four essays contribute something new to ongoing conversations on their topics – Civil War photography, wartime propaganda, and social change. They made valuable discoveries by immersing themselves in their time periods – the 1860s to the 1950s – by finding original sources: newspapers, magazines, letters, documents, speeches, posters, and photographs. They emerged from that experience with fresh insights worthy of sharing with a public beyond the university classroom.

The leadoff essay was written by Elizabeth Paul, who as senior at Georgia State University won a Top Three prize at the Antebellum, Civil War and 19th Century Press Symposium at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga in November 2006. The next two studies were presented at the Southeast Symposium of the American Journalism Historians Association in Panama City, Florida: John L. Carkett IV of the University of Florida (February 2005) and Erin Robinson of Georgia State University (February 2006). The fourth work, by Qing Tian, a Ph.D. candidate at Georgia State University, was selected for presentation at the Global Fusion 2004 conference in St. Louis.

All four authors delved into issues which were important in their time periods and are still of interest today. They looked at the role of mass media, words and images, when focused on issues of war and social history.

The Atlanta Review of Journalism History is proud to be the forum to showcase this original research.
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The *Review* staff thanks the Editorial Board members, all media historians, most of them members of the American Journalism Historians Association, for devoting time and talent to thoughtful critiquing of the essays submitted for this issue. The reviewers were Fred Fedler of Central Florida University, Wallace Eberhard, Emeritus of the University of Georgia, William Huntzicker of St. Cloud University, Karla Gower of the University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa, Kittrell Rushing of the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, Frank Fee of the University of North Carolina, Terry Lueck of the University of Akron, and Patrick Washburn of Ohio University.

Credit for the overall production itself goes to the *Review*’s staff, led by Managing Editor Farooq Kperogi, a Ph.D. candidate in Public Communication who came to Georgia State University from Nigeria, where he was a daily newspaper journalist. Farooq coordinated the staff in the composition of the publication, editing the copy and the page proofs. He was assisted by Associate Editor Jennifer Rankine, whose skills with InDesign were greatly valued. Also helping was Assistant Editor Alexandra Lukas. Additional eyes scanning for errors included Dr. Hongmei Li, Sarah Marske, Qing Tian, Emma Harger, Dan Shui, Megan Beall, and Jin Zhao.

Finally, the Review staff is grateful for the essential financial support provided to the Georgia State University Journalism History Society through the Student Activity Fee allocated by the College of Arts and Sciences. The *Review*, as always, appreciates the steady encouragement and support provided by the Department of Communication thorough its chair, Dr. David M. Cheshier.
The Mystery Men Who Took the Pictures: 
Civil War Photojournalists Associated with Mathew Brady’s 
Gallery from 1861-1865

Elizabeth Paul

The technological advances of photography in the 19th century from early single-image daguerreotypes to the multiple reproduction collodion process allowed Mathew Brady and other Civil War photographers to document the war and reproduce their vivid images for the public. The advent of the wet-plate collodion process in 1851 allowed the photographs to be reproduced as popular stereograph images for the public. Brady and his men became the world’s first true photojournalists, providing graphic images of the bloody reality of war to the public and the press.

However, because Brady received credit for work produced by his employees, his name obscured the identities of the men who braved the dangers of war to take the pictures. Because of the scrupulous attribution by Alexander Gardener, manager of Brady’s Washington D.C. gallery until 1863, the names of a few photographers emerged from Brady’s shadow. Alexander Gardner, Timothy O’Sullivan, James Gibson, and George Barnard took some of the most memorable Civil War photographs.

Identifying the true authors of the photographs attributed to Brady in Harper’s Weekly helps give these pioneering photojournalists of war the credit they deserve.

Despite the enormous influence of Mathew Brady’s war photographs, history does not name Brady as the father of photojournalism. Roger Fenton, who photographed the Crimean War in 1855, holds that honor. However, the war photographs taken by Brady and his photographers became the first truthful photographs of a war and the gory aftermath of battle.

Unlike Brady, Roger Fenton photographed only images that would boost morale. Despite this, his pictures were dramatic, real depictions of camp life. Although Fenton used a different process to produce his negatives, the waxed-paper process, his images possibly influenced both Brady and Alexander Gardner, Brady’s future gallery manager. Gardner,
editor of the *Sentinel* newspaper in Glasgow, Scotland gave a positive review of Fenton’s photographs on display at the Water Colour [sic] Society in London in 1851.¹

Fenton’s work ignored the bloody reality of war, possibly because of governmental orders, lack of opportunity, or personal aversion. His work focused on the troops, camp life, and the officers, not combat or its aftermath.² Because of Fenton’s omissions, Brady and his photographers became the first real photojournalists. However, simply taking the pictures did not make them photojournalistic; they had to be published as well.

Printing reproductions of the photographs in the papers wasn’t possible during the Civil War. Technology hadn’t advanced enough to print the pictures directly in the papers. Artists copied the photographs onto woodblocks for printing by newspapers; despite the possibilities for error in the engraving process, illustrations credited to Brady looked almost exactly like the photographs. This attention to detail helped the photographs bring home the realities of war to a horrified audience, even though the photographs could not capture any action because of long exposure times.

Already famous before the Civil War,³ Brady seized the opportunities of war to become even more famous, and to document important events. Brady took advantage of a fashion trend to help make his name synonymous with photography. The carte-de-viste, a small photographic calling card, became extremely popular in both America and Europe in the late 1850s. Fashionable people kept albums full of photographs of famous people, as well as calling cards of their own. After the Civil War began in 1861, demand rose for photographs of important people like General McClellan and President Lincoln.

Even while Brady’s fame grew, he began to do less and less of the actual photographic work. Despite his name on everything that came from his galleries, Brady didn’t physically take the many pictures attributed to him. He stopped taking pictures early in the 1850s because of his failing eyesight, relying instead on his assistants to do the work for him. His eyesight had become so bad the press remarked on it: “Mr. Brady is not operating himself, a failing eyesight precluding the possibility of his using the camera with any certainty,” said an article in the *Photographic Art Journal.*⁴ So if Brady actually went to the battlefields during the war,
he could only direct his many assistants. Brady included his assistant Ned House in his list of companions at the first battle of Bull Run. He reminisced about this first expedition to reporter George A. Townsend:

“We made pictures and expected to be in Richmond the next day, but it was not so, and our apparatus was a good deal damaged on the way back to Washington.”

After returning to Washington, Brady promptly had his picture made in his campaign clothes: a linen duster over his suit and a dapper straw hat on his head. In an oblique reference to House, Brady referred to “we” when speaking about taking the pictures.

After the Civil War began in 1861, the troops mustered in Washington, providing a perfect opportunity for Brady. Eager to obtain pictures before the war ended, Brady and his team set out to get every picture they could. Despite his self-proclaimed diffidence: “I never had an excess of confidence, and perhaps my diffidence helped me out with genuine men.” Brady could certainly be persistent. General George McClellan, then stationed in Washington, sent photographs to his mother and wrote: “I enclose some photographs of your wandering son which the artist insisted upon taking by main force and violence.”

Despite his small army of assistants, Brady’s name appeared in the papers and journals, not the names of the photographers who worked for him. The press enthusiastically applauded ‘his’ efforts: “From the onset of the war Mr. Brady has been in the field,” declared a New York Times article of 1862. A blurb in Harper’s Weekly of 1864 said, “Mr. Brady, the photographer, has lately returned from the army in Virginia with a series of views of the campaign.”

Brady claimed any pictures taken by his employees or with his materials. Despite the hardworking employees, Brady somewhat arrogantly told the reporter Townsend after the war: “My gallery has been the magazine to illustrate all the publications in the land. The illustrated papers got nearly all their portraits and war scenes from my camera.” Brady felt that even though he didn’t operate the camera, the photographs belonged to him. Despite his exaggeration, Brady supplied the Northern papers and magazines with many photographs.

Brady made a drastic decision when he decided to add war photographer to his title of celebrity photographer. The dapper little man who built a career from photographing celebrities and who wore Atwood’s
coloigne and silk scarves decided to leave the comfort of his famous gallery and take a huge financial risk. 14 Brady said about his reasons, “I can only describe the destiny that overruled me by saying that, like Euphorion, I felt I had to go. A spirit in my feet said ‘Go,’ and I went.” 15 Appeals to destiny aside, his petition to Congress post war attempting to sell war negatives stated his reasons more nobly as: “The collection and preservation of valuable historical material.” 16 Either way, Brady told Townsend that both his wife, Julia, and his friends did not approve of his venture: “They looked unfavorably upon this departure from commercial business to pictorial war correspondence.” 17

Brady’s considerable influence helped him obtain the permission he needed to photograph the war. He went to President Lincoln, whom he had previously photographed, for access to the troops. According to Lincoln biographer Carl Sandburg, Brady badgered Lincoln for permission, but the permission had a caveat: Brady would have to pay for the venture himself. 18

Lincoln’s approval didn’t open every door, however. Brady needed a military pass to follow the army. Exasperated by the number of people going through the army lines, General-in-Chief Winfield Scott issued a notice on July 1, 1861, requiring everyone to have a pass signed by him or a military commander. 19 Brady, who claimed he was familiar enough with Scott to bring him his favorite wild ducks, applied to Scott for a pass. According to Brady, Scott confided he was resigning the next day, and sent Brady elsewhere. 20 Brady received his pass and joined the army at the first battle of Bull Run in July of 1861 with two wagons and six assistants. 21 However, because Scott did not officially resign until October of 1861 due to illness, Brady may have mixed up his dates or even fabricated the story.

The Life of a Photographer During the Civil War:

Whether in the field or the studio, Brady’s photographers faced many difficulties. The technical aspects of photography made the job frustrating and demanding, and field work was even worse. None of Brady’s men left memoirs about their jobs, but other photographers spoke of the difficulties involved in field work. George Rockwood, also a Civil War photographer, wrote about preparing the glass plates for the negatives:
When ready for action, the plate was carefully coated with “collodion,” which carried in solution the “excitants” - bromide and iodide of potassium, or ammonia, or cadmium. Collodion is made by the solution of gun-cotton in about equal parts of sulphuric ether and 95 proof alcohol. The salts above mentioned are then added, making the collodion a vehicle for obtaining the sensitive surface on the glass plate. The coating of the plates was a delicate operation even in the ordinary well-organized studio.22

Developing the negatives offered potential for disaster. Temperatures could ruin the solutions, bugs and debris could stick to the wet glass plates after rinsing, and any stray ray of sunlight could destroy the carefully obtained negative.23 After development, the heavy glass plates could be shattered on uneven roads in bouncing wagons.

The heavy wooden cameras and tripods made the job more difficult and strenuous as well. The photographers used two main types of cameras: the stereoview and large format camera. The stereoview camera produced negatives for what could be called the television of the 19th century. Stereograph viewers gave a three-dimensional viewing experience by putting a double photograph into a special holder. Because of the natural optical illusion of the human eyes, the image looked three dimensional.24 The stereoview camera had double lenses to imitate eyes, making a double negative on one plate.

The smaller three-and-one-quarter inch glass plates of the stereoview camera allowed shorter exposure times than the large-format cameras, allowing photographers to almost capture movement. Even so, the average exposure times for a stereoview camera ran about one-tenth of a second.25 To put this in perspective, a camera needs at least a one-thirtieth of a second exposure to avoid blur.

While more difficult to use than stereoviews, the large-format cameras offered much larger negatives and prints. The sizes of large-format cameras ranged from 7x9 inches to as large as 17x14 inches. Brady’s and Gardner’s men used the average folio size, 7x9 and 8x10. Exposure times for the large-format cameras ranged from 15 to 30 seconds long, to a quick 5 or 10 seconds if the sun was bright.26
From start to finish, making a photograph took about 10 minutes. The photographer coated the glass plate with collodion, placed it in a light-proof holder, and put the holder in the back of the camera. To make an exposure, the photographer removed the interior dark slide covering the wet negative, and then took the lens cap off the camera lens. After exposing the plate, the photographer would replace the lens cap and dark-slide. Immediately after exposing the negative, the wet glass plate had to be developed in chemical baths, rinsed with water, and allowed to dry. All chemical work had to be conducted in the dark, or the negative would be exposed and ruined.  

After capturing the image on a negative, the photographer had to transport the fragile negative back to the gallery and print a positive. Generally, prints were only as large as the negative. The sole exceptions at the time were Brady’s “imperials,” or enlarged portraits. However, the process didn’t produce clear images and wasn’t widely adopted.

To develop a print, the gallery employees coated paper with albumen, or egg white, and silver salts. After the paper dried, the printer would make a contact print by placing the light-sensitive paper in the sun with the glass negative on top. Depending on the brightness of the light, the paper would expose for up to an hour. It would then be developed in a chemical bath, fixed to prevent fading, and dried. The silver salts provided the image and the egg whites gave a glossy coating to the paper. The Albumen process produced a brownish sepia type photograph, not a true black and white.

Photographers in the field needed a special wagon to carry their materials. Brady and his men used a converted four-wheeled ambulance to carry their chemicals and glass plates. The ambulance had a light-safe door on the back, which allowed the photographer to develop his plates in the dark. The soldiers dubbed the unusual looking contraption the “what-is-it” wagon and it became widely recognized by the troops.

The difficult job of a photographer required the same conditions faced by the soldiers, but with extra problems. Although the photographers had transportation, that transportation could bog down in the mud or make crossing a stream difficult. Worse than the mud was the aftermath of a battlefield. War correspondent Henry Villard wrote about the dead on the battlefield: “I could easily trace the course of the action by the ghastly lines
of dead and severely wounded from the points of the first rebel attacks to where they stopped in the evening.”

Another correspondent, George Townsend, spoke of “the sickening smell of mortality,” something the photographers endured when photographing the battlefield.

The job could be dangerous as well as demanding and disgusting. Photographers also faced stray bullets and risked capture. Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart captured Alexander Gardner as Gardner traveled to Gettysburg to retrieve his son at his boarding school. Luckily, Stuart released Gardner that same morning, allowing him to photograph the aftermath of one of the bloodiest battles in the war.

War photographers braved bullets and artillery to photograph the action. O’Sullivan photographed the artillery at a battery during the siege of Petersburg. Eye witness Lt. James Gardner, no relation to Alexander, recalled how O’Sullivan risked injury by standing when the gunners lay down.

**Printing and Distributing the Photographs:**

Once the photographs made it safely back to the gallery, production began almost immediately to provide the latest information to the public. One glass negative offered unlimited potential for reproduction. The stereograph prints, for example, were reproduced literally in the millions. The E. and H. T. Anthony Company in New York published more than 1,000 views a day from the negatives sold to them by photographers in the field. The canny businessman Gardner negotiated a contract with the Anthony Company for Brady before the war began. Brady’s contract with the Anthony Company earned him about $28,000 from the war and brought him fame. However, Brady claimed he spent over $100,000 photographing the war, so he may have actually lost money even though the Anthony Company provided his supplies.

Photographers who didn’t sell their negatives to the Anthony Company could sell the pictures to an illustrated news outlet like Leslie’s, Harper’s Weekly, or the New York Illustrated News. Although Brady boasted that “The illustrated papers got nearly all their portraits and war scenes from my camera,” he never mentioned how much the papers paid him.

Brady didn’t just rely on the papers and the Anthony Company for exposure to the public. Both his New York and Washington galleries
prominently displayed pictures taken by his photographers in the field. A reporter for the *New York Times* covered the new photographs of Antietam at Brady’s New York Gallery:

At the door of his gallery hangs a little placard, “The Dead of Antietam.” Crowds of people are constantly going up the stairs; follow them, and you find them bending over photographic views of that fearful battlefield, taken immediately after the action. Of all the objects of horror one would think the battlefield should stand preeminent, that it should bear away the palm of repulsiveness. But, on the contrary, there is a terrible fascination about it that draws one near these pictures, and makes him loth to leave them. You will see hushed, reverent groups standing around these weird copies of carnage, bending down to look in the pale faces of the dead, chained by the strange spell that dwells in dead men’s eyes.  

A reporter with the *New York Herald* marveled at the accuracy of the Antietam pictures: “Minute as are the features of the dead, and unrecognizable by the naked eye, you can, by bringing a magnifying glass to bear on them, identify not merely their general outline, but actual expression.” A reporter from the *New York Times* said of Brady’s series: “The minuteness with which even features are re-produced in these ‘Incidents’ is so remarkable that only the microscope can enable one to understand and appreciate it fully.”

As usual, the *New York Times* reporter who spoke about the ‘Incidents of the War’ series gave Brady credit, not the photographers, and praised Brady for his pioneering work. Regardless of authorship, the photographs brought home the realities of war. The *New York Times* commented, “We recognize the battle-field as a reality, but it stands as a remote one.” Brady’s photographers took the first pictures of bodies after a battle. Without these pictures, the full depth and carnage of the war might not have been understood by the public. The *New York Times* reporter said, “Mr. Brady has done something to bring home to us the terrible reality and earnestness of war. If he has not brought bodies and laid them in our
dooryards and along the streets, he has done something very like it.”

Oliver Wendell Holmes Senior recalled his search for his injured son at the Antietam battlefield and compared his memories to the photographs: “Let him who wishes to know what war is look at this series of illustrations.” He agonized over the photographs:

> It was so nearly like visiting the battle-field to look over these views, that all the emotions excited by the actual sight of the stained and sordid scene, strewed with rags and wrecks, came back to us, and we buried them in the recesses of our cabinet as we would have buried the mutilated remains of the dead they too vividly represented.

The gruesome photographs of Antietam caused such a reaction that the photographers went looking for more bodies. Only Gettysburg provided photographs with the same impact as those of Antietam.

**Who Were the Photographers?**

Of the men who worked with Brady, Alexander Gardner proved to be the most important. Born in Scotland in 1821, Gardner came to America in 1856. He quickly came to work for Mathew Brady, whom he might have met at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in London in 1853. Gardner, an accomplished photographer in his own right, managed Brady’s Washington gallery that opened in January of 1858. Despite managing the gallery for Brady, Gardner also spent time in the field photographing the war. Together with James Gibson, Gardner captured the first photographic images of the dead at the Antietam battlefield. Gardner left Brady sometime between November of 1862 and March of 1863, and opened his own gallery in Washington. The *Washington Daily National Intelligencer* announced the grand opening of their gallery on May 26, 1863 in a building opposite the newspaper on Seventh Street. Gardner and his men, former employees of Brady, competed with Brady’s men for pictures of the war. Unlike Brady, Gardner gave full credit to other photographers.

Thanks to the scrupulous detail of books published by Alexander Gardner, the names of some photographers have been preserved. After
Gardner broke with Brady midway through the war he published a catalog of pictures available for reproduction in 1863. He followed this with two books entitled *Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book of the Civil War* and *Memories of the War in 1865*. Each photographer received credit for their pictures in these books, showing that many of the photographers who worked with Brady followed Gardner after he left.

Alexander didn’t come to America alone. His brother, James Gardner, followed him to New York to work for Brady. James followed his brother from Brady’s establishment and helped Alexander open his own gallery. The Washington directory labeled him as an “Operator at A. Gardner’s, 511 7th St.” Dated photographs put James at Brandy Station, Va. with the Army of the Potomac in February of 1863. Despite the number of Gardner’s operatives at Gettysburg, James did not take any photographs. In April of 1864, James photographed Washington D.C., and then moved to Virginia in May, spending at least 15 days there. James followed the advance to Petersburg in June of 1864 with O’Sullivan, and captured the execution of Private William Johnson for the Gardner gallery on June 20, 1864. James went back to the gallery, and photographed the Harewood hospital in April of 1865 while his brother traveled to Richmond. The pattern of James’ photographs indicates that he managed Alexander’s gallery in Washington, occasionally going out into the field.

Like the Gardner brothers, Timothy O’Sullivan worked for Brady and may have learned photography from him. O’Sullivan appeared mostly as a name in Gardner’s books, with little else known about him. Born around 1840, the young man in his twenties photographed the war with uncanny sensitivity. Historian Horan contended that Brady lived in the same neighborhood on Staten Island, New York, as O’Sullivan, and that O’Sullivan probably knew Brady before he came to work as an apprentice under Gardner. Dated photographs show that O’Sullivan began photographing early in the war, perhaps accompanying Captain Du Pont in his campaign in South Carolina. The dates put O’Sullivan with the army in South Carolina in November and December of 1861. O’Sullivan went on to photograph General Pope’s Virginia Campaign in 1862 and captured the first photographs taken on the same day as a battle. O’Sullivan began working for Gardner’s gallery in 1863, but mostly stayed with the Army of the Potomac in the field. A telegram from Gardner
in Washington put O’Sullivan with the Army of the Potomac in July of 1863, confirming that O’Sullivan stayed with the army after the battle of Gettysburg. 60

Some of Brady’s photographers were less well known. William Reddish Pywell, a photographer who worked for both Brady and Gardner, left behind little but his name on photographs in Gardner’s books. Born in 1843, Pywell was even younger than O’Sullivan when he photographed the war. According to the Washington directory of 1865, Pywell worked as an “Operator at Gardner’s.” 61 Like O’Sullivan, Pywell followed Gardner from Brady’s establishment in 1863. Dated photographs from Gardner’s Sketch book placed Pywell in Alexandria, Virginia in August of 1862, 62 and later put him at Vicksburg, Chickasaw Bayou, and Big Black River Station in Mississippi in February of 1864. These sporadic dates may imply that Pywell stayed at the gallery while others went out into the field with the armies.

George N. Barnard was one of the most interesting photographers who worked with Brady and Gardner. Born in 1819, Barnard began daguerreotyping in the 1840s 63 around the same time as Brady. Barnard opened his own gallery and gained a reputation as an artist. He helped address the technical issues engravers faced in attempting to reproduce photographs. Using the collodion process, he photographed directly onto boxwood, eliminating the artists needed to copy photographs. Barnard received a bronze medal for his technique at the Fair of the American Institute in 1855. 64 However, because of the technical problems involved, including no negatives and the cumbersome wooden blocks, the process didn’t catch on very well.

Barnard worked for the Anthony Company and the U.S. government during the Civil War as well as Brady and Gardner. Gardner’s catalog put Barnard in Virginia re-photographing Bull Run and Yorktown in 1862. 65 By December of 1863, Barnard no longer worked for Gardner. The Topographical Branch of the Department of Engineers, Army of the Cumberland, hired Barnard to reproduce maps and photograph Confederate cities and fortifications. 66 Barnard followed the army to Atlanta and the sea, capturing images of Southern fortifications, battlefields, and landscapes. 67 Some of these images were published in 1866, in a book entitled photographic Views of Sherman’s Campaign:
Embracing Scenes of the Occupation of Nashville, the Great Battles around Chattanooga and Lookout Mountain, the Campaign of Atlanta, March to the Sea, and the Great Raid through the Carolinas. The book included exquisitely formal photographs that clearly showed the destruction of the war. Barnard opened the book with a photograph of Sherman and his generals. However, both Brady and Barnard claimed the photograph.68

Unlike Barnard, James F. Gibson worked closely with Gardner even before they left Brady’s establishment. Of all the Civil War photographers associated with Brady, only Gibson comes close to the prolific production of O’Sullivan and Gardner. Gibson, with Barnard and Wood, covered the Peninsular campaign in 1862, photographing Williamsburg, Yorktown, Norfolk, Richmond, and Fair Oaks. These men, including O’Sullivan, began copyrighting their photographs as early as May 5, 1862,69 perhaps as protection against Brady’s grasping habits.

Gibson recorded the hospital at Savage’s Station in Virginia on June 30, 1862 after the battle of Fair Oaks. The slightly blurry picture showed the action of medics tending to injured men who lay on the ground in the shade of a tree. This poignant picture took on new meaning when viewers realized that both the hospital and the wounded faced firing from artillery70 before being captured by the rebels.71

Gibson provided photographs of the U.S.S. Monitor, the North’s ironclad ship, on the James River in Virginia, on July 9, 1862.72 Following this, Gardner and Gibson together captured the aftermath of battle at Antietam in September of 1862. Both photographers arrived either during the battle or directly afterward and began photographing immediately.73

When Gardner left Brady and opened his own gallery in 1863, Gibson followed. He and Gardner joined O’Sullivan in Gettysburg after the battle on July 5, 1863. Gibson photographed the hotel in Emmitsburg, Maryland, where rebel commander J.E.B. Stuart released Gardner after his capture.74 After Gettysburg, Gibson’s name does not appear in the Sketchbook or on any other photographs. Gibson’s astonishing contribution included over 140 photographs credited to him in the Catalog alone.

Like Gibson, David Knox was little more than a name in Gardner’s books. No credits to him appeared in the Catalog, and the Sketchbook credits his first photo shown as taken in September of 1864.75 A
telegram from Gardner at Antietam to Knox in Washington put Knox at the Washington gallery, working for Brady in 1862. Knox’s only photographs published in the Sketchbook put him at the Petersburg advance with O’Sullivan and James Gardner. Perhaps Knox worked more as an assistant than a field photographer.

Other photographers who worked with both Brady and Gardner included John Reekie, William Morris Smith, and John Wood. Although David B. Woodbury continued to work for Brady, his name appeared on five photographs in Gardner’s Catalog. This could have been a result of the promiscuous sharing of negatives, or Woodbury may have sold his photographs to Gardner. In a telegram after leaving Gettysburg, Gardner confirmed the presence of both Woodbury and A. Berger in the field as Brady’s operatives.

These photographers were not the only people working for Brady. According to historian Josephine Cobb, other Brady employees included A. Berger, T. Brown, N. Addison, A.B. Foons, R. Meyers, T.C. Roche, James Wright, and B. Meyers. These men deserved credit for their work and have been eclipsed by Brady’s name. Because of Brady’s practice of claiming photographs, any photographs these men took were unidentified.

Brady’s and Gardner’s men were only a few of the men photographing the war on both Confederate and Union sides. Although they were probably the most famous, Brady and Gardner’s men had competition. According to the records of the Army of the Potomac, more than 300 Union photographers received an army pass. The records include only the names of the photographers, their assistants, and their destinations.

**Brady’s Photographs in the Press**

Even when the newspapers and journals wrote about the photographs’ content, they never gave the photographers credit. The phrase “From a photograph by Brady” appeared on every picture from Brady’s gallery used by the press before Gardner left, and even on some after he left. *Harper’s Weekly* stated, “Mr. Brady, the photographer, has lately returned from the army in Virginia with a series of views of the campaign,” and the *New York Times* exclaimed “From the outset of the war Mr. Brady has been in the field.” However, the photographs used by the press were those of Brady’s photographers. An analysis by the author of *Harper’s Weekly* from
1861 to 1866 showed engravings from pictures by Gardner, O’Sullivan, Gibson, Holmes and Woodbury, all credited to Brady. A double-page spread in *Harper’s Weekly* on the Antietam battlefield used pictures by Gardner, but credited them all to Brady. Harper’s Weekly credited Brady with a portrait of John Burns after Gettysburg, “The only man in Gettysburg who fought at the battle.” However, it was O’Sullivan, not Brady, that photographed Burns.

Articles in non-illustrated papers also gave Brady credit. The *New York Times* credited Brady with Gardner’s and Gibson’s Antietam pictures in 1862, and in 1864, credited Brady with pictures probably taken by O’Sullivan and James Gardner. The *Times* commented on Brady’s post-war collection in 1867, giving him credit for work done by his employees and other photographers. Included were Gardner and Gibson’s Antietam photographs, Barnard’s photographs of Tennessee, Georgia, and Sherman’s March to the Sea. This collection included pictures of the Andersonville prison, credited to an assistant of Brady captured by the Confederates. These were probably taken by George S. Cook, according to Historian Horan.

One instance of Brady receiving credit he might deserve was for the Gettysburg photographs published in 1863. The *New York Herald* commented on photographs credited to Brady, who did go to the battlefield with his assistants. Some of the pictures appear to be taken by a Brady assistant and most cannot be attributed to Gardner’s men. The one exception was a photograph of John Burns’s house, taken by O’Sullivan.

As always, when Brady went to the field he included himself in a picture to prove he followed the action. A photograph by O’Sullivan showed Brady in a wheat field at Gettysburg, wearing his customary white linen duster and straw hat. O’Sullivan worked for Gardner at that time, but remained on good terms with Brady.

Despite being overshadowed by Brady for many years, Gardner finally saw his byline appear in the papers. Despite Gardner opening his own studio in March of 1863, he saw only Brady’s byline in *Harper’s Weekly* until July 9th, 1864. Ironically, when Gardner finally saw the line “From a photograph by Gardner” in *Harper’s Weekly*, the double-page spread used mostly O’Sullivan’s pictures, and only two of Gardner’s photographs. This trend of the press using Gardner’s byline on his employees’
photographs continued throughout the war. Although many photographs were taken from Gardner’s *Sketchbook* with its clearly detailed credits, Gardner’s name appeared on all the illustrations in the press.\(^{94}\) Perhaps the papers held Brady’s view that anything from the gallery should be credited to the owner.

Some of the period’s most compelling pictures came from Gardner’s gallery. Brady’s byline continued to appear in the papers, but primarily on portraits of great and important men.\(^ {95}\) Gardner and his men captured the portraits of the conspirators in Lincoln’s assassination, and Gardner and his assistants were the only photographers allowed at the execution.\(^ {96}\) Instances like these clearly showed that Gardner became a serious competitor for Brady. While Brady’s boastful statement that his gallery supplied all the photographs for the papers could have been true before Gardner left, it certainly wasn’t true afterward.

After Gettysburg, the competition between the two galleries could clearly be seen. Brady and Gardner went to the Gettysburg battlefield with their assistants. Gardner and his men arrived earlier than Brady and obtained photographs of the dead. Brady and his men arrived too late to photograph the dead, and instead photographed points of interest. Historian Katz claimed that Brady eclipsed Gardner with his Gettysburg photographs published in the *Harper’s Weekly* August 22 issue of 1863.\(^ {97}\) At least three of the photographs in that issue were by Gardner’s men. The photographs of John Burns and his residence on the front page were taken by O’Sullivan, not Brady.\(^ {98}\) The third mis-labeled photograph of the Gettysburg cemetery gatehouse on page 532 of that issue was taken by Gardner.\(^ {99}\) The remaining seven illustrations credited to Brady were not listed in Gardner’s *Catalog* or *Sketchbook*, making the byline plausible.

The photographs in *Harper’s Weekly* provide an analysis of the credit given to photographers. While not a conclusive study, *Harper’s Weekly* reflected the content of the illustrated papers. The author tallied illustrations credited to photographers associated with Brady, printed in approximately 200 editions from 1861 to 1865. Unlabeled illustrations, artist renditions, or other photographer’s illustrations were not included in this count. Although bylines were tallied, some bylines included more than one illustration. Gardner’s Antietam photographs appeared under one title credited to Brady, but the two-page spread included eight
Although Brady’s byline appeared 150 times, the numbers reflected his preference for remaining at the gallery. While Gardner’s byline appeared 37, his illustrations were usually from the field, not the studio. George Barnard, formerly of Brady’s gallery, saw his byline only seven times. Timothy O’Sullivan, James Gardner, James Gibson, and the remainder of Brady and Gardner’s men never received credit in Harper’s Weekly. 101

Of the 150 illustrations credited to Brady, 140 of them were portraits of individuals or groups. Only 10 were not portraits, and these included the Antietam photographs, Lincoln’s funeral procession, and views of Gettysburg. By contrast, only 9 of the 37 illustrations credited to Gardner were portraits. The non-portraits included the execution of the conspirators in Lincoln’s assassination, the review of the troops at the end of the war, and the execution of Wirz, former commander of Andersonville. Like Gardner’s work, most of Barnard’s illustrations came from his work with Sherman’s army. Scenes of Charleston, Fort Sumter, and Sherman at Savannah were included, as well as a few portraits. 102

Any illustration credited to Brady logically could be attributed to someone else because he did not physically operate the camera. Most of the work from Brady’s galleries cannot be easily credited. The Antietam illustrations were photographed by Gardner. The illustrations of John Burns were photographed by O’Sullivan, despite Brady’s byline and his presence at Gettysburg. 103 O’Sullivan also photographed the Fairfax Court House, attributed to Brady in an October issue of 1861. 104 O’Sullivan photographed the execution of Private William Johnson for attempted rape of a white woman, attributed to Brady in the July 9th issue of 1864.

Photographs credited to Gardner included work by photographers W. Morris Smith, Timothy O’Sullivan, James Gardner, and John Reekie, and himself. Reekie’s compelling photograph of a burial party collecting skeletal remains wasn’t published in Harper’s Weekly until 1866, despite being photographed in 1865. 106 James Gardner photographed the ruined Norfolk navy yard, but “A. Gardner” received the credit. 107 One of the most prolific photographers of the war, O’Sullivan had a full-page spread of his Gettysburg Harvest of Death photograph printed in Harper’s Weekly, but it was credited to Gardner. 108 Smith, who photographed the dedication of the monument at the first battle of Bull Run, saw his
photograph on the front page of the July 1, 1865, *Harper’s Weekly*, credited to Gardner.\(^\text{109}\)

Occasionally, the illustrated papers questioned ownership. An interesting conflict comes from a group portrait of William T. Sherman and his generals. *Harper’s Weekly* credits Brady with the studio photograph in 1865, and Brady told an interesting story about how he got the photograph. Immediately after the war, Brady convinced General Sherman to show up for a group photograph at his studio. While waiting for Major General Blair, Sherman played silly games with a little girl waiting with her mother.\(^\text{110}\)

This exact portrait showed up again in Barnard’s book, *Photographic Views of Sherman’s Campaign*. The title of the photograph included the phrase: “Photo from nature by G.N. Barnard.”\(^\text{111}\) However, Barnard photographed in South Carolina in 1865, and continued photographing the South until June of 1866. He didn’t have time to take a picture in Brady’s studio, and worked for the U.S. government instead of Brady.

The disputed photograph was taken in Brady’s studio. Sherman sat in a chair seen in many studio photographs. Sometimes called the “Lincoln chair” because Lincoln sat in it for his portraits, the chair had been discarded by Congress.

Understanding the complexity of how the illustrations were printed in the papers puts emphasis on the choices of photographs. Because the procedures were costly and time-consuming, only the most important photographs made it into the paper. Engravers copied the photographs onto wood by drawing the outlines with a thin pencil. The process was complicated, according to *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine*, which described exactly how the woodcut illustrations were made:

A block of solid wood is cut across the grain, just the height of type (a little less than an inch). The upper surface of this is polished, and upon this the artist, with a fine lead pencil, makes a drawing precisely as though he were making it upon paper, giving every line just as he wishes it to appear. This block is given to the engraver, who cuts away every part of the wood not covered by the artists’ line, which are left standing in relief.\(^\text{112}\)
An engraving cost about $30 each in 1865. To put that in perspective, this price was about two and a half months pay for the lowest ranking U.S. soldier. The larger illustrations like the Antietam double-page spread in *Harper’s Weekly* were made up of clamped together blocks of boxwood. To speed up the procedure more than one engraver would work on a piece, each doing the job “for which he has a special taste or aptitude.”

The engraving process did not produce an exact copy of the original photograph, but usually resembled it very closely. For example, the double-page spread of Gardner’s Antietam photographs placed soldiers in the center photograph of Burnside’s Bridge. The original picture shows no soldiers, and the trees are cropped at the top. In general, comparisons of *Harper’s Weekly* illustrations with the original photographs showed few changes from the originals. In one frequent deviation from the photographs, engravers placed clouds where the original picture had none due to slow exposures.

Gardner’s labeling revealed at least one anomaly. A controversial picture at Gettysburg’s Devil’s Den titled “Home of a Rebel Sharpshooter” shows a dead rebel soldier behind a rock wall. Despite Gardner’s dramatic captions in his *Sketchbook* claiming authorship, he credited this same picture to O’Sullivan in his 1863 catalog.

The “Home of a Rebel Sharpshooter” provided an interesting look at how Civil War photographers manipulated their images. The common public perception of photography held that the camera couldn’t lie. An article on General Grant’s Virginia campaign in *Harper’s Weekly* expressed the sentiment of the day: “Of course it is impossible for photography to lie, and we may therefore regard these portraiture as faithful to the minutest feature of the original scene.” Not every photograph or print remained free from manipulation, though. After the war began and Lee became commander of the Confederate army, Brady frantically looked for a picture of Lee to give to the press. The picture he found showed a younger Lee in a suit of civilian clothes, hardly appropriate for a military commander. Brady had his artists touch up the photograph, painting on a fake uniform with India ink. The resulting image, complete with absurd epaulets on the Napoleonesque uniform, appeared in *Harper’s Weekly* of August 1861. Galleries commonly used ink to clean up flaws in the photographs, put in backgrounds, and eliminate wrinkles in clothing. The
Sherman photograph by Brady included a fake background of drapery, clearly added to mask the uneven background.

Brady wasn’t the only one to alter a photograph. The contested “Home of a Rebel Sharpshooter” photograph from Gettysburg featured a corpse moved by the photographer. Based on historian Frassanito’s work comparing pictures by Gardner and O’Sullivan, the photographer dragged the body some 40 yards and placed it by the stone wall for a more compelling picture. Having photographed the picture of the corpse in “A Sharpshooter’s Last Sleep,” which showed the same rifle, he then moved the body for “Home of a Rebel Sharpshooter.” The common infantry rifle in the photograph, a prop, could be seen in other pictures as well. The caption written by Gardner emphasized the sentimental composition to the point of actual lying:

> On the nineteenth of November, the artist attended the consecration of the Gettysburg Cemetery, and again visited the ‘Sharpshooter’s Home.’ The musket, rusted by many storms, still leaned against the rock, and the skeleton of the soldier lay undisturbed within the mouldering uniform, as did the cold form of the dead four months before. None of those who went up and down the fields to bury the fallen, had found him.

Because both O’Sullivan and Gardner photographed Gettysburg, the picture could have been taken by either of them. Given Gardner’s use of props at Gettysburg, including a canteen, a rifle, and even a severed hand, he probably arranged the scene, with O’Sullivan possibly photographing it.

In conclusion, while Mathew Brady cannot take full credit for the photographic coverage of the Civil War, he should be given credit for his insistence to record history with his camera. Although Brady could not have done any of the work alone, he could be termed the first photojournalist, concerned only with recording and preserving an event, and disseminating it to the public. Of all the photographers associated with Brady, Alexander Gardner deserved the most credit for his persistence in attempting to record the action and aftermath of the war. Were it not for his determined independence from Brady, the rich photographic details
of the war and life in the army would not exist in such rich detail. He and his photographers followed the army more closely than Brady’s assistants, and produced images with more impact than Brady. More importantly, were it not for Gardner, none of the photographs claimed by Brady could be conclusively identified. His Sketchbook and Catalog gave credit where it was due.

While Brady should receive some credit, men like Alexander Gardner, Timothy O’Sullivan, and James Gibson should be remembered for their pioneering work. After all, their hard work gave Brady much of his undeserved fame for photographing the Civil War. Because these photographers never received credit in the newspapers their photographs appeared in, they should now be honored by recognition of authorship.

Most of all, the individual unnamed photographers should receive credit for the incredible work that they did that has been overshadowed by the looming name of Mathew Brady. Despite the staggering amount of work done to identify the photographers, there remains room for even more study. Understanding as much as possible about the true photographers of the war helps bring to light the truth about the Civil War.
Endnotes


2 Ibid.


6 Ibid.


14 Josephine Cobb, *Mathew B. Brady’s Photographic Gallery in Washington*,
rpt. from the Columbia Historical Society Records, Vol. 53-56, Washington D.C. 1955, 21. Cobb’s information came from Brady’s creditors, who used itemized bills in the bankruptcy case which provided much of the little detail we have about Brady.


Katz, Witness to an Era, 21.


Horan, Mathew Brady, 38.


Davis, George N Barnard, 48.


Ibid.

Roger Fenton used a converted wine-merchant’s wagon for his supplies. It looked very similar to the wagons Brady and his men used, and may have influenced their choice of vehicle.


Townsend, Campaigns of a Non-Combatant, 109.

Katz, Witness to an Era, 61; Gibson, “Emmitsburg, Maryland. Farmer’s
Inn and Hotel where our special artist was captured, July 5 1863,”
stereograph LC-B811-228[P&P] Prints and Photographs Online
D?ils20:/temp/-pp_jkmx::.

Horan, Timothy O’Sullivan, 48. Horan does not say exactly where
he got this photograph. His introduction lists the National Archives,
Society, The Art Institute of Chicago, the George Eastman House,
Rochester, and the New York Public Library’s Rare Book Room as
sources for O’Sullivan’s photographs; Miller, Photographic History, Vol.
I, 32-34.


Ibid., 128.

Katz, Witness to an Era, 38


Cobb, “Photographers of the Civil War,” 128.


“Fine Arts: Brady Incidents of the War - The Battles of South Mountain
and Antietam, &c, &c,” The New York Herald, 5 October 1862, page
unknown.


Ibid.

Oliver W. Holmes, Sr., “Doings of the Sunbeam,” The Atlantic Monthly,
July 1863, 11-12.

Ibid.

Katz, Witness to an Era, 3-14.

Brady won one of three top prizes in Daguerreotypes at the London
exhibition (“Industrial Exhibition of 1851: American Awards,” The
New York Times, 29 October 1851, 2.) but claimed he “Took the first
prize away from all the world” to Townsend. This prize gained him the
attention of the Crown, prompting a visit from the Prince of Whales
in 1860 (“Visit of the Prince of Wales,” Harper’s Weekly, 3 November
1860, 689-690.)

Ibid., 15.


Gardner, *Catalog of Photographic Incidents*.


Ibid., 272.


Ibid., 45.


Davis, George N Barnard, 63.

Ibid., 69. Davis’ book reproduces Barnard’s publication *Photographic Views of Sherman’s Campaign*. Because the book does not include the text written by Theodore Davis, the author has chosen to include it as a secondary, not primary source. The photos and captions were unchanged.

Ibid., plate 1: 1865; Horan, Mathew Brady, photograph album number 117.


Townsend, *Campaigns of a Non-Combatant, and His Romaunt Abroad During the War*. (New York: Blelock & Co., 1866), 190.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 20-24. The dates on the photographs indicate that most of the photographs were taken the day after the battle.

Ibid., 27.

Gardner, *Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book*, plates 73, 75-77.


Ibid., 63.


All of the photographers listed by Cobb were male. No female photographers worked during the Civil War photographing the action.

Ibid., 129.


Horan, Mathew Brady, photograph album number 326, 327.

“Fine arts: The Late Battle of Gettysburg – Brady’s Photographs of the Scene of Conflict, Etc,” *New York Herald*, 6 August 1863, page
unknown.

90 Horan, Timothy O’Sullivan, 2.

91 Katz, Witness to an Era, 63, 76. Katz prints a telegram from Gardner that asks O’Sullivan to give Brady’s operatives Woodbury and Berger “every attention” if they come his way.


93 Ibid.

94 Many of the photographs appear with the legend “Photographed by Gardner, and published by Philip & Solomon, Washington D.C.” Philip and Solomon published Gardner’s Sketchbook.

95 Analysis of Harper’s Weekly illustrations, 1861-1866.


97 Ibid., 69.


101 Harper’s Weekly, 1861-1865. The analysis included only those
illustrations credited by name to the photographer. The number of
times each name appeared was counted and tallied. Brady’s men were
not the only photographers credited in Harper’s Weekly, but they were
the only ones considered for this analysis.

Ibid.

“Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. John L. Burns, the ‘old hero of Gettysburg,’
with gun and crutches.” LC-B811-2401[P&P] Print and Photograph
query/D?ils:1:/temp/-pp.ORo8::; “Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. John
L. Burns’ cottage. (Burns seated in doorway).” LC-B811-2403[P&P].

“Fairfax Court House, the Rebel Gen. Bonham’s Head-quarters.—
[Photographed by Brady.]” Harper’s Weekly, 5 October 1861, 638.

“Execution of the Negro William Johnson, at Petersburg, Va.—

“Collecting the Remains of Union Soldiers for Re-interment in
National Cemeteries.—[Photographed by A. Gardner, Washington,
D. C.],” Harper’s Weekly, 24 November 1866, 740; Gardner, Gardner’s
Photographic Sketch Book, plate 94.

Gardner, Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book, plate 18; “Ruins of the
Norfolk Navy-Yard.—[Photographed by A. Gardner, Washington, D.
C.]” Harper’s Weekly, 8 April 1865, 213.

Gardner, Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book, plate 36; “The Harvest
of Death—Gettysburg, July 4, 1863.—[Photographed by A. Gardner,

Gardner, Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book, plate 100; “Monument
Erected on the Field of the First Battle of Bull Run.—[Photographed by
Gardner, and Published by Philip & Solomons, Washington, D. C.]”
Harper’s Weekly, 1 July 1865, 401.

Horan, Mathew Brady, 63. Horan took the story from a February 11,
1893 Chicago Evening Post article on Brady.

Davis, George N Barnard, 109, plate 1: 1865.

“Making the Magazine,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, December
1865, 11.

Varhola, Everyday Life during the Civil War: A Guide for Writers,


Gardner, Gardner’s Photographic Sketchbook, plate 41. Gardner’s morbid description included wondering how much pain the soldier suffered, and who waited for him at home.

Gardner, Catalog of Photographic Incidents, 8.


Gardner, Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book, plate 41.

Ibid., plate 40.

Katz, Witness to An Era, 69.

Gardner, Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book, plate 41.

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Cry “Creel!” and Let Slip the Words of War!
American Propaganda and
The Committee on Public Information
1917 – 1918

John L. Carkeet IV

Over there, over there,
Send the word, send the word over there -
That the Yanks are coming,
The Yanks are coming,
The drums rum-tumming
Ev’rywhere.
So prepare, say a pray’r,
Send the word, send the word to beware.
We’ll be over, we’re coming over,
And we won’t come back till it’s over
Over there.
~ George M. Cohan

World War I orchestrated one of the world’s greatest campaigns in mass manipulation, partially because “noble” causes such as spreading democracy, toppling tyranny, and defending religion remained imaginary. It was up to the political elite to disguise these fantasies into realities. Fighting over convoluted causes rooted in rivalries among royalties, the belligerents developed complex strategies to harness the peoples’ hatred for their perceived adversaries. Through a variety of media, each major player devoted hundreds of days, thousands of men, and millions of dollars to reveal the truth (or, more accurately, their version of it) to allies, enemies, and neutrals alike.

This paper focuses on the propaganda machine created by the most apprehensive and ambivalent nation in the war: the United States of America. A majority of the primary and secondary sources present the domestic activities of the Committee on Public Information (CPI), a federal institution that consisted of 19 subdivisions, each disseminating a particular type of propaganda. Many of the facts and figures derive from the memoirs of George Creel, the CPI’s brilliant and boisterous chairman. To make this
article a manageable undertaking, the author narrowed the Committee’s efforts within those divisions that produced pamphlets, posters, motion pictures, and orators for homefront consumption. This paper not only explains the roles each medium played during the conflict, but also provides a correlation with the basic, theoretical concepts of propaganda.

Approximately 65 million men donned a uniform between 1914 and 1918. More than 8 million would make the ultimate sacrifice on the fields and seas of battle, leaving 3 million widows and 10 million orphans to endure decades of mournful hardship. Europe mutated into a mass of unmarked graves littered with rusting weapons and rotting carcasses. Those souls fortunate to survive the four years of carnage deemed the conflict as “The war to end all wars.” Few could not imagine a conflict greater than what they experienced in the Great War. Just as tragically, fewer still never realized they fell victim to one of the world’s greatest campaigns in mass manipulation.

Despite the immense loss of men and materiel, the Allied and Central Powers continued to fight with a deadly determination fueled by their citizens’ basic instinct of personal and national survival. However, this sense of self-preservation falters unless other, more complex causes come to bear. The nations on either side understood that, before one can combat one’s enemy, one must know one’s enemy; only then can one come to hate him without remorse. On a national scale, no finer method of achieving such attitudes exists than propaganda.

Although utilized in hundreds of confrontations throughout recorded history, propaganda took several millennia to emerge as an essential tool to armed conflict. Its development depended on innovators such as Tsai Lun, Johannes Gutenberg, and Alexander Graham Bell to expedite civilized communication. Additionally, propaganda required social restructuring, for

…the established rulers of society were reluctant to attach very much importance to propaganda. The proponents (propagandists) of the established symbols, like “monarchy,” did not have much to offer about the nature of the propaganda
which they believed would defend monarchy. The apologists for “democracy” invoked the “will of the people,” and were rather loath to describe how it was possible to manipulate the popular will.⁶

It was not until the First World War when, with the aid of mass media such as newspapers, photographs, and movies, propaganda reached maturity. By the war’s incarnation, propaganda had evolved into a government-institutionalized element.⁷ As one writer of the New York Times observed, “the European war deserves to be distinguished as the first press agents’ war.”⁸

An analysis of the methods utilized by every belligerent throughout the war lies beyond the scope of this paper. The focus of this review resides on the implementation of propaganda by arguably the most ambivalent nation to participate in the war: The United States of America. This country’s inclusion reigns as one of the world’s greatest ironies because “Woodrow Wilson, whose 1916 re-election campaign slogan was ‘he kept us out of the war,’ led America into the First World War. With the help of a propaganda apparatus unparalleled in world history, Wilson forged a nation of immigrants into a fighting whole.”⁹

The work of institutions that distributed propaganda material during the Great War has been well documented. Relatively few scholars, however, partake in the theoretical, persuasive elements behind the practical aspects of propaganda. The government of the United States implemented a variety of methods to rally support for the war; thus, a single theory or model cannot encompass the efficacy of American propaganda. Nevertheless, a common theme lies throughout the majority of America’s efforts: fear. The government’s success in scaring its citizens into action ultimately led to the nation’s unconditional support (and Germany’s unconditional surrender). This paper examines the complex strategies supervised by the American elite to harness this basic emotion as the harvester for hatred.

Elementary questions require attention before engaging in theoretical subtleties. How did the war begin? Who were the chief participants? What or who constituted America’s entrance into the war? Most importantly, how did the United States Government, led by an
administration that previously glorified neutrality, persuade its people to take arms against a foe thousands of miles away?

**Definitions of Propaganda**

A complete answer to the final question requires a survey of propaganda’s definitions. Even when spoken the word possesses seductive qualities. As Michael Choukas, author of *Propaganda Comes to Age*, explained, “first come two staccato stabs, then an explosive and climatic third syllable, and then the final vowel which agreeably rounds out the cadence. Not to relish its mouth-filling ebullience is to confess oneself insensitive to the nuances of speech.”

Due to propaganda’s overlapping relationships among advertising, journalism, political science, and public relations, a universally accepted definition remains imaginary. Despite the lack of conformity, several meanings share common components. William Hummel and Keith Huntress took a rudimentary approach to the term, recognizing propaganda as “any attempt to persuade anyone to a belief or to a form of action.” So did E.L. Bernays, who classified propaganda as “a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.” Although applicable, these broad interpretations fail to separate propaganda from persuasion. Authors Richard Perloff, Anthony Pratkanis, and Ell Aronson parted the pair. They agreed that the former refers to “techniques of mass persuasion that have come to characterize our postindustrial society.” Furthermore, Perloff emphasized that propaganda “refers to instances in which a group has total control over the transmission of information.” Although Perloff used the harsh, political climates of Nazi Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as examples, this state of total control also applied to the democratic ambiance of wartime America. Pratkanis and Aronson updated the traditional definition of propaganda—one that emerged during the First World War—from “the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions [through] the use of lies and deception” to “mass suggestion or influence through the manipulation of symbols.”

In *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, author Leonard Doob stated that “propaganda can be called the attempt to affect personalities and to control the behavior of individuals toward ends considered unscientific or
of doubtful value in a society at a particular time.”17 He further explained that “propaganda is supposed to be underhanded or anti-social, but in fact operates when there is no science or when people’s values are in conflict.”18 French philosopher Jacques Ellul amplified this characteristic, claiming propaganda is “a technique rather than a science.”19 He clarified his stance, however, when noting that the technique of propaganda contains scientific traits since “it tends to establish a set of rules, rigorous, precise and tested.”20

Perhaps the most encompassing definition derives from the work of Harold Lasswell, arguably the most influential social scientist of the twentieth century. Lasswell’s Propaganda Technique in the World War “was the first major American publication to argue that the use of propaganda during warfare was neither ominous nor insidious.”21 He labeled propaganda as “the war of ideas on ideas.”22 Two decades passed before he expanded his definition, stating that it is “the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism.”23 Since a majority of Lasswell’s research on propaganda derives from techniques implemented during the First World War, it is appropriate to use his definition as the analytical basis for this paper.

The Deceptive Peace and the Dawn of War

To fully appreciate the power of propaganda unleashed in the United States, one must establish a basic understanding of the major events unfolding before and during the war. Many historians mark the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, as the spark that ignited the global powder keg.24 Indeed, the “whole edifice of European peace and stability crumbled” as the result of his death.25 However, such stability remained illusory long before Gavrilo Princip fired the infamous shot:

Since the brief Franco-Prussian War [of 1871], all the major nations had developed substantial arms industries, and all —except for Great Britain—had instituted programs of compulsory military service so that they would mobilize large forces quickly. All the major powers had developed elaborate
war plans [that] had two assumptions in common: (a) That war would come, and that, (b) when it came, all of Europe would be involved.\textsuperscript{26}

The belligerents formed a series of alliances to prevent a single nation dominating the continent, thereby maintaining the peace.\textsuperscript{27} However, these agreements would act as catalysts for the war’s emergence and expansion. On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary, outraged over the death of their future king at the hands of Serbian nationalists, declared war on its neighbor. Russia, honoring its alliance with Serbia, declared war on Austria-Hungary. Alarmed by Russia’s mobilization near her borders, Germany declared war on August 1. That same day, Germany initiated its contingency plan for a two-front assault into Russia and France by sending a large portion of its army to the Belgian border. On August 3, as the Kaiser’s soldiers marched into Belgium, Germany declared war on France. Great Britain, obligated by treaty to defend Belgium, sided with France and declared war on Germany and her allies. Over the next ten days, the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey) would make formal declarations of war against the Allies (Great Britain, France, Russia, and Japan). The First World War was under way.\textsuperscript{28}

**From Certain Victory to Complete Stalemate**

Utilizing the Schlieffen Plan, the German army overwhelmed the Belgian defenses and entered Northern France in a matter of days.\textsuperscript{29} By the first week in September, German troops were within 30 miles of Paris. Their advance faltered when the French repelled the invaders on the banks of the Marne River.\textsuperscript{30}

At this point, the two armies attempted to outflank one another, with opposing lines moving north by northwest in what came to be called the “race to the sea.” Room to maneuver vanished when both sides simultaneously slammed into the shores of the English Channel.\textsuperscript{31} Alan Axelrod interpreted the results of the race, stating that, “by the autumn of 1914, [there] was a stabilized Western Front that extended from some 600 miles from the Belgian coast…to the border of neutral Switzerland.”\textsuperscript{32}

This deadlock led to the development of trench warfare. The Allied and Central Powers forged new weapons such as poison gas, tanks,
and flamethrowers in hopes of achieving breakthroughs. However, each side responded to its foe’s innovations with counter-devices or refined versions of the weapons. The belligerents opened new fronts as a means to spread their enemies’ resources. Opposing forces clashed from the Balkans to the Belgian Congo to Burma. Both sides, however, understood that the key to victory laid in the deadlock on the Western Front.

American Neutrality and European Influence

President Woodrow Wilson initially committed to maintaining America’s neutrality. This task proved increasingly difficult. American entrepreneurs sought to maximize profits through exporting tons of materiel to both sides. The Allied and Central Powers flooded the American press with atrocity stories—most of which were fabricated—to curry favoritism. The alleged savagery of the German occupation in Belgium gained particular interest in the papers:

“In a tobacconist’s shop I found a girl behind a counter crying bitterly…A party of Germans had been billeted at the house of the girl’s mother…The gray-haired old woman had done her best for the soldiers, and when they were leaving they pretended to be grateful to her. One of them extended his hand as if to shake hands with her, but at the same moment, as she put forth her hand, another German standing beside her raised his sword and hacked off the poor old woman’s hand at the wrist.”

As the war progressed, the people of the United States began to take sides. In his book, *Propaganda for War*, Stewart Ross claimed that Americans expected combat “to be honorable, civilians and property protected, and neutral nations exempted from perils.” Great Britain took advantage of America’s romantic outlook of warfare by promoting their cause “as a holy crusade against the forces of evil.” Under the command of the Secret War Propaganda Bureau, British agents pumped the American press with hundreds of stories depicting the horrific exploits of the German military. One such accurate yet hypocritical article that appeared in American papers described the deadly introduction of
chemical warfare:

‘This atrocious method of warfare...this diabolical contrivance...the willful and systematic attempt to choke and poison our soldiers can have but one affect upon the British peoples and upon all non-German people of the earth. It will deepen our indignation and our resolution, and it will fill all races with a horror of the German name.’

Through an intense British propaganda campaign and Germany’s inability to solidify and simplify its campaign on U.S. soil, a majority of Americans began to favor the Allies. Its efforts expanded thanks to the German High Command’s decision to initiate unrestricted submarine warfare. In 1915, a German U-boat torpedoed and sank the Lusitania, a luxury liner that became the final resting place for 124 Americans. A U.S. Navy warship suffered a similar fate less than two years later. President Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany soon afterward.

The final, fatal moment came when British Intelligence Agents intercepted the Zimmerman Telegram, a coded message sent by the German foreign minister to the president of Mexico. The document proposed an alliance between the two nations, with the understanding that “Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.” When the British sent a decoded transcript to the White House, an infuriated Wilson allowed every American newspaper to publish it. Germany had “done all that was necessary to kill what little sympathy for the German cause existed in the United States.”

On April 2, 1917, Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany:

…I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defence but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring
the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.\textsuperscript{48}

Five days later, major newspapers published the House and Senate’s joint resolution:

“Therefore be it resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives by the Senate…that the state of war between the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government…”\textsuperscript{49}

“Government” is the key word in Wilson’s speech and Congress’s resolution. The executive and legislative branches emphasized that America had “no quarrel with the German people,” for she possessed “no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship.”\textsuperscript{50} In time, a vast majority of Americans—fueled by fear and fury pumped by propaganda—would discard this distinction.

Meanwhile, many members of Congress—particularly the six Senators and 50 Representatives who voted against the declaration—classified the resolution as mere war rhetoric. However, President Wilson and his cabinet would use those words to maximize executive power.\textsuperscript{51}

**George Creel and The Committee on Public Information (CPI)**

One week after America’s official declaration of war, Wilson received a letter from three members of his cabinet: Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. The signers of the document called for the creation of a government agency that would promote the war through publicity and censorship.\textsuperscript{52} They proposed a civilian should hold the position of chairman, someone “of proved courage, ability, and vision, [and] able to gain the understanding of the press and at the same time rally the authors of the country to a work service.”\textsuperscript{53}

George Creel stood as the primary candidate for the task. Creel’s
career path amounted to impressive achievements in the press and politics. Without any formal education, Creel, at the age of 18, entered the journalism field as a newspaper reporter in 1894 for the *Kansas City World*. Within five years he had published his own newspaper, the *Kansas City Independent*. After writing several articles on progressive (Secretary Lansing labeled them as “Socialistic”) subjects such as Women’s Suffrage, Creel established a reputation as a “muckraker” having in the interim acted as editor for the *Rocky Mountain News*. After a bout with corrupt government officials in Denver, Creel was appointed as that city’s police commissioner during the time of America’s neutrality.54

Creel’s letters to Daniels reveal his pride and enthusiasm for the position. “I am willing to take the post and I know that I could fill it better than anybody else,” Creel penned. “I know the newspaper game, I can write, I have executive ability and I think I have the vision.”55 Despite his eagerness, several of Creel’s contemporaries remained skeptical. Mark Sullivan, editor of *Collier’s Weekly* during the war, observed that “wherever [Creel] was…trouble, commotion and angry controversy arose about him as surely as smoke goes upward.”56 Other politicians and journalists described him as “indefatigable, brash, unprincipled and hypocritical.”57 Ross declared that these traits made Creel “precisely the right man for the job.”58

Wilson signed Executive Order 2594 on April 13, 1917:

I hereby create a Committee on Public Information, to be composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a civilian who shall be charged with the executive direction of the Committee. As Civilian Chairman of this Committee, I appoint Mr. George Creel. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy are authorized each to detail an officer or officers to the work of the Committee.59

Although publicly announced as an organization directed by a democratic committee, those within the political elite understood that Creel “answered to Wilson and no one else.”60 Creel’s memoirs suggest that the sole proprietorship of the CPI stemmed from his less-than-
admirable outlook of the Presidential Cabinet, particularly Secretary Lansing:

I never gave [Secretary Lansing] another thought, nor did anyone else for that matter. As far as I can remember, the only thing I ever said about him was that he worked at being dull and carried conservatism to the point of medievalism.\(^{61}\)

Supported by a $6.85 million budget, the CPI recruited the best minds in business, media, academia, and the art world. The Committee blended advertising techniques with a sophisticated understanding of human psychology. Its efforts marked the first instance that a modern democracy disseminated propaganda on a national scale.\(^{62}\) As Delwiche observed, “it is fascinating that this phenomenon, often linked with totalitarian regimes, emerged in a democratic state.”\(^{63}\)

The CPI and Censorship

Creel swore that the CPI was “not an agency of censorship,” and that “the press of the United States...were set upon with honor, and made partners of Government in guarding information of tangible benefit to the enemy.”\(^{64}\) However, the agency took immediate steps to limit damaging information.\(^{65}\) The organization implemented voluntary guidelines for the news media and helped to pass the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, legislation that defiled the First Amendment.\(^{66}\) The CPI did not have explicit enforcement power, but it “enjoyed censorship power which was tantamount to direct legal force.”\(^{67}\) Creel “insisted that his purpose [was] to increase instead of curtail the amount of information furnished to the press.”\(^{68}\) He even denounced censorship as “the abuse of shielding from public criticism the dishonesty or incompetency of high officials.”\(^{69}\) Creel contradicted himself when, in May of 1917, the CPI issued “voluntary” censorship guidelines.

At first, the guidelines were grounded in logic. They included the suppression of “threats or plots against the life of the President or other high officials,” “news relating to the locality, number, or identity of warships,” “information regarding the aircraft and apparatuses used at Government aviation schools,” and similar activities sensitive to the war
They also allowed the press to print dispatches wired from the Western Front since Allied censors on the European continent reviewed, revised, and—if necessary—revoked them prior to transmission. This relatively loose policy tightened when, in June of 1917, those who lived in the continental United States found out that the first large contingent of U.S. soldiers landed in France a mere five hours after the fact. The nation’s news agencies pleaded innocence since the cablegram in question received the censors’ approval. Consequently, the blame fell on the only government agency capable of releasing such information in a “timely” manner: the CPI. To appease an infuriated War Department, the Committee released a stricter set of guidelines. For the remainder of the war, all news regarding American forces deployed abroad required authorization from the War and Navy Departments.

Journalists complied with the official guidelines to avoid severance from government press conferences. Radical newspapers, such as the socialist *Appeal to Reason*, were nearly stifled by wartime limitations on dissent. Together with Postmaster General Albert Burleson’s obsession with revoking mailing privileges to even the most patriotic of publications, “[The CPI] came as close to performing [censorship] as any government agency in the US has ever done.” Lasswell reported the mass output of CPI material ensured “the question of America’s participation was no longer in debate…dissenting voices were no longer tolerated.”

**Prepping the Press**

Censorship served as only one element of the CPI’s efforts. Creel ensured his organization examined where information flowed within the population and flooded these channels with pro-war material. The CPI’s domestic branch composed of 19 sub-divisions, each focusing on a particular type of propaganda. The major divisions comprised of newspapers, academics, artists, and filmmakers.

The Division of News reigned as the largest sect in the CPI. Creel insisted the information issued by the division was “…not opinion nor conjecture, but facts—a running record of each day’s progress in order that the fathers and mothers of the United States might gain a certain sense of partnership…” Lies aside, the Division of News acted as the primary conduit for war-related information, distributing more than 6,000
press releases throughout the conflict’s duration. According to Creel, on any given week, more than 20,000 newspaper columns were filled with material gleaned from CPI handouts. Although the press appreciated the Committee’s contribution, it could not handle the wealth of information

…on their wires. And newspapers were compelled either to cut it down or throw it away. A large force of magazine writers, newspaper men, clerks, and messengers was employed on that work. It required two large buildings in Jackson Place [Washington, D.C.] to house the force.

Consequently, Creel ordered the Committee “to abandon the practice of preparing news “stories” to the newspapers, and confine its statements to bald official announcements, without embellishment, elaboration, or the application of imagination.”

To further control war information, the CPI created the *Official Bulletin*, the nation’s first government daily. It presented “all proclamations and executive orders issued by the President” while placing “proper” publicity to “all other subjects related to the prosecution of the war.” This well-designed tabloid mimicked the style commonly found in the mainstream press. The CPI distributed the *Bulletin*—free of charge—to editors who used them to supplement their papers’ coverage of the war. Incorporating CPI-endorsed material from the *Official Bulletin* was essential to editors since Frederick Palmer, the Chief Press Officer of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), stifled war correspondents with strict censorship policies.

The *Official Bulletin* appeared six days a week from May 10, 1917, to March 31, 1919. In October of 1918, circulation reached its climax at 115,031 copies. They appeared in newspapers, post offices, and military training camps. Members of Congress, state governors, and city mayors also received complimentary copies of the *Bulletin*.

Creel accredited the creation of the *Official Bulletin* to the President, for it was Wilson’s “conviction that the government should issue a daily gazette for the purpose of assuring full and authoritative publication of all official acts and proceedings.” However, Creel believed “it would be misrepresented, possibly to the degree that would destroy its usefulness.”
Despite Creel’s hesitant endorsement, the *Official Bulletin* served its purpose by presenting tedious yet important information such as citations for bravery, proceedings from major government departments, and casualty and prisoner-of-war lists. Such lists sometimes stretched the *Bulletin*’s length from an eight-page pamphlet to a 40-page obituary.  

**Patriotism Through Fear**

Lasswell claimed that “the stars in the propaganda firmament during the World War were mostly journalists…They know how to get over to the average man in the street, and to exploit his vocabulary, prejudices, and enthusiasms” A majority of the articles depicted atrocity scenes, portraying the Germans as barbarians bayoneting babies, raping girls, and pillaging towns throughout the European countryside. Though the tales dramatized these events, a majority of the American public regarded the reports as fact. Stories of possible espionage sealed Americans in a state of paranoia. One such frightening fable derived from German Plots and Intrigues, one of many of the CPI’s “informational” booklets:

If strikes should fail to close American munitions plants, if money were lacking to buy up all their products, and if the Government refused an embargo, Germany’s agents had yet another resource—to destroy all war materials and other supplies for he Entente States while in course of shipment by sea. One project of this kind…consisted in placing the holds of steamers incendiary bombs which…would explode and ignite the surrounding cargo…fires were started by them on thirty-three ships sailing from New York alone.

Fantastic, hypothetical scenarios further fueled the population’s fear. The Study of the Great War foretells a perplexing account of “what might have been:”

If we had stayed out of the war, and Germany had won, we should have had to defend the Monroe Doctrine by force or abandon it…there would have been a German naval base in
the Caribbean commanding the Panama Canal...America's independence would be gone unless she was ready to fight for it.

*Why America Fights Germany*, a CPI-endorsed booklet that sold more than 700,000 copies, presents “a graphic narrative of what a sudden invasion of the United States by these Germans would mean”:

One body [of German soldiers]...lands...and advances without meeting resistance...They [capture] Lakewood, a station on the Central Railroad of New Jersey...they pillage and burn the post-office and most of the hotels and stores...One feeble old woman...is taken out and hanged (to save a cartridge)...Fifty leading citizens are lined up...and shot...The troops move on to treat New Brunswick in the same way.

Compositions created by the CPI focused on fear appeals. Perloff defined these appeals as “a persuasive communication that tries to scare people into changing their attitudes by conjuring up negative consequences that will occur if they do not comply with the message recommendations.” Pratkanis and Aronson further explained that fear appeals are most effective when

(1) they scare the hell out of people, (2) it offers a specific recommendation for overcoming the fear-arousing threat, (3) the recommended action is perceived as effective for reducing the threat and (4) the message recipient believes that he or she can perform the recommended action.

The CPI achieved all four elements and, as a result, the appeals led to an explosion of anti-German fervor. Millions of Americans discarded anything remotely representing their enemy’s country or culture. Public school boards banned German classes. Symphony conductors avoided works by Mozart and Beethoven. Liberty became the word of choice for Americans. Sauerkraut was renamed “liberty cabbage” and dachshunds “liberty pups.” Even the mayor of Germantown, Indiana, renamed his city...
Americans hesitant in joining the anti-German sentiment were labeled as “slackers,” a term originally coined as a derogatory statement toward draft dodgers. People branded as slackers were subjugated to insults, threats and even physical abuse by over-zealous patriots. Those citizens courageous enough to rally in public places and speak out against the war found themselves surrounded and assaulted by mobs. Baltimore, Maryland, erupted in violence when, on the eve of Wilson’s declaration of war, “4,000 persons stormed the Academy of Music... swept a cordon of police aside, and smashed a big pacifist meeting to bits.”

As the war’s casualty count increased, so did the magnitude and frequency of routed peace rallies. With the Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918 soiling the First Amendment, vigilante groups took root throughout the nation. Organizations such as the Knights of Liberty, the All-Allied Anti German League, and the Boy Spies of America attracted hundreds of thousands of members, all sharing the sole purpose of patrolling for and pummeling on pacifists. Federal, state, and local authorities did little to punish or prevent the brutality. Some law enforcement agencies supported their own vigilantes, the most notorious belonging to the American Protective League. At its height in the summer of 1918, this nationally-recognized, anti-German group sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice boasted over a quarter-million paying members.

Even President Wilson, whose 1912 campaign called for America taking her place as the “moral leader of the world,” proclaimed: “Once lead this people into war and they’ll forget there was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fiber of our national life, infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man in the street.”

A recorded statement of George Creel’s position on the issue of stifling dissent through brute force remains undiscovered. He avoided direct contact with the topic altogether in his published works. However, Creel pondered the nation’s political position during the conflict when
he asked his readers, “How could the national emergency be met without national unity? …Not to combat prejudices and disaffection at home was to weaken the firing line.”

**Propaganda in the Hallowed Halls of Academia**

Creel fretted that “public opinion was without shape and force.” He believed the “life-and-death character of the struggle was not understood,” and therefore “had to be brought to [the American people] as a matter of definite intellectual conviction.” Consequently, the CPI scoured the countryside for patriotic professors. Through a trial-and-error system of what Creel dubbed as “popular pamphleteering,” the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation crept into the hallowed halls of academia.

Creel set a trio of goals for this division: (1) “to make America’s own purposes and ideals clear both to ourselves and to the world,” (2) to present “the aims, methods, and ideals of the dynastic and feudal government of Germany,” and (3) to give a “convenient form of information which would help in a constructive way in the daily tasks of a nation at war.”

Utilizing the words of Wilson, pamphlets such as *War, Labor, and Peace* and *The War Message and Facts Behind It* met the first objective. The former title tailored to those who preferred to skim rather than read, for it kept footnotes to short, bold phrases set next to the President’s address to Congress:

> Wilson: An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle.

> Footnote: Justice, the principle of our program.

In contrast, the latter booklet expanded each sentence transcribed
from Wilson’s speeches into essays:

Wilson: Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments.

Footnote (Abbreviated): Contrast these two standards: Bethmann-Hollweg addressing the Reichstag, August 4, 1914: “We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law…” Or Frederick the Great…speaking in 1740 and giving the keynote to all his successors, “The question of right is an affair of ministers”…Against this set the words of the first President of the Young American Public…”the foundation of our national policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality, and the preeminence of free government be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its citizens and command the respect of the world…”

The Committee accomplished its second pamphleteering goal with The President’s Flag Day Address and Conquest and Kultur. Both booklets rely on remarks by Germany’s political leaders throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Many direct quotes derived from questionable secondary and tertiary sources. The President’s Flag Day Address, for example, contains quotations taken from the Yellow Book, the French equivalent to America’s Red, White, & Blue Propaganda Pamphlet Series.

Regardless of the pamphlets’ sources, either booklet eluded to Germany entering the war not only to expand its empire…

‘Must kultur rear its domes over mountains of corpses, oceans of tears, and the death rattle of the conquered? Yes; it must…The might of the conqueror is the highest law before which the conquered must bow.’

…but also because

‘War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity…Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle
and longing for it. Let us [The Germans] ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful.’

The third—and perhaps most important—objective spreads among the most prolific pamphlets. *The First Session of the War Congress* “included every measure which became a law, either or not it had a direct bearing upon the war.” The acts passed by the 65th Congress ranged from the remarkable...

The aviation act provided for additional officers and enlisted men, in such numbers as the President might deem necessary, and set aside $640,000,000 in a lump sum for their pay and equipment, and for the purchase and production of all types of aircraft, guns, armament, aviation field, barracks, etc.

…to the routine:

Upon complaint of the Treasury Department that the current quarter dollars would not “stack,” this act was passed approving a change in the position of the eagle, the rearrangement of the stars and lettering, and a slight concavity of the surface.

*Home Reading Course for Citizen Soldiers* targeted the millions of men signed up for selective service. The booklet, which covers a variety of topics from military bearing to monthly pay, maintains an informal tone and “does not attempt to give binding rules and directions.” The authors—a collaborative effort between The War Department and the CPI—differentiated their work with German military “doctrine” by promoting individualism and “fair play.”

An army made up of self-reliant, thinking men has a great advantage over a merely machine-like army…fighting fairly and treating even the enemy with as much humanity as his own conduct will permit. As for slaughtering or enslaving the civilian population of captured territory, attacking
prisoners, or assaulting women American soldiers would as little commit such crimes in time of war as in time of peace. In this respect most of the civilized nations of the world think alike.\textsuperscript{117}

The authors unintentionally implied their loyalty to outdated tactics and units. Comments such as “singing and whistling is usually not allowed but encouraged” and “the Cavalry will again come into its own before the war is ended” are as baseless in modern warfare as Belgium’s atrocity stories that soaked the Allied press.\textsuperscript{118} To its merit, \textit{Home Reading Course for Citizen Soldiers} provided potential recruits with a superb introduction to the structure and culture of the United States Army. Subjects such as saluting, insignia, drill, marches, and formations remain applicable to this day.\textsuperscript{119}

\textit{The National Service Handbook} should be recognized as the most “biased free” booklet in the CPI library. It outlines the government’s plan to mobilize the nation via a collaborative effort between private industries and federal institutions. The handbook urges

\ldots every citizen [to] give his all, whether this be time, or money, or life or all three...[by] answering an ever-increasing demand manifested by citizens throughout the Nation for reliable information on all branches of service, military and non-military, this Handbook is published.\textsuperscript{120}

\textit{The National Service Handbook} covers hundreds of topics from mining coal and manufacturing munitions to subsidizing farmers and assigning women in the workforce. It dives into greater detail on America’s military branches than \textit{Home Reading Course for Citizen Soldiers}. For example, the \textit{Handbook} lists the specific physical, moral, and mental qualifications for officer candidate school, a rigorous, 60- to 90-day program to turn college-educated civilians and non-commissioned officers into second lieutenants or ensigns.\textsuperscript{121}

\textit{The National Service Handbook} also served as a recruiting tool for “professional men and women.”\textsuperscript{122} From lawyers to preachers, nearly every profession received a footnote on how it could contribute to the war. Not
surprisingly, the publication speaks highly of individuals with skills that directly correlated with the functions of the CPI, particularly orators and artists:

It is necessary to provide as speakers at public meetings where the principles of our Government, the causes of the war, the duty of the citizen, and other topics may be discussed with a view to informing the public, enlightening the ignorant, and inspiring the faithful and loyal.\textsuperscript{123}

The artists of the country can render a distinguished service by employing their talents in the creation of war posters...The war will provide the opportunity and the challenge to American artists. Their work can be a great stimulus to recruiting for the various branches of service, to support of Government loans, to relief work, and to encouragement of civilian work behind the lines.\textsuperscript{124}

Officially, nearly every government agency praised the pamphlets’ historical and political accuracy. In reality, the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation relied on scholars to write cleverly skewed pamphlets to “deceptively enlighten the already manipulated American Public.”\textsuperscript{125} Titles such as \emph{The German Whisper and Conquest and Kultur} depicted a militaristic Germany threatening to “douse the flames of democracy.”\textsuperscript{126} Other booklets, such as \emph{The Kaiserite in America: One Hundred and One German Lies, Published Especially for the Commercial Travelers of America}, sought to counter any pro-German propaganda on American soil. The CPI distributed the work to secondary and tertiary teachers. While academic rigor of these pieces remained dubious, professors—out of patriotism or paranoia—used them as study guides.\textsuperscript{127}

Historical inaccuracies compounded when respectable thinkers, such as John Dewey and Walter Lippmann, endorsed the “objectivity” of the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation. Even in the face of this trend, a few scholars refused to fall in line. Randolph Bourne, John Dewey’s former pupil, felt betrayed by his mentor’s collaboration with the war effort.\textsuperscript{128} In one of several essays, Bourne attacked his colleagues
for self-consciously guiding the country into the conflict. “[The] German intellectuals went to war to save their culture from barbarization,” wrote Bourne. “And the French went to war to save their beautiful France! Are not our intellectuals equally fatuous when they tell us that our war of all wars is stainless and thrillingly achieving for good?”

The CPI ensured such dissent would descend on deaf ears. However, the organization had limited control over scholars who promoted the war but failed to write in a manner easily absorbable for professors and their pupils. Instead, these authors tailored their prose to gain approval from their scholarly peers. Their pamphlets “consisted of page-long paragraphs, complex sentences, and vague generalities.”

Sherman’s American and Allied Ideals: An Appeal to Those Who Are Neither Hot nor Cold is a testament to the archaic language:

Contemporary German thought is prehistoric, reversionary, paradoxical. It seeks to fly against the great winds of time, to row against the deep current of human purposes, to ignore the grand agreements of civilized man, and to seek its sanction in the unconscious law of the jungle. The Allies are seeking to cooperate with the power not of ourselves which has been struggling for righteousness through the entire history of man; and their cause will be borne forward by the confluent moral energies of all times and peoples.

Even if the reader comprehended the rhetoric, he or she probably questioned the author’s loyalty. Instead of persuading people to support the war, Sherman insulted the efforts of other propagandists by “warning” readers that:

The first temptation of the propagandist is to become a wily liar, betraying the cause which he advocates by false emphasis, garbled reports, and the suppression of evidence. His second temptation is to become a blind and venomous hater of every one and all things that oppose propagation of his faith. His third temptation is to yield to megalomania and national
egotism—signs of that madness, which, according to the ancient proverb, appears in those whom God has marked for destruction.\textsuperscript{132}

Sherman kept the confusion consistent right through his merciful conclusion:

We need not fear the perils that best the propagandist if we have once a clear vision of the object of our propaganda. We need not fear lest we become wily liars, for our very object is that central human truth which is the object of all knowledge. We need not fear lest we become venomous haters, for the very object is the inculcation of the sense of human brotherhood and human compassion. We need not fear lest we become besotted nationalists, for our very object is the inculcation of a sense of those common things which should be precious to all men, everywhere, at all times. We have drawn the sword to defend what Cicero beautifully called, “the country of all intelligent beings.”\textsuperscript{133}

In other cases, the author’s writing style is not at fault. Rather, his selection of sources plagues the persuasive value of the composition. Charles Altschul’s 	extit{German Militarism and Its German Critics} is one such pamphlet. Although better constructed for mainstream consumption, Altschul’s work suffers from its primary source: 	extit{Vorwärts}, a German daily newspaper. Before its temporary suppression by its own government in June of 1915, 	extit{Vorwärts} was the mouthpiece for the Social Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{134} Its editorials spewed socialist rhetoric so profusely that the newspaper spat at the face of Wilson’s war slogan: “making the world safe for democracy.” The fact that Altschul considered 	extit{Vorwärts} a pro-Allied propaganda piece pits his faith in America’s forefathers and, more importantly, the war effort into question.

Altschul made a noble attempt to reveal the “barbarism” of the German military. His collection of eyewitness accounts, however, resides in the extreme realms of the ridiculous…
“Witness offered to pay N.C.O. Reichle all the liquor he would
drink all week if he would abstain from beating one day. This
was refused on the ground that he had to do enough beating
every morning to get properly aroused.”

…or the reasonable:

“Once when it was very cold, the captain ordered the drill to
be carried out in the barracks and only half an hour in the
open air. The soldiers thereupon had to stand outside for half
an hour at attention.”

Altschul seems to have taken liberties while translating Vorwärts
and other German documents, for what German editorial—even one
speaking out against the war—would quote Shakespeare?

“The socialist proletariat declines all responsibility for the
events conjured up by a governing class that is deluded unto
madness. The socialist proletariat knows that new life will
blossom out of the ruins, for itself in particular. All responsibility
fall upon those in power today! For them it is a question of
TO BE or NOT TO BE!”

Other pamphlets possessed neither prose nor point, as exemplified
in *The Great War: From Spectator to Participant*. The pamphlet suffers
from conclusions too outlandish to be considered propaganda:

It was when the British Parliament in 1867 passed the second
reform bill and England became a democracy…English
aristocrats had fully seen their mistakes during our Civil War
and had [begun] to see the greatest statesmen of the nineteenth
century had as yet produced was not born in a manor house on
an English countryside, but in a log cabin in Kentucky.

To capitalize his poor performance, McLaughlin apologized
for giving “…only a meager outline of the story and [telling] it ineffectively.”

Creel gave the writers of the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation a single order: “to do their work so that they would not be ashamed it 20 years later.” Sherman, Altschul, and McLaughlin most likely never read that memo.

For these reasons, the CPI hired authors to create more comprehensible material. *The German War Code*, for example, creates simplistic arguments to persuade readers that “brutality, ruthlessness, terrorism, and violence of the German forces have [been] cold-bloodedly programmed for years by the German authorities.”

We are at war with a country that openly stands for the employment of hired assassins…to overcome its enemy… German army officers are warned against being misled by the excessive humanitarianism of the present age, which the German manual says has generated into “sentimentality and flabby emotion.”

The CPI constantly criticized Germany’s military doctrine. Several pamphlets such as *A War of Self-Defense* exaggerated otherwise undeniable material:

The United States ought…to have yielded to the Kaiser’s extension of his invasive [u-boat] battle line out upon the ocean to the twentieth meridian in our direction, we should have had no reason for forcibly resisting its extension at the Kaiser’s command to the thirtieth degree, nor the sixtieth, nor even to the very 3-mile limit off our own coast line.

These pamphlets also played on the country’s naïve outlook on armed conflict. In *The German War Code*, authors George Scott and James Garner claimed that

The German Government further declares its manual of war law that “all measures” which conduce to the attainment of the object of the war are permissible…All means which modern
invention affords, including the fullest, most dangerous, and most massive means of destruction, may be utilized…

Scott and Garner proceeded to criticize German “war law” manuals for their lack of compassion and chivalry. Unlike their Allied equivalents, German military doctrine supposedly discarded humanitarianism,

…thus making it proper for German officers to employ… poisonous gases, to poison wells in Southwest Africa, to drop bombs in the streets and plazas of undefended towns, to bombard coast towns where not a battery or soldier was to be found, [and] to torpedo merchant vessels on sight without the slightest attempt to save their passengers and crews…

Other pamphlets quoted “authentic” documents from the German military. In German War Practices, translation booklets distributed to German soldiers supposedly consisted of these phrases: “If you lie to me, I will have you shot immediately;” “Carry out all the furniture;” and the author’s personal favorite, “I am thirsty. Bring me beer, gin, or rum.”

The most persuasive pamphlets relied on eyewitness accounts from the Western Front. In German Treatment of Conquered Territory, American writer Grace Ellery Channing recorded his personal observations in Belgium. He makes the following statement to those citizens against America’s entrance in the war:

Those who think otherwise are those who have not looked on at the Prussian system at work and who lack any imagination to conceive it. They have not seen the people of the liberated regions arrive in groups, dumb and terrible, like hunted animals, almost dehumanized by misery. Of mothers whose young daughters have been torn from them, the tongue lacks language to speak. One wonders, as one listens, that there is a woman left sane where the German army has passed.

When not describing the diabolical deeds of the German Empire, the pamphlets focused on boosting morale. They answered America’s most
fundamental question at the time: Why are we fighting Germany? *The Nation in Arms* takes a direct approach to the answer by stating Germany “…made the attack on us; not on our shores, but on our ships, our lives, our rights, our future.”\(^{149}\) *Why America Fights Germany* complements the remarks, stating

The German Government has drowned our citizens, sunk our ships, destroyed our property, insulted our flag…Mercy and justice through all the world are at stake…Germany plans to dominate the Old World from its center, and to-day has largely accomplished the plan. In a few years, it will be too late to stop her.\(^{150}\)

Booklets such as *The Study of the Great War* express the solemn “duty of all citizens to support the war whole-heartedly.” It warns patriots of the “the men who are today speaking and writing and printing arguments against the war, [for they] are rendering more effective service to Germany than they could ever render in the fields with arms in their hands.”\(^{151}\) *The Nation in Arms* endorses the American government when assuring

The mothers and fathers, [the] wives and sisters, of American soldiers that the Congress has provided the money and the expert minds of this country are providing the experience and the knowledge…to protect our soldiers against any possible loss or sacrifice that can be avoided in this great undertaking.\(^{152}\)

*The Battle Line of Democracy* provides a variety of stories, speeches and poems from classical and contemporary literature from not only America but her Allies as well.\(^{153}\) The booklet opens with the words of Abraham Lincoln:

“With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a
just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.”

With over 5 million copies in print, *How the War Came to America* stands as the agency’s most prominent contribution to pamphlet propaganda. It weaves an idealistic tale of how America, a peaceful society founded on the principles of equality, “sought every honorable means to preserve faith in that mutual sincerity between nations.” Written by George Creel, the work “merits high marks in propaganda, if grotesque failures as history.” The most deceptive comments reside in the Bolshevic Revolution of 1917:

...the free men of the all the world were thrilled and heartened by the news that the people of Russia had risen to throw off their Government and found a new democracy...here at last was a struggle in which all who love freedom have a stake. Further neutrality on our part would have been a crime to our ancestors, who had given their lives that we might be free.

Regardless of quality, the copious messages created by the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation required an audience with the patience and interest to read the lengthy material. People who possessed the ability and desire to examine the pamphlets were generally educated men in war-sensitive professions. Politicians, scholars, industrialists, engineers, and physicians were likely candidates for comprehending the message. Their highly visible, interactive positions allowed these individuals to recommend the publications to their peers, and, more importantly, disseminate key points at public gatherings such as rallies, lectures, board meetings, and briefings. The pamphlets—all 75 million copies—“became an arsenal from which speakers and newspapers drew whole batteries of speeches and editorials and special articles.”

**Posters, Pictures, Paintings and Propaganda**

The CPI did not restrict its efforts to the written word. Creel feared that “the printed word might not be read, people might not choose to attend meetings or to watch motion pictures.” He “had the conviction,” and rightly so, “that the poster must play a great part in the fight for public opinion.”
The Division of Pictorial Publicity hired the most talented illustrators, sculptors, and cartoonists of the time. Unlike Creel’s “pamphleteers,” the CPI published specific instructions for their visual propagandists, especially during Liberty Loan drives:

“When you sit down to draw a Liberty Loan cartoon your problem is just this: What can I draw that will most effectively make my readers buy bonds?

A pretty picture that appeals to the eye or a side-splitting humorous cartoon may catch the public fancy for the moment but you will decide after thinking it over that the really worthwhile thing from the standpoint of bond selling is not the appeal to the eye or to the sense of humor but the appeal to the brain and the heart.

If your cartoons leave your audience with something to think about or with some strong emotion they will accomplish their end. If you can make your readers think or feel strongly they will act.

Consider yourself a Liberty Bond salesman actually talking to your readers. Think of the arguments you would use in persuading them to buy. And then draw those arguments.

A general cartoon about the Liberty Loan crushing the Kaiser will sell few bonds, whereas a very specific and personal cartoon will sell many. The closer home you bring the problem to each individual the more bonds you will inspire him to buy.

Study out the psychology of every cartoon carefully and try to make each sell the maximum number of bonds. Remember that the success of the Fourth Liberty Loan depends in a measure upon the effectiveness of your cartoons. Make every cartoon count.

Nothing is more important to-day than the winning of the
war. The criterion of each act is therefore whether or not it is helping to hasten victory. The worth of each cartoon depends upon how much it aids in the national cause.

Every time you draw a cartoon you have the opportunity of helping to win the war. Grasp every one. During the coming weeks your cartoons can be especially useful and we trust that you will draw as often as possible on the Fourth Liberty Loan…”

The combination of control and creativity produced the desired results: the production of “posters that represented the best work of the best artists—posters into which the masters of the pen and brush had poured heart and soul as well as genius.”

The artists worked closely with publicity experts in the Advertising Division, an organization that purchased—but usually received at no charge—space in newspapers and magazines. Over 800 editors from monthly and weekly periodicals donated over $2 million worth of advertising each year. By the summer of 1917, it was impossible to purchase a periodical void of CPI-endorsed material.

American artists painted more than 2,000 different types of posters, more than any other single nation. Each were produced in mass quantities and plastered on walls and halls across the country. The signs contained a variety of themes to complement their respective campaigns. Topics ranged from recruitment (Fig. 1) to food conservation (Fig. 2). The most prominent posters featured Uncle Sam, a fictitious character whose origins remain a mystery. The patriotic caricature gained popularity thanks to an U.S. Army recruitment poster painted by James Montgomery Flagg (Fig. 3). Flagg’s masterpiece, however, skips the stroke of creative genius. The legendary phrase and pose is an adaptation of Alfred Leete’s illustration of Lord Kitchener, one of Great Britain’s war heroes (Fig. 4).

Nevertheless, those working for the Division of Pictorial Publicity produced a variety of unique illustrations with original content. Recruitment sparked fierce competition among artists to create appealing posters for each branch of service (Figs. 5-8; Fig. 20). Other popular poster campaigns encouraged citizens to buy government (a.k.a. “Liberty”)
bonds (Fig. 9) and combat espionage by self-censoring war sensitive information (Fig. 10). Although many illustrations demonized the Germans (Fig. 13; Fig. 18), other posters sought a more noble approach to reinforce morale by praising the work of manufacturers (Fig. 11; Fig. 17). Artists implemented similar techniques to gain support from the disenchanted African-American population (Fig. 12).  

Regardless of the genre, artists often illustrated women to sharpen the poster’s image. They played a variety of roles from victims (Fig. 13) to guardians (Fig. 14). The most popular depiction consisted of women in nursing professions (Fig. 15).  

To the author’s knowledge, a content analysis of American propaganda posters has yet to be scientifically classified. However, the ability to do so has been available to scholars when, in 1938, the Institute of Propaganda Analysis (IPA) published 10 propaganda devices. The International Society for General Semantics (1995) shortened the list to 7 to better reflect propaganda with contemporary research. Although the Society utilized contemporary print advertisements as examples, the devices are no less applicable to the posters of the First World War. Table 1 presents a brief explanation of each propaganda device as described by the Society. The corresponding figures serve as samples.

### Semantic Tools of Propaganda

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Propaganda on the Silver Screen

Moving images made their debut twenty years prior to World War I. Their popularity soon overshadowed that of paintings and photographs. In 1911, America boasted more than 11,500 motion picture theaters. By 1914, that number increased to 18,000 theaters selling more than 7 million tickets each day.\(^{169}\)

The governments of industrialized nations realized the cinema’s persuasive power and included the medium as part of their propaganda efforts. When America entered the conflict, the “motion picture had come of age socially and politically,” and that the film industry “had emerged as the most important vehicle for projecting the meaning of the war as the struggle of Good against Evil.”\(^{170}\)

The CPI dedicated an entire department to the relatively novel medium. Appropriately dubbed the Division of Films, this organization secured the war’s promotion on the silver screen.

To do this, the CPI’s filmmakers collaborated with the U.S. Army Signal Corps and negotiated with the creative, entrepreneurial minds in Hollywood. The Signal Corps boasted hundreds of cameras and cameramen deployed throughout America and Europe and provided nearly 1 million feet of film.\(^{171}\) The CPI included the Signal Corps’ raw footage in educational documentaries.

At first, the CPI limited their productions to short films tailored to specific topics and audiences. Dull documentaries such as *Soldiers of the Sea, Army and Navy Sports,* and *The Medical Officers’ Reserve Corps in Action* were thankfully never shown in theaters. Rather, the Committee restricted distribution to government agencies and patriotic societies so as “to avoid all appearance of competition with the commercial producers.”\(^{172}\) This practice proved ineffective and was later abandoned in favor of meeting the needs of the mainstream.\(^{173}\)

In 1918, the CPI produced three feature-length films: *Pershing’s Crusaders, America’s Answer,* and *Under Four Flags.* The trio shared a “newsreel” feel since they included “not only scenes of fighting, but glimpses of all of the activity connected with the beginning and carrying on of the war by America.”\(^{174}\) The scenes depicted in *Pershing’s Crusaders* exemplify this characteristic:
The pictures begin with a representation in drawings and photographs of Germany’s aggression and character… Farming and food are dealt with next to show one of the prime departments of American preparation… Workmen are pictured putting wood and steel together… Then comes America actually at war… soldiers in camp, training behind the lines… [then] on their way to the front. 175

The informative images of these films guised their true intent: to inspire audiences, impress allies, and intimidate enemies with America’s uncontested commitment to defeating the Hun. Although they did not “live long in the memory of the world,” these films were landmark achievements for the film industry. 176 For the first time in motion picture history, a federal institution edited, distributed, and marketed movies for global consumption. 177

The Motion Picture News summarized the mood in Tinseltown, claiming that “every individual in this industry wants to do his share,” and promised that “through slides, film leaders and trailers… they will spread propaganda to the immediate mobilization of the country’s great resources.” 178 In fact, Hollywood took the initiative in psychologically preparing the American people for war. Numerous newsreel agencies, having been denied access to the fighting fronts, turned to the motion picture companies for footage. The movie moguls orchestrated mock battles to fill in the dearth of real combat reels. 179 These scenes—shot in the picturesque “battlefields” of California and New Jersey—evolved into hypothetical war dramas.

The Battle Cry of Peace (1915) led the charge for this motif, as it vividly portrayed an unprepared America invaded by “a hostile European power.” 180 This nine-reel epic, regretfully labeled as “lost to neglect,” urged audiences to abandon pacifism and join the war before it bled onto American soil. 181

Dozens of films, ranging from short documentaries to feature-length dramas, were produced. Though their styles and popularity differed, the majority of American motion pictures shared common themes. To the delight of audiences (and to the dismay of Creel), the private sector of the motion picture propaganda movement favored
the “dubious caricature of the enemy” rather than the glorious cause of America and her allies.\footnote{182} Michael T. Isenberg, author of War on Film, observed that “films of the war period endorsed the axiom that the wearer of the German uniform was invariably a drunk, a looter or a rapist, following the cue of his emperor.” Films such as The Beast of Berlin (1918) and Wolves of Kultur (1918) “marked the Kaiser as both war fomenter and archvillain.”\footnote{183} One picture, To Hell With the Kaiser (1918), was so popular that Massachusetts riot police tussled with an angry mob who were denied admission.\footnote{185}

Other films substituted anti-German sentiment for other, arguably more crucial, motifs. Several pictures exalted the productivity of workers in munitions plants and shipyards. Some films promoted recruitment while others exaggerated the dire consequences of draft dodging. A handful of movies promoted food conservation.\footnote{186}

Many of America’s celebrities lent their support both on- and off-screen. Douglas Fairbanks and Mary Pickford toured the nation urging Americans to buy Liberty Bonds.\footnote{187} During these drives, Japanese-American actor Sessue Hayakawa would lead the huge crowds in hearty shouts of “Banzai!”\footnote{188} Musician George Cohan received the Congressional Gold Medal (not to be confused with the Congressional Medal of Honor) for composing Over There, a song that best reflected the nation’s patriotism.\footnote{189} While shooting Hearts of the World, director D.W. Griffith and his crew put themselves in harm’s way by capturing actual battle footage on the front lines of France.\footnote{190} Charlie Chaplin, the medium’s master comedian, gave the greatest contribution of time and talent. He “managed not only to find humor in the subject but to transcend the mediocrity of the vast majority of war movies.”\footnote{191} Chaplin’s Shoulder Arms (1918) received rave reviews but, according to Crighon Peet, “his villains were too absurd and his own adventures too fantastic to mean much as propaganda.”\footnote{192} When off the set, Chaplin wielded his celebrity status to pitch Liberty Bonds and sent autographed photos to shell-shocked Allied soldiers.\footnote{193}

Medium aside, the single quality that defined the Division of Film’s uniqueness was its commitment to persuade people with low involvement tendencies. As Perloff explains, individuals of low involvement “believe that an issue has little or no impact on their lives.”\footnote{194} Although difficult
to conceive that a world war would not dramatically alter a person’s life, many Americans continued their daily routines with minimal interruption. Farmers, factory workers, and especially youths too young to register for the draft participated in day-to-day activities without coincidence. Verbose propaganda messages proved inconsequential since these people had little formal education and no interest. The Division of Films and, to a lesser extent, the Division of Pictorial Publicity bridged the communication gaps through emotional appeals.195

The Four-Minute Men

Regular radio broadcasts sat several years distant when America entered the First World War. The CPI substituted the technological inadequacies by creating a nationwide organization of orators called The Four-Minute Men.196 Creel described how a friend approached him with the proposal:

In the very first hours of the committee, when we were still penned in the Navy library, fighting for breath, a handsome, rosey-cheeked youth burst through the crowd and caught my lapel in a death-grip. His name was Donald Ryerson…and the plan that he presented was the organization of volunteer speakers from the purpose of making patriotic speeches in motion-picture theaters….Had I had the time to weigh the proposition from every angle, it may be that I would have decided against it, for it was delicate and dangerous business to turn loose on the country an army of speakers impossible of exact control and yet vested in large degree with the authority of the government.197

Melodramatic flair aside, Creel’s decision to incorporate Ryerson’s organization into the CPI proved priceless to America’s propaganda campaign. His concern for the lack of centralized control dissolved into a pool of praise thanks to the dedication of the Division’s three chief organizers: Donald Ryerson, William Blair, and William Ingersoll.198

The CPI adopted the name from the minutemen of the American Revolution, and combined it with the average time a speaker had to complete his presentation at a movie theater while the projectionist
changed film reels. This window for words was too small for “haphazard talks by nondescripts.” Rather, the limit required “careful, studied, and rehearsed efforts of the best men in each community.”

Although theaters served as the staple setting for the Four-Minute Men, they also appeared at camps, colleges, churches, concerts, and other public gatherings. Millions of Americans listened to the emotionally stirring and presumably impromptu speeches. Few realized that the organization adhered to strict CPI guidelines repeatedly listed in *The Four-Minute Men Bulletin*. On May 22, 1917, they read as follows:

The speech must not be longer than four minutes, which means there is no time for a single wasted word.

Speakers should go over their speech time and time again until the ideas are firmly fixed in their mind and can not be forgotten. This does not mean that the speech needs to be written out and committed [memorized], although most speakers, especially when limited in time, do best to commit.

Divide your speech carefully into certain divisions, say 15 seconds for final appeal; 45 seconds to describe the bond; 15 seconds for opening words, etc., etc. Any plan is better than none, and it can be amended every day in the light of experience.

There never was a speech yet that couldn’t be improved. Never be satisfied with success. Aim to be more successful, and still more successful. So keep your eyes open. Read all the papers every day, to find a new slogan, or a new phraseology, or a new idea to replace something you have in your speech… Conceive of your speech as a mosaic made up of five or six hundred words, each one of which has its function.

Get your friends to criticize you pitilessly…Let your friends know that you want ruthless criticism. If their criticism isn’t sound, you can reject it. If it is sound, wouldn’t you be foolish to reject it?
Be sure to prepare very carefully your closing appeal, whatever it may be, so that you may not leave your speech hanging in the air.

Don’t yield to the inspiration of the moment, or to applause to depart from your speech outline. This does not mean that you may not add a word or two, but remember that one can speak only 130, or 140, or 150 words a minute, and if your speech has been carefully prepared to fill four minutes, you can not add anything to your speech without taking away something of serious importance.

Cut out “Doing your bit.” “Business as usual.” “Your country needs you.” They are flat and no longer have any force or meaning.

Time yourself in advance on every paragraph and remember you are likely to speak somewhat more slowly in public than when you practice in your own room.

There are several good ideas and statements in the printed speech recently sent you. Look it up at once.

If you come across a new slogan, or a new argument, or a new story, or a new illustration, don’t fail to send it to the Committee. We need your help to make the Four-Minute Men the mightiest force for arousing patriotism in the United States.202

Stern enforcement was necessary since the speaking campaigns mimicked those of other government departments. Ross presented several examples:

When food shortages loomed in Europe among the Allies, the Food Administration asked the Four-Minute Men to commend food conservation to their listeners...“Eyes for the Navy” sought donations of quality binoculars, formerly a chief export of Germany...one [campaign] thanked theater managers for
their support.  

Since money and men were vital to victory, bonds and recruitment stood on the forefront of the Four-Minute Men’s missions. In May of 1918, President Wilson “purchased another $50 bond on the $5 cash and $5 a month plan, and had challenged a million American men and women to match it.” Wilson needed not to say more, for the Treasury Department asked the Committee to broadcast the message, and paid for the telegrams that went out to the state and county chairmen. Within a few days fifty thousand Four-Minute Men were delivering the challenge to the people of every community in the United States, and the loan took a leap that carried it over the top.

One year earlier, the U.S. Government encouraged all able-bodied American males to register for the draft. The CPI handed the Four-Minute Men their first, official assignment: “Universal Service by Selective Draft.” For nine days, orators marveled movie-goers “with the idea that registration day should be a festival of honor for the future draftees.” Their words produced the desired effect. On June 5, 1917, 10 million men signed on the dotted line, thereby acknowledging that they would answer America’s call to arms. This was generated by an energetic band of speakers orchestrated by a committee barely a month into its existence.

Stephen Vaughn, author of *Holding Fast the Inner Lines*, attributed “the use of voluntary local speakers, the ability to use ready-made audiences, and a tight control from national headquarters in Washington” to the triumph of Four-Minute Men. Funding, training, and other favorable conditions also contributed to the organization’s success. The foundation of the Four-Minute Men’s achievements, however, resided in each speaker’s ability and reputation. Ross described the typical Four-Minute Man as a “community leader…with above-average formal education, such as attorneys, physicians and educators.” This wide spectrum of speakers brought a variety of talent to the theaters. The linguists spoke in several languages to better acclimate themselves with
culturally diverse crowds. The showmen memorized speeches given by national leaders so as to recite them to constituents across the country. The technicians acquired short audio clips of speeches given by the nation’s civilian and military elite and played them on phonographs. The harmonizers carried a tune and lent lyrics to the topics.210

Although the CPI granted local communities the right to select their speakers, Creel reluctantly sat behind the judge’s panel for those candidates who could not take “no” for an answer:

There was pathos as well as humor in many of the incidental happenings. Men of the most unlikely sort had the deep convention that they were William J. Bryans, and when rejected by local organizations many of them traveled clear to Washington for the purpose of delivering a four-minute speech to me in order that I might see for myself the full extent of the injustices to which they had been subjected.211

The highly selective process governed by the Four-Minute Men and the CPI assured each volunteer possessed charismatic qualities. Segments from the speech below reflect the fluid finesse of these fine orators:

Ladies and Gentlemen: I have just received the information that there is a German spy among us—a German spy watching us. He is around, here, somewhere, reporting upon you and me—sending reports about us to Berlin and telling the Germans just what we are doing…For the German Government is worried about our great loan…Money means everything now; it means quicker victory and therefore less bloodshed. We are in the war, and now Americans can have but one opinion, only one wish in the Liberty Loan…Do not let the German spy hear and report that you are a slacker.212

When the CPI disbanded the Four-Minute Men on New Year’s Eve of 1918, the Division numbered nearly 75,000 speakers scattered throughout the continental United States and her territories. Each orator averaged 1,000 speeches during his tenure.213 Creel estimated
that 134,454,514 people listened to their addresses. He likely made a miscalculation, since the Census Bureau estimated the country’s population at 103,208,541.214

Quantifiable quandaries notwithstanding, the Four-Minute Men “brought nearly every citizen, no matter how isolated, into touch with the war.”215 The Committee led the ancient art of oration to its former glory—albeit temporarily. Never before (and perhaps never again) would the human voice carry across the country without the aid of radios and cameras. As President Wilson—a prolific communicator in his own right—admirably quipped:

The spoken word may light the fires of passion and unreason or it may inspire to highest action and noblest sacrifice a nation of free men. Upon you four-minute men, who are charged with a special duty and enjoy a special privilege in the command of your audiences, will rest in a considerable degree, the task of arousing and informing the great body of our people…216

The End of the War, the CPI and George Creel

In June of 1918, French soldiers and American Marines won the battles of Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood.217 Sticking to the facts, General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, reported that “the Second Division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on June 4th, which resulted in the capture of Belleau Wood after very severe fighting.”218 Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, most likely under the influence of the CPI, added to his own “official” report that

Belleau Wood was a jungle, its every rocky formation containing a German machine-gun nest, almost impossible to reach by artillery or grenade fire. There was only one way to wipe out these nests—by the bayonet. And by this method were they wiped out, for United States Marines, bare-chested, shouting their battle cry of “E-e-e-e-e y-a-a-hh-h yip!” charged straight into the murderous fire from those guns, and won.219
Dramatizations aside, these victories signaled the disastrous end of the Germans’ final offensive in the war. In July of that same year, the Allies launched a front-wide counter-offensive, repeating a German defeat at the Marne. The next month saw a British victory at Havrincourt, which coincided with another triumph at St. Mihiel, the first engagement solely coordinated by the AEF. This string of victories persuaded the Allies High Command to push the attack. On September 26, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Allied Supreme Commander, unleashed the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. His campaign produced the largest and last engagement for the AEF. Six weeks and 26,277 American lives later, the remnants of German High Command, exhausted and on the brink of facing mass mutiny, stepped onto Foch’s railway carriage and entered negotiations for a cease fire.

The initiation of an armistice on November 11, 1918, ceased hostilities on the Western Front and marked the beginning of the end of the First World War. The next day, George Creel, under intense scrutiny from a war-weary public and a Republican-dominated Congress, ceased all domestic CPI operations. Even he admitted the Committee “…was a war organization only, and that it was without proper place in the national life in time of peace.”

The suddenly unemployed army of CPI agents found refuge through contacts in Washington, D.C. and New York. Creel was not as fortunate. Before the Committee closed its doors, he faced a myriad of accusations, many of which canceled out one another. Creel spent several years clearing his name via committee hearings, official statements, and published books. In the 1920s, he lost a small fortune and a large portion of his “trustworthy” reputation from two shady business schemes. This series of unfortunate events would haunt him as he sought the Democratic Party’s candidacy for the governorship of California. After a defeat by muckraking socialist Upton Sinclair, Creel returned to a humble living as a writer and political consultant.

Creel wrote three major books after the First World War. How We Advertised America, published two years after the Armistice, presented a melodramatic history of the CPI interwoven with his proclamation of self-righteousness. In 1944, Creel exposed Nazi atrocities in War Criminals and Punishment. Despite its honesty, the work failed to gain favor among
readers. Ironically, the CPI’s activities had made Americans apprehensive in believing every report from Europe. They dismissed the war crimes of the Nazi regime accurately described in the book as mere propaganda. This outlook disintegrated with the Allies’ discovery of German concentration camps. Instead of gaining notoriety for enlightenment, War Criminals and Punishment drowned in a sea of “see, I told you so” proclamations.226

Creel summarized his lifetime achievements with Rebel at Large, appropriately published two years after the Second World War.Aside from acknowledging the German-Bolshevik conspiracy as a “misunderstanding,” Creel’s second recollection of the CPI remains unchanged from the first. Creel insisted that he and his agency did nothing wrong, claiming:

…many of the accusations leveled against me gained the look of truth …The Committee on Public Information…received national circulation: faking the story of a submarine attack on our transports; the loot of a federal property worth $600,000; an attempt to steal a $14,000,000 government plant; accepting bribes for the use of my name and prestige, etc. If the newspapers printed my raging denials it was on the market page.227

Creel’s search for sympathy from his readers separates the tone of Rebel at Large with How We Advertised America. In the final chapter of Rebel at Large, Creel reminisced how he wrongly…

…stood guilty in the public estimation of crimes that deserved shame and ostracism. Out of my own lifelong attitude to such offenses, I had the conviction that people would spurn me as a leper, and it took all of my courage to leave home and office for the open street…every lie saw me die a thousand deaths.228

Creel saw a second chance at fame with the outbreak of the Second World War. In 1942, he offered his expertise to the newly created Office of War Information (OWI). President Franklin D. Roosevelt, disgusted by the propaganda antics witnessed as Undersecretary of the Navy during the Wilson administration, rejected Creel’s inclusion in the OWI. Creel
evoked his desperation to “serve in any capacity” as he

…trudged from office to office, patiently recalling the part I
played in World War I. The young men to whom I talked, many
of them looking as if they had just come from commencement
exercises, were very courteous, but seemed to have difficulty in
differentiating between the 1917 conflict and the Punic Wars.
By the time I gave up in despair, they almost had me believing
that I was a veteran of Caesar’s campaigns.229

The defeated Creel spent the remainder of World War II on the
civilian sidelines as a correspondent for Collier’s Weekly. He proclaimed
that, from his outsider vantage point, he could see the “stumbling and
fumbling” of the federal government’s handling of the war effort.230

In the early 1950s, Creel, abashed by the way the Democratic
Party abandoned him, offered his consultation services to then Republican
presidential hopeful Dwight D. Eisenhower. Creel received a lukewarm
welcome from the Grand Old Party. Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy
considered adding him as an adviser to their respective staffs. Such offers
failed to reach fruition, for Creel died in 1953 at the age of 76, having
never again approached the pinnacle of power he had enjoyed for nearly
two years as America’s propaganda czar during World War I.231

The CPI Legacy

Despite the ignominious termination of the CPI, the organization
had grown “into a spectacular propaganda mechanism…setting countless
precedents for government manipulation and public opinion.”232 In its
brief, two-year history, the CPI solidified public relations as a professional
field. Furthermore, the organization assisted the field’s progression from
the press agentry to the public information stage by exposing the value
of public affairs. Cutlip, Center, and Broom defined press agentry as
“creating newsworthy stories and events to attract media attention and
to gain public notice.”233 These same authors classified public affairs as “a
specialized part of public relations that builds and maintains governmental
and local community relations in order to influence public policy.”234

Before America entered the First World War, public relations
practitioners relied on the theatrical techniques perfected by the publicity stunts of showmen such as P.T. Barnum. With the introduction of the CPI, the “manipulators of the symbols of public opinion” proved they could increase persuasive power exponentially by merging fictitious fluff with “factual” (mis)information. Despite its exaggerations and falsifications, the CPI expedited the field’s transition from “public-be-damned” and “public-be-fooled” policies to a “public-be-informed” philosophy. This approach provided the theoretical and practical foundations of modern public affairs. Today, nearly every government institution in America from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Internal Revenue Service bases its public opinion strategies on the organizational and conceptual framework of the CPI.

Governments around the world emulated the CPI’s techniques. Ironically, the defeated Germans took great interest in the former American agency. Adolf Hitler commended the CPI’s propaganda efforts in Mein Kampf:

...it became evident what immense results could be obtained by a correct application of propaganda...all our studying had to be done on the enemy side, for the activity on our side was modest...For what we failed to do, the enemy did, with amazing skill and really brilliant calculation. I, myself, learned enormously from American war propaganda.

Hitler would soon incorporate and later enhance the CPI’s strategies to his own propaganda machine, the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment.

Ross claimed the roots of the CPI’s success were embedded in Creel’s simplistic approach, for he viewed the agency’s purpose as a means “to convince a lukewarm population that the nation was engaged in a life-and-death struggle over the forces of evil.” Creel’s pragmatism gave birth to an agency that, according to one historian, “was a true child of the twentieth [century], using modern methods of psychology, mass production and advertising to market its product.” Creel would have probably agreed, since he himself proclaimed that
There was no part of the great war machinery we did not touch, no medium of appeal that we did not employ. The printed word, the spoken word, the motion picture, the telegraph, the cable, the wireless, the poster, the sign-board—all these were used in our campaign to make our own people and all other peoples understand the causes that compelled America to take arms.243

Conclusion

According to Lasswell, the First World War promoted propaganda to “one of three chief implements of operation against a belligerent enemy.”244 Finch claimed that the war was the first modern conflict “between masses, and the propagandists adapted to match this new situation.”245 The “masses” were not merely people but media as well. Never before did nations have so many communication devices at their disposal, and the United States government used them to their full potential. From the printed word to the motion picture, America achieved total propaganda, a technological and social feat that occurs when media work together to induce a complete change in public opinion.246 American propaganda exposed the myth that personality traits such as self-esteem, gullibility, and intelligence determine an individual’s susceptibility to persuasion.247 In a matter of months, the mood of American people, regardless of their age, race, sex, or status, transcended from peaceful apathy to ruthless passion. The statistics speak for themselves: 24 million men registered for the draft, of whom 6.4 million were pressed into service. Death’s final toll came to 126,000, or approximately 234 American soldiers, sailors, and airmen slain each day for 18 months.248 Even if Wilson had kept us out of the war, propaganda would have instilled the war in us.
Endnotes


8 New York Times, 9 September 1914, quoted in Ross, Propaganda for War, 2.


18 Ibid., 241-242.


20 Ibid., 4.


23 Lasswell as quoted in Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” 369.


The article’s author concluded the eye-witness account with “There is every reason to believe this story true in every detail.” “Saw Mother Mutilated,” *New York Times*, 29 August 1914, 3.


Ross, *Propaganda for War*, 17.

Ibid., 19.


Excerpt from newspaper article as quoted in Ponsonby, *Falsehood*, 146.

“The Germans were not so effective at simplifying the issues of the war into right against wrong, and failed to establish any coordinated machine for propaganda. They were also put at a particular disadvantage when, on 15 August 1914, the Allies cut the transatlantic cable, thus cutting off Germany’s main line of communication to America.” Haste, *Keep the Home Fires Burning*, 39.

Between patrols, many German U-boats sought refuge in ports along America’s eastern seaboard. Ironically, the federal government allowed the Kaiser’s crews to refit and refuel their boats under the protection of American neutrality (not to mention the U.S. Navy). The German U-boat captains would show their “gratitude” by sinking merchant vessels sailing to and from the United States. *The Moving Picture Boys in the Great War*. David Shepard, 1975; Videocassette, Republic Pictures Home Video, 1986.

This tragedy could have been avoided if the Allied Powers ceased loading munitions onto civilian vessels, particularly passenger liners and hospital ships. Casualties could have been kept to a minimum if travelers heeded warnings from German High Command, one of which was printed in the *New York Times* on the eve of the attack. Ross, *Propaganda for War*, 64-67.

German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman to Ambassador Count Johann von Bernstorff, “Zimmerman Telegram,” January 1917; Available from [http://www.etsu.edu/cas/history/resources/Private/Faculty/Fac_From1877ChapterDoc/ChapterImages/Ch21Zimmermantelegram.jpg](http://www.etsu.edu/cas/history/resources/Private/Faculty/Fac_From1877ChapterDoc/ChapterImages/Ch21Zimmermantelegram.jpg); Internet; accessed 29 March 2004.


Excerpt of letter from Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels to President Woodrow Wilson, as quoted in “Creel to Direct Nation’s Publicity,” *New York Times*, 15 April 1917, 1.

55 Excerpt of letter from George Creel to Josephus Daniels, as quoted in Ross, Propaganda for War, 218.


57 Ibid., 28.

58 Ross, Propaganda for War, 220.


60 Ross, Propaganda for War, 225.


62 Blakey, Historians on the Homefront; Ross, Propaganda for War.

63 Delwiche, Of Fraud and Force, 4.


65 Ross, Propaganda for War.

66 Reader’s Digest. Ross, Propaganda for War.

67 Ross, Propaganda for War, 230.


73 Time-Life Books

74 Ross, Propaganda for War, 267.

75 Harold Lasswell, Public Opinion in War and Peace: How Americans Make up Their Minds (Menesha: George Banta Publishing Company,
1943), 7.
76 Delwiche, *Of Fraud and Force*; Mock and Larson, *Words that Won.*
77 Creel, *How we Advertised*, 72.
78 Ross, *Propaganda for War*.
80 Apparently the press desired to reserve those sensational tasks to their respective staff. Ibid., 2.
84 Creel, *How we Advertised*, 208.
85 Ibid.
89 Earl Sperry and Willis West, *German Plots and Intrigues: In the United States During the Period of Neutrality, Red, White, and Blue Series, no. 10* (Washington D.C.: Committee on Public Information, 1918), 17.
91 Ross, *Propaganda for War*, 239.
96 Axelrod, *Complete Idiot's Guide*
The government also prosecuted nearly 2,200 individuals who spoke against the war, of who 1,055 received convictions. The most prominent prisoner within this group of pacifists was Eugene Debs, U.S. Presidential candidate for the Socialist Party. Ross, Propaganda for War, 320.


From Section 3 of the Espionage Act of 1917: “Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall wilfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever when the United States is at war, shall wilfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall wilfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.” Espionage Act. From “Primary Documents: U.S. Espionage Act, 15 June 1917.” Available from http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/espionageact.htm, 2002; Internet. Accessed 5 May 2007.

Mead, The Doughboys, 367

Ibid, 368


Mead, The Doughboys, 365


Creel, How We Advertised, 100.


Ibid, 104-108


Mertz, First Session of the War Congress, 21-22

Ibid., 20.


Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 19 & 32.

Ibid., 10-15.


Ibid., 36.
124 Ibid., 36.
125 Blakey, *Historians on the Homefront*, 73.
127 Ibid; Vaughn, *Holding Fast; Creel, How We Advertised*, 112.
129 Blakey, *Historians on the Homefront*.
130 Ross, *Propaganda for War*, 238.
132 Ibid., 4.
133 Ibid., 23.
136 Altschul and the staff of *Vorwärts* most likely never served in the military, hence the confusion between brutality and discipline Ibid., 13.
139 Ibid., 9.
140 Creel, *How We Advertised*, 104.
142 Ibid., 12-13.


Ibid, 9.


Notice that, unlike German Militarism and Its Critics, neither the German documents nor the eyewitness accounts stemmed from the country’s Socialist papers.


Lane and Baker, *Nation in Arms*, 10.

Despite the inclusion of British and French literature, *The Battle Line of Democracy* preserves its “American” innateness.


*How the War Came to America, Red, White, and Blue Series* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Public Information, 1918), 8-9.


Creel, *How we Advertised*, 16.


Ibid., 133.

Committee on Public Information, Bureau of Cartoons, *Bulletin No. 16*. 

162 Creel, How we Advertised, 134.

163 Creel, How we Advertised, 159; Mock and Larson, Words that Won.


165 Ross, Propaganda for War.

166 It came as a shock that the CPI would endorse a poster featuring African-Americans killing Caucasians, especially during the tumultuous period between the Civil War and the Civil Rights movement. Author’s Note. 7 May 2007.

167 Vaughn, Holding Fast.


171 14 years earlier, the U.S. Signal Corps, boasting neither cameras nor cameramen, borrowed these novelties from the Agriculture Department to film the Wright Brothers first flight. Ward, The Motion Picture Picture, 3.

172 Creel, How We Advertised, 119-120; Vaughn, Holding Fast, 204-205

173 The Moving Picture Boys in the Great War, David Shepard, 1975; Videocassette (Republic Pictures Home Video, 1986); Vaughn, Holding Fast, 207-208


175 Ibid., 7.

176 Creel, How We Advertised, 117.

177 Research implies that these films were the prototypes to “edutainment”
Motion picture cameras did not arrive to the Western Front en masse until shortly after the American Expeditionary Force did the same. *Moving Picture Boys*.


Those same crowds would have drawn and quartered the actor if he led that rally cry 23 years later. Fortunately for him, Hayakawa—who was earning $5,000 a week during the First World War—moved to France in 1937. He joined the French Underground resistance movement during World War II, and resurfaced as an A-list actor throughout the 1950s. His most famous (and ironic) role was that of Colonel Saito in *The Bridge on the River Kwai* (1957). *The Moving Picture Boys*, 1975; Sessue Hayakawa, Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sessue_Hayakawa; Internet. Accessed 5 May 2007.
Ross, Propaganda for War.

Ibid., 265.

Chaplin’s first and only “war” film provided a long overdue, light-hearted outlook on the war. Released a month before the armistice, Shoulder Arms showed audiences that they could find humor in an otherwise morbid event because World War I was as good as won. Ibid., 265; Shoulder Arms, Charlie Chaplin, 1918; Video Cassette, 2001.

Winter and Baggett, The Great War.

Perloff, Dynamics of Persuasion, 130.

Pratkanis and Aronson, Age of Propaganda; Ross, Propaganda for War. Reader’s Digest.

Creel, How We Advertised, 84.-85.

Ibid., 87-93.

A 1917 article in the German newspaper, Frankfurter Zeitung, ridiculed this “revolutionary” claim since “America has done so little up to the present that four minutes will be ample time.” “Ridicules Campaign Here,” New York Times, 25 November 1917, p. 5; Ross, Propaganda for War, 244.

Creel, How We Advertised, 94.


Ross, Propaganda for War, 245.

“Match Wilson’s ’50,”” Washington Post, 2 May 1918, 1

Creel, How We Advertised, 87-88

Mead, The Doughboys, 376.

Ibid., 376.

Vaughn, Holding Fast, 120.

Ross, Propaganda for War, 247.

Committee on Public Information, Four Minute Men Bulletin, No.
17 (8 October, 1917); “Patriotism on Records,” *New York Times*, 13 February 1918, 14.

211 Creel, *How We Advertised*, 89.

212 Committee on Public Information, *Four Minute Men Bulletin, No. 17* (8 October, 1917)


216 Woodrow Wilson, quoted in “President Thanks the Four Minute Men,” *New York Times*, 19 November 1917, 4.


222 Creel, *How We Advertised*, 401; Ross, *Propaganda for War*.

223 Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*. 


Vaughn, *Holding Fast*.

Creel, *Rebel at Large*, 360.

Ibid., 360.

Ibid., 314.

Ibid., 315.


Ibid., 17.


Ibid., 122.


Center, Cutlip, and Broom, *Effective Public Relations*, 122-123; Seitel, *Practice of Public Relations*, 31-32


Pratkanis and Aronson, *Age of Propaganda*.


Creel, *How We Advertised*, 5.

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Let the Flappers Flap!
Press Coverage of Women’s Fashions 1920-1929

Erin Robinson

In the 1920s, a type of woman known as the flapper emerged. She was unlike anything anyone had ever seen. This paper follows society’s reactions to flappers from 1920-1929. The decade is separated into three sections (1920-22, 1923-25, 1926-29). Each section focuses on three aspects – people opposed to them, people who defended them, and people who made predictions about them (if they were on their way out or if they were going to stay). This paper explores how close or far away flappers were from being accepted. As the years went by, opposition to them went from being very harsh to mild. Although flappers were never completely accepted, their defenders helped them emerge as a prominent symbol of the Roaring Twenties.

In the United States in 1920, the fashions and activity of flappers were well underway. Though many accused them of destroying “established custom” and being immoral, many young women dove headfirst into the flapper lifestyle by smoking cigarettes, dancing the Charleston, wearing long beads, driving cars, drinking bootleg liquor at speakeasies, (bars that illegally sold alcohol) dancing to jazz music, and being sexually active.1 A publication of the time, The Decatur Review, defined a flapper as a “young lady who [thought] she knew lots more than she did, [and] flapped her wings before she knew how to fly.”2 Press coverage of these vibrant young women showed that not everyone appreciated this new lifestyle, especially the elderly. They were not used to it because it drastically differed from what they were accustomed. The fashions greatly differed and were more daring than anything anyone had ever seen. When women started wearing shorter skirts and dresses and rolling down their stockings to expose their knees, it was the most flesh that had been exposed in public than at any other time in history.3

Where did flappers come from? Some attribute their arrival to women being granted the right to vote in 1920,4 a first step towards independence and equality for women. Some said it was because women
had “engaged in war work and tast[ed] the sweets of independence and equality with man.”

Flappers became a symbol of the Roaring Twenties, from 1920 to 1929. Through press coverage of them during these years, one can examine opposition to them, defense of them, and predictions made about them. Changes in these perceptions can also be observed to see whether these women were accepted by the public.

In the first few years of the decade, flappers represented the most publicly visible women in the generation that emerged. They, not the women who conformed to the long-skirt-wearing rules of society, were noticed and either criticized or praised by the public. For these daring women, gone were the days of high-necked, long dresses that covered women from head to toe. They considered corsets no longer a necessity.

Even though, by 1920, flappers had been around for a few years, many people did not like that flappers “bust[ed] into more prominence than a red nose and caused more trouble than a Red agitator.” It was unknown if those who opposed flappers at the beginning of the decade would ever accept them.

Some did not know what “flapper” meant. A 1922 letter written to The Decatur Review in Illinois asked, “Kindly tell me what a flapper is . . . Do you wear ‘em, eat ‘em, hug ‘em, or what?” People, especially the elderly, also did not like that young women tried new things and no longer followed the rules set by society, which said that women should ‘be quiet, yielding, and submissive. Author George H. Douglas concluded, “The women of the twenties were often simply seeking to do the kinds of things that their older sisters, or even their mothers had been doing – but with more drama and gusto.” Because young girls adopted their mothers’ practices, the emergence of flappers could be looked at as something that “had been building up to a national explosion . . . and when it finally arrived [in 1920], the speakeasy world was ready.” Their actions in the beginning of the decade shocked their elders who were not used to seeing girls be so passionate about the flapper lifestyle.

The speakeasy world may have been ready, but many were not and quickly voiced their opposition. In addition to the smoking, drinking, and the fact that “in flapperland . . . matters like chaperones [were] considered old-fashioned,” flappers’ enthusiasm for jazz dancing was
another reason some people did not welcome them into society. Those who supported traditional styles of dance were horrified that girls would attend tea and dinner dances and remove their corsets so they could better sway their hips, dance closer to their partners, and kick up their heels to the Charleston. In Atlanta, some so opposed jazz dancing that they asked the city council to do away with “all dances where the feet are not used.”

Some blamed their resistance on the perceived bad effects on people’s health: “From the point of view of health, it is poisonous, nerve-racking, shattering, the din and clatter, the tomtom music – no rhythm, no melody – just sex and bedlam.” Speaking of sex, if a young woman visited a man in his room, traditionalists quickly reminded her that not too long ago, a woman who did that would have wrecked her social career. Some women, however, were not worried about any negative effects on their reputations.

Though it was still not acceptable for a woman to visit a man alone in his room, daring women met men at parties for “petting.” Also, the era’s cozy automobiles, parked on a quiet, deserted road, provided mobility and opportunity. “Petting” or “necking,” was part of the social discourse, at least in colleges, where students were daring in print. *College Humour* magazine published this “conversation” between coeds:

1st Flapper: The boy I’m going with now thinks of nothing but necking.

2nd Flapper: What can you do with a fellow like that?

1st Flapper: Neck.

These “petting” parties and other similar gatherings caused concern. In Oneonta, New York, deputy sheriffs aimed to “put an end to parking of [cars] on lonely roads around the city” where residents “have branded the petters as obnoxious pests who must be eliminated” as “a public nuisance.” Just like jazz dancing, “petting” was something that some older couples could not believe that the young people so boldly participated in.

Short skirts and dresses also came under harsh scrutiny in the early 1920s. In Utah, those who opposed of short skirts proposed a bill that would fine or even imprison women wearing skirts more than three inches above their ankles. In Ohio, people thought that the skirts worn by girls over age 14 should reach their insteps. Fashion entrepreneurs had
their own way of trying to stop women from wearing them, which will be discussed further.

People who voiced dismay about flappers also looked for someone or something to blame. Some blamed the sisters and mothers. In a Syracuse newspaper one lady contended: “You can blame the flapper’s mother every time . . . as the mothers flap, so flap the youngsters. Mother sets the pace and her daughter follows. While mother is flapping . . . at an afternoon tea . . . or bridge game daughter goes out flapping in an auto. It’s only natural.”

Writers at times acknowledged flappers’ originality. “The flapper is quite original in her own artistic, flapping way.” The quote continues sarcastically, “After all she is a problem and we must keep on criticising her.” The same writer noted their usefulness for “delicious copy and splendid models for magazine covers.”

Stating that flappers could be on magazine covers but not exist in everyday life shows the double standard women had to deal with. It must have been frustrating and confusing for women to see flapper fashions displayed so prominently on magazine covers and not feel they were allowed to try it themselves. Everyday women being hindered from wearing the fashions can be attributed to the women’s flaws. Anyone who did not fit the model perfect figure was expected to “determine what best to keep hidden away from the all-too-watchful eyes of others.”

Carrie Chapman Catt, president of the International Women Suffrage Alliance, speculated that the reason women adopted flapper fashions was because they obeyed the “dictum of fashion.” Unlike the view regarding “gusto” mentioned by George H. Douglas, Catt’s statement implies that women felt they had no choice but to bob their hair and wear short skirts. Angela J. Latham discusses French designer Gabrielle “Coco” Chanel as “one of the most influential forces in women’s fashion” who brought the simple, “boyish” haircuts to the United States. Along with the haircuts, Chanel introduced fringe to the United States. Sara Marshall Cook, in a Washington Post article, discussed its “lavish” use on dresses, hats, and shawls. She enjoyed the “rather lovely” fringe fashions, noting that people slowly got used to them due to their copious appearances on women’s clothing. Alice Langelier, in a Texas newspaper, seems to favor the fringe when discussing a Paris dressmaker and the “chic effect” of
putting horse-hair fringe on his designs: “One of the smart dressmakers has started putting horse-hair fringe on her latest models. The effect is very chic.”

Many young women embraced the flapper lifestyle, including dancing and smoking cigarettes. Such women were equated with men who were “sprinkling” their “wild oats.” One woman who took the flapper lifestyle to the extreme was “Madcap Connie” of New York City. Connie defied rules of propriety by climbing a flagpole on a dare and dressing like a tomboy. She determined not to let anyone “slay her individuality.”

Her flagpole antics made a 1922 Indianapolis newspaper article which highlighted her bold flirtations to the males watching her: “It’s cold up here, boys, don’t you want to come up and keep me warm?”

Open flirting is one example of the degrees of flappers that existed, as described by Ellen Welles Page in a 1922 *Outlook Magazine* article. She explained the semi-flapper, the flapper, and the super flapper. The semi-flapper did nothing more than wear shorter dresses; the flapper generally wore short dresses and cut her hair short; the superflapper did all these things as well as engaged in more scandalous activities such as drinking, wearing makeup or climbing a flagpole like Madcap Connie. At one time, hotels and fashionable restaurants even banned superflapper types. Page’s explanation of the different types of flappers was a way to introduce and explain flappers, perhaps in the hope of making them more acceptable to society.

Page also made a plea to older generations “to overlook our shortcomings, at least for the present, and to appreciate our virtues . . . you must help us. Give us confidence, not distrust. Give us practical aid and advice – not criticism . . . Be patient when we make mistakes . . . Believe in us, that we may learn to believe in ourselves.” Marion Miller, the education secretary and director of the YWCA, in 1922 urged the public not to judge flappers. “The young girl of today needs sympathy and understanding to help her face a very complex world . . . condemnation is the wrong attitude to take toward . . . the ‘flapper.’”

For some people, sympathy and understanding may have been hard to give to women whose bold fashion senses were not limited to every-day wear. As early as 1921, women stopped wearing the traditional bathing costumes that covered most of their bodies and started rolling
their stockings down or wearing one-piece suits. Authorities enforced regulations against the suits, but women still pushed the boundaries to see what they could get away with. Some women rolled their stockings; some exposed all of their legs. In Atlantic City, guards who enforced the bathing suit restrictions had a hard time telling who followed the rules and who did not: “Many of the suits worn by women bathers approached so close to the limit that the beach guards said it was difficult to tell where the suits stopped and the law began.”

A Los Angeles woman literally and figuratively fought back when the police took her to jail for rolling down her stockings at the beach. While being escorted to jail, she allegedly punched a policeman, almost knocking him down. She declared it was not the city’s business whether or not she rolled her stockings and pledged to fight her arrest, even if it went all the way to the Supreme Court. Her boldness was characteristic of flappers who seldom shied away from expressing their beliefs.

Considering the change in and reactions to what women wore to the beach, it is quite a feat that flappers managed to last throughout the decade. Coco Chanel influenced bathing wear – before the 1920s, tanned skin was a sign of someone working in the field. By wearing wide-brimmed hats and using parasols, women avoided exposing their skin to the sun at all costs. But when Chanel visited the French Riviera and returned to the United States with slightly darker skin, off-season tans became “a status symbol, indicating that the individual had the means and the leisure time to travel to warmer climes during the harsh winter months.” Tanning was such a new concept that some flappers spelled their names on their arms with adhesive tape.

Sometimes defense came from unexpected sources. In the summer of 1921, the 72-year-old Atlantic City mayor observed about 500 women on the beach wearing one-piece suits. Not only did he not object, he had someone in mind whom he wanted to see wearing one: “I don’t see anything immoral in it . . . and I don’t understand why the one-piece suit has been prohibited in Atlantic City. Why, I am going to get one for my wife.”

Others defended flappers as symbols of the time. Statements such as, “The flapper is the picturesque figure of the day, whether we understand her or not,” and “I believe the flapper will make the most
interesting type of woman ever known” showed that not everyone disapproved of flappers. In 1921 The Mansfield News even advised women to keep their calves in shape since short skirts were fashionable and showed a picture of a woman on a stationary bicycle trying to do just that. The same article also gave advice on rouging knees and said, “The dimpled charms may be enhanced with powder and even painted beauty spots.”

Some critics predicted flappers’ demise, certain that the lifestyle was only a fad that would not last through the decade. Fashion heads viewed the shorter skirt as something that would soon be on its way out. In the summer of 1922, the head of the women’s department in a New York City dress shop audaciously declared that “the days of the flapper are numbered. The longer skirt, fashion’s decree for up-to-date styles, has sounded her doom.” If a woman wanted a short dress, store owners told her she would have to shorten it herself and would later regret it. They claimed short dresses would end up in attics with pantalettes and hoop skirts. In addition, they predicted the loss of the flapper’s personality: “She is waging . . . a losing battle against the effacement of her jaunty recklessness, the loss of her piquant, convention-defying, self-sufficient personality. All the signs and portents are that the longer skirt will be the victor.”

Battles and victors seem harsh metaphors to use when talking about abolishing flappers, which shows how upset and determined people were to go back to old ways.

Some critics forecast not only the end of certain fashions, but also what would emerge next. “The flapper will take her place in the gallery of time along with the Colonial dame, the bustle girl, the Gibson girl and the vamp. And who shall succeed the flapper? . . . Dame fashion . . . has chosen her successor ‘Lady Bug.’ The 1850 period will be the ‘influence’ for the young girls’ dress . . . a modest frock [will have an] intriguing note of femininity [that] will mark its up-to-dateness.” Early in the decade, opponents stated that flappers had “passed into complete oblivion” and that “the fad for boldness has spent itself.”

Fashion entrepreneurs and dress shop owners’ claims neither stopped women from engaging in controversial activities nor caused them to go back to old traditions, for example, squeezing themselves into corsets. Although longer skirts were deemed the newest fashion, women kept buying flapper fashions. Store owners tried to discourage women
from buying these fashions by placing wax figures in their windows and dressing them in more traditional outfits with tight bodices. Although women’s magazines declared that the country “needed the corset physically, fashionably, and morally,” women would buy material in the newest fashionable colors and “kept right on buying or making loose, simple, comfortable frocks.”

George H. Douglas notes one view of the time - that the “fashion moguls” of New York or Paris did not bring on the flapper era with their short skirts and dresses. Instead, the millions of women who decided that they were tired of wearing uncomfortable corsets and tight bodices and wanted looser clothes for their more active lifestyles were responsible. The fashion moguls did not bring the flapper era in and they did not have much success in trying to drive it out.

A shop in New York City that had trouble selling styles that women did not want and asked one of its experienced salesladies why the styles were not selling and she replied helplessly: “How can I sell these styles? . . . The flappers won’t buy them.”

Critics also predicted that bobbed hair would fade away. In November 1922, the New York Ladies’ Hair Dressers’ association announced that bobbed hair had gone out of style. The following month, a New York newspaper claimed that forecasts that had been made six months previously about bobbed hair disappearing would hold to be true. It stated that, due to high cost and upkeep, the bobbed hair style was “passing, dying the death of fads before it.” As with the clothes, stylists thought if they stated that bobbed hair was unfashionable, maybe flappers would grow their hair out and wear it traditionally.

In line with looser, shorter dresses and bobbed hair going away, people predicted that flappers would reform. Some assumed that they would quit their eccentric ways as soon as they married or had children: “Mothers still take slight comfort in the thought when flappers marry and become mothers they will cease to flap.” Some women did reform after marriage; one notable example was “Madcap Connie.” A year after her flagpole antics, she traveled abroad and returned to the United States as a woman who had “blossomed into” a “conservative society beauty” who was “infinitely older in worldly wisdom, with the poise of a princess . . . At the . . . club dances . . . she wears skirts to her ankles and never laughs.”

By the mid-1920s, not much had changed from the early years of
the decade. Predictions about the flapper era coming to an end did not come true. Women still smoked and drank, attended petting parties, and wore makeup. They still bobbed their hair and refused to wear corsets. Social acceptance still did not happen, however. Stories and features about them continued to run in newspapers, and when one “smoked a cigarette conspicuously on a public street, reporters made a front page story of the incident.”

Opponents of the flapper lifestyle asked what the world was coming to. One article pointed out flappers’ lack of conventional skills, like baking a cake: “All she thinks of is freedom and independence. She won’t even use the word ‘obey’ in the wedding ceremony anymore. Where are our boys to find good, sweet, industrious, patient wives such as their grandfathers had?” The same article printed a response to this particular opposition by a young girl of the time: “Can I bake a cake? No . . . but I can earn enough money to buy a dozen cakes a day . . . As for respecting things . . . I’m not going to respect any old thing, simply because someone tells me to.”

Many schools did not want their female students wearing flapper fashions in the halls of learning. In Pennsylvania the “city of Somerset sommersaulted into a style class war” when the Parent-Teacher association had a meeting where they pushed the school board to enforce a dress code upon female students that would ban “silk stockings, short skirts, bobbed hair, and low-necked, sleeveless dresses.” A group of flappers marched in and interrupted the meeting as they collectively protested, “I can show my shoulders. I can show my knees, I’m a free-born American. And I can show what I please.”

If a girl showed her legs, flapper fashions deemed she simply had to have silk stockings; the conventional cotton ones were just not fit to be worn with short dresses. A California newspaper praised girls at an Oregon high school who would not wear the silk stockings; they formed a cotton stocking organization. The newspaper said that it was a shame that other girls expected to attend school dressed in silk like “show dolls” and that “the dress up habit of school kids has been a worse disgrace than the smoke habit of their mothers.” Advocates of cotton stockings said that foolish dress led to foolish behavior.

By the mid-1920s more seemed to gradually accept flappers as
some older women began to embrace the lifestyle themselves. They saw how much fun younger flappers had and decided they wanted to try it. A young woman named Jane, from Bruce Bliven’s 1925 “Flapper Jane” article, points out the irony of the situation: “The old girls are doing it because youth is. Everybody wants to be young now – though they want all us young people to be something else. Funny, isn’t it?” However, these older flappers; were “a different story” and people said that grownups who “pursued flapperdom” were a “waste . . . of human material.”

Once married, flappers were expected to stop engaging in the lifestyle. Society simply could not have “flapper wives.” A married woman should leave her jazz dancing, smoking, drinking, bobbed-hair-wearing lifestyle at the altar. Later in the decade, there is evidence that some mothers invited the lifestyle upon their offspring and dressed their young daughters in flapper styles.

The double standard during this time dictated that women could wear the new fashions only if they could wear them well. In 1923, *The Atlanta Constitution* ran a half-page feature called “Pannieres for the Plump; The Best Way to Dress,” which gave women “a way to dress to disguise [their] fat.” The article said that many women had the idea that if they wore a lot of fringe, they would cover up their extra weight, and it declared, “sleeveless frocks should be religiously avoided.”

In the middle of the decade efforts by the fashion industry to turn women back to long dresses and corsets did not work. In 1924 manufacturers found that women did not want what store managers put on display in the stores. Women preferred shorter skirts “and they wanted them right away.” By 1925, efforts to steer away from flapper fashions continued to be futile, especially regarding the corset: “The corset is a dead as the dodo’s grandfather; not feeble publicity pipings by the manufacturers, or calling it a “clasp around” will [bring it back].” Unlike dressmakers, stocking manufacturers saw an opportunity to promote their product. Newspapers during this time from all over the United States show plenty of advertisements for silk stockings, including *The Atlanta Constitution*, *The Bridgeport Telegram*, and the *Oakland Tribune Magazine*. An ad in *The Syracuse Herald* promised “pointed heel reinforcements that slenderize the ankle.”

Some maintained their strong defense of flappers; it continued
to come from unexpected sources. As the elderly Atlantic City mayor defended the one-piece bathing suit in 1921, a California Reverend wrote a letter that ran in a 1923 issue of the *Oakland Tribune Magazine*: “I am one of those who stand for the flapper[s]. [They are] a symbol of the time” and “we do wrong to condemn them, to defy them, to suspect them.”

A major change in bathing suits was seen between 1923 and 1924. In the summer of 1923, policewomen were sent to Chicago beaches to arrest women who bathed without stockings. Women continued to fight against the regulations. In 1924, they could finally wear to the beach what they wanted. By this time, just about every woman showed her legs “all without a whiff of scandal.” This lack of scandal is evidence of the gradual acceptance of the flapper lifestyle.

Slowly but surely, flapper characteristics became more than fads that could be brushed aside. No stockings at the beach and shorter skirts symbolized the new, independent women who wanted equality with men: “Women have highly resolved that they are just as good as men and intend to be treated so. They don’t mean to have anymore unwanted children. They don’t intend to be debarred from any profession or occupation which they choose to enter. They clearly mean . . . that in the great game of sexual selection they shall no longer be found to play the role . . . of helpless quarry.” The assertiveness of the flapper caused some to declare her the “hope of the world” and claim that “her defiance and daring are glorious . . . she is the son of Woman Awakened.” Some found flappers a refreshing change to the safe, submissive women in society. However, the feminist tendencies of the flapper also garnered disapproval. A 1924 article talked about Leap Year Dances where “the girls steal the manly prerogatives by paying for the taxis, asking for the dances, leading on the dance floor, and taking the initiative in wooing . . . It’s hard for mere man to be manly this year with the girls stealing his stuff. Flapper feminism is the rage.”

People continued to predict the demise of flappers. In 1925 one writer pointed out that flappers’ practices of powdering their cheeks, painting their lips, and combing their hair in public were quite common and seen daily, but that “such practices . . . must not be regarded as a new feature of the twentieth century . . . [they] really are ‘old stuff’ in which no really up-to-date person should be so bromidical as to indulge.” Instead of simply stating that flappers were just a fad that would soon go away,
people tried to associate the characteristics with something out of date that no fashionable woman would do.

Predictions also went the other way. In 1925, Ernie Young, a theatrical producer in Chicago, described what would be the typical girl in 1926. He said she would be a flapper and that her hair and skirts would be shorter. People also made claims regarding the bobbed hairstyle. In 1922 the New York Ladies’ Hair Dressers’ association had said that bobbed hair was on its way out. But by 1924, people said that women would not be growing their hair out anytime soon: “Let the men and all other opposed to bobbed hair say what they will, bobbed hair is here to stay. That is that and if you care to dispute it go to any flapper who has tasted the freedom of bobbed hair. You will soon know that women certainly ARE going to keep their hair bobbed no matter what is said. It wasn’t so long ago that the . . . cry went up that bobbed hair was doomed.” In just a few short years, adamant assertions that bobbed hair would disappear had been completely reversed.

The mid-1920s brought acceptance and opposition to flappers, just as in the beginning of the decade. It also brought predictions about their futures. There were some slight changes, however. People opposed young as well as old flappers. Some did not mind them as long as they reformed when they got married or had children. People not taking offense to flappers was a sign of their gradual acceptance by some. Another sign was that people made predictions about them not going anywhere, in addition to the predictions that had been that they would soon fade out.

In the last few years of the decade, critics did not succeed in making flappers disappear. People continued to defiantly state that flappers would not be around much longer, and Paris and New York City style heads saturated fashion magazines and “the smartest shops” with styles resembling those of the late 19th century. Fashion writers joined them, saying that skirts had gotten entirely too short and that women should lower their hemlines.

Instead of predicting that flappers would go away, people said that they had gone away and out of style. Critics claimed that flappers had been replaced by more poised, soft-spoken women who wore tasteful outfits. One 1928 article, titled “Gone is the Flapper”, said they were no longer found in any part of the United States: “The flapper has sung her
swan song in the North, South, East, and West . . . gone completely out of style.” As in the previous years of the decade, people tried to equate short skirts and bobbed hair with something out of style in hopes of more quickly getting rid of them.

Additional opposition to shorter skirts and dresses continued to come from the general public, though it seemed slightly relaxed compared to previous years, as seen in the following excerpt from a 1928 newspaper: “Clothing styles ‘move in tides.’ We understand it now – the girls have been preparing for high water . . . women are now buying dresses on the installment plan. We have seen some of them wearing the first installment.”

A noticeable playful tone is seen in this comparison of clothing styles and tides. A haughty, “I-told-you-so,” tone is evident in the following quote regarding women who bobbed their hair and then, not liking it, decided to grow it out: “Undoubtedly these ladies have discovered that bobbing of the hair has not enhanced their appearance . . . let the ladies find that they do not look as good bobbed as they thought they would, and many of them will return to the old way.”

The height of the flapper hairdo seemed to be over to those who prided themselves on their claims in past years of its passing. A 1929 Pennsylvania newspaper poked fun, saying they had bobbed hair and bobbed brains.

People had had time to get used to flappers so this may be why they did not react as harshly as they had previously and instead brought humor to their criticisms.

Opposition to flappers, even if light-hearted, often elicited a response from those who defended them. In 1926 they got support from another unlikely source. During a Mother’s Day Address delivered at the Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, D.C., James J. Davis, the Secretary of Labor at the time, said that, contrary to some beliefs, the flapper was not more frivolous than “girls of the same age of previous periods” and predicted that she would “give a good account of herself when the time came to take her place among the matrons.”

Hollywood caught on to the changing lifestyles as well. Actress Louise Brooks was famous for her bobbed hair that thousands of women emulated. When “actress flappers” were mentioned, the public often thought of Clara Bow, who starred in such films as Wings in 1927 and Ladies of the Mob in 1928. Filmmakers often cast her in low-status roles such as a waitress or a salesgirl; however, in each story her “character would
rise above her lowly station in life and obtain her goal.”

Other writers, like Elizabeth M. Gilmer, known as “Dorothy Dix” during the time, defended flappers by downplaying all the hysteria they caused. Gilmer said that “bad girls were ‘as old as sin itself’” so nothing about them shocked her. She said that short skirts were so commonplace that “no one notices a woman’s legs anymore than they do her arms.”

It took almost a decade for some people to get used to flappers. A 1927 feature in a North Dakota newspaper urged readers to “realize that [the flapper] is, at bottom, a healthy, fine-souled American girl – and you will presently discover that instead of being a national problem she is one of the nation’s greatest assets.”

It seems that flappers got their due credit as symbols of the Roaring Twenties. Mentions of the decade often bring to mind these forward-thinking women who broke away from the suppressing society of the early 1900s.

In 1929 Oakland Tribune Magazine ran a full-page feature titled, “What Makes the Flapper Go Round?”, an analysis and explanation of flappers. The article finished on an encouraging note: “If she had been made to order by physicians of the universe, the flapper could not be more perfect for the role she has to play as the mother of America’s next generation . . . if there ever was a time when a nation needed a backbone of mothers with flapper psychology, this year . . . is IT!”

This attitude was quite a change from when people wanted women to stop being flappers before they had children.

Lighthearted opposition brought lighthearted defense. The following poem ran in a Richmond newspaper in 1928, written by someone who obviously liked women in short skirts: “So it’s knees, knees, knees! / Fat, thin, thick, ugly, funny looking knees / Can’t the skirts of mothers day be / Brought again to us? Well maybe - / But I’d rather that they couldn’t, if you please.”

Finally, women showing their knees was not such a bad thing, a goal they had been trying to reach for quite a few years.

Advocates of short skirts defended their stance in a more practical way. They emphasized their support through health reasons: “It is naturally the most practical, sensible style to wear” because “it is healthier” and “with a short skirt one isn’t liable to collect the dust and germs of the street and so subject oneself to the risk of disease.” Unlike the opposers of jazz dancing who had said it was unhealthy, this reason for wearing short skirts
actually made sense.

Fashion heads persisted in their efforts to drive flappers away by continuing to include long skirts and dresses in their fashion lines. But women enjoyed too much the freedom they felt with flapper fashions, a feeling that they “would not readily relinquish, despite the Paris mandate [that short skirts are out].” They further demonstrated their refusal to give up this freedom when, in 1929 a group of them paraded up and down Park and Fifth Avenues in New York City in dresses that showed their knees.

By the end of 1929, flappers proved that they had more staying power than some people thought. Despite continuous predictions that they would not last, they emerged as one of the most prominent symbols of the Roaring Twenties. They may have even lasted through the next decade if not for the 1929 stock market crash and Great Depression of the 1930s, which put a halt to the extravagant lifestyle of flappers. These independent women drastically differed from the subservient, docile women of the 19th century in how they expressed themselves through daring fashions. Because of the radical change in attitudes, lifestyles, and dress, not everyone completely accepted them, neither at the beginning of the decade nor at the end. Luckily, flappers were not completely shunned as many people supported and defended them, which most definitely contributed to their existence and longevity. Their gradual acceptance is illustrated when tracing opposition to them and seeing it go from very intense to mild. Defense of the flappers, in response to the opposition, also went from being quite strong in the beginning of the decade to more moderate at the end.
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7 “What is a Flapper?” 24.
10 “When the Flapper Sows Her Wild Oats,” The Indianapolis Star, 29 January 1922, 10.
13 “What is Jazz Doing to Our Boys and Girls?” 2.
14 Mordden, 52.
17 Fay Stevenson, “Mother Not to Blame for Flapper’s Flapping,” The Syracuse Herald, 9 February 1922, 12.
18 Ibid.
19 Latham, 34.
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22 “Ribbons and Fringes Blossom Forth,” The Washington Post, 8 May
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26 Ibid.


28 Douglas, 8.

29 Page, 607.


32 “Bather Goes to Jail. Keeps Her Knees Bare,” *New York Times*, 4 September 1921.

33 Laubner, 69.


37 “Exit the Flapper Via Longer Skirts,” E2.


40 Douglas, 7.

41 Hopkins, 32.


44 Stevenson, “Mother Not to Blame for Flapper’s Flapping,” 12.

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Invisible Forces in Action:  
Early Coverage of the Korean War by People’s Daily  
(June - November 1950)  
Qing Tian

China’s entry into the Korean War took the United States by surprise and had a profound impact on the outcome of the war. The gradual decisions made by Chinese leaders to intervene during the early stage of the war were reflected in the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party. This study analyzes the coverage of the Korean War from June to November of 1950. Based on the timing of the war and China’s intervention, the People’s Daily’s early coverage is divided into three phases: the interpretation of the start of the war, the public opinion preparation for the military intervention, and the justification for China’s entry into war. During this process, the Chinese government effectively utilized the People’s Daily to evoke patriotic feelings, mobilize the public and acquire legitimacy for its decisions.

For a long time, the Korean War has been described as the "forgotten war" in Western scholarship. However, the war has been remembered in many different ways. Of a number of significant aspects of the Korean War, none is more important than the Chinese intervention. China’s entry into the war immediately altered the balance of power on the Korean battlefield, and turned the United States and United Nations (UN) operation from a success at hand into a major disaster. The gradual and step-by-step decisions made by Chinese leaders to intervene during the early stage of the war have received new and particularly detailed attention, especially with the declassification of Soviet and Chinese archives in recent years.¹

During this complicated decision-making process, mass media played an important role. In Communist China, media have long been regarded as a crucial part of the party–state machine, functioning as a tool of propaganda, organization, mobilization and control.² This paper focuses on the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) coverage of the Korean War from June to November 1950, to demonstrate how mass media in China were used as an instrument of ideological control, and how the leaders, especially Mao Zedong, manipulated the media to bolster the party’s
position and gain ideological legitimacy for China’s entry into the war.
The choice of the People’s Daily as a primary source is based on its
central role in China’s propaganda system. The People’s Daily has been
known as China’s most influential newspaper since its establishment on
June 15, 1948. It is the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the top decision-making body in
China. The paper is directly controlled by the Propaganda Department
of the Central Committee. The People’s Daily uses its authority to
shape Chinese public opinion. Other mass media in China, no matter
newspaper, radio or television, often have to reprint or re-broadcast the
important news and commentaries from the People’s Daily. 3

Editorials and commentaries of the People’s Daily are especially
essential to understanding China’s propaganda state. They have always
been interpreted as voicing the official viewpoints of CCP and the Chinese
government. All editorials and commentaries on the People’s Daily are
reviewed by the chief editor of the paper before publication. In many
cases, they also undergo strict censorship from the central leaders (usually a
politburo member). 4 Many Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong, have
even drafted editorials and commentaries for the People’s Daily in person.

Based on the timing of the war and China’s intervention, People’s
Daily’s early coverage of the Korean War can be divided into three phases:
the interpretation of the start of the war, the public opinion preparation
for the military intervention, and the justification for the entry into war.

The Outbreak of the War

At the middle of June 1950, the People’s Daily had already “predicted”
the outbreak of the war. Great importance was attached to the eagerness
and resolution of North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
DPRK) to bring the whole of Korea into unity. On June 19, the People’s
Daily reported that Syngman Rhee, the president of South Korea (the
Republic of Korea, ROK), intended to start a civil war under the assistance
of the United States to “turn the whole Korea into a U.S. military base
and colony.” 5 South Korea and America reportedly had taken a series of
military actions to prepare for a war. According to the People’s Daily, the
U.S. government allegedly had provided over $110 million to South Korea
to prepare for the war in the name of “financial assistance.” 6 The visit of
John Foster Dulles, the U.S. secretary of state, at South Korea from June 17 to 20 was described as “the warmonger’s conspiracy.”

At dawn on June 25, 1950, the army of North Korea unexpectedly attacked the positions of the South over the 38th Parallel, the line then serving as the border between the two states. At 11 a.m. North Korea announced a formal declaration of war and what is now known as the Korean War officially began. In the announcement, North Korea claimed South Korean forces attacked the North in the Haeju area and its declaration of war was in response to this attack.

The *People’s Daily* responded to this event immediately but cautiously. On the second day, it only carried a brief story on the front page, which duplicated the DPRK announcement that the “South Korean army unexpectedly attacked the North over the 38th Parallel.” Ever since, the Chinese public has been fooled by Chinese media about the cause of the Korean War for more than forty years.

However, solid evidence from various sources suggested that Chairman Mao Zedong knew as early as the end of 1949 that North Korea intended to attack the South. Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing had actively exchanged views and proposals in the year preceding the war. During Mao’s visit to Moscow in 1949, Stalin asked him “what he thought about the essence behind such an action. … Mao answered with approval and also expressed the opinion that the United States wouldn’t interfere in an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves.” In other words, Mao expected a quick North Korean victory at that time.

Another proof that China knew of North Korea’s attack strategy is that in January 1950, at the request of North Korean President Kim Il Song, China arranged the return of 14,000 Korean soldiers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) back to North Korea with their weapons. These troops were merged into the Korean People’s Army (KPA) units and deployed at the 38th Parallel for the coming offensive.

The *People’s Daily*’s instant response to the war also indicated that Mao and other leaders in Beijing were not surprised by the North Korean invasion. On June 27, the paper devoted most of its front page to the war, including several dispatches from Pyongyang, some background information about the start of the war, and an editorial titled “North
Korean people fight to repel invader.” The editorial reiterated that the
campaign was initiated by South Korea with the assistance of the United
States. South Korean President Syngman Rhee was compared to Chinese
Nationalist President Chiang Kai-Shek, but was dismissed as less
sophisticated than Chiang Kai-Shek both on military and political issues.
The editorial ended with the assurance of the certain victory of the Korean
people’s struggle for independence, freedom and unity.

However, the U.N. Security Council’s resolution of the previous
day, calling upon North Korea to withdraw to the north the 38th Parallel,
was not mentioned in the People’s Daily. Not until June 28 did the People’s
Daily cite the Soviet Union’s official Tass News Agency, which indicated
the United Nation’s condemnation of North Korea for attacking the
South was illegitimate. As noted by Allen, in this and subsequent People’s
Daily reporting of the United Nation’s decisions, a time lag of 48 hours
or even longer always existed, suggesting China’s “reliance upon Russian
interpretation of these matters.”

In contrast with the delayed treatment of the U.N. resolution, the
People’s Daily’s reaction to U.S. President Harry Truman’s order on June
27 to render full sea and air force support to South Korea, especially the
order to place the U.S. Seventh Fleet at the Taiwan Strait was immediate
and intensive. It published Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s
denunciation of the move as “an armed invasion into the territory of China
in total violation of the United Nations Charter.” Along with Zhou’s
statement, an editorial by the People’s Daily and a reprint of the editorial
from Soviet’s most authoritative newspaper, Pravda (The Truth), were also
published on the front page of the People’s Daily.

From June 30 to July 5, stories about Korea slipped into the back
pages of the People’s Daily, except for a summarized statement from
Pyongyang’s foreign minister. News of the war appeared only on the
international news page. There, stories concentrated on how the North
Korean army advanced on the battlefield, and how various countries and
organizations condemned U.S. “atrocities”.

The People’s Daily’s swift reaction to the U.S. protection of Taiwan, as
contrasted with its diffident treatment of the Korean War, indicated that
at the beginning of the war, China’s main concern was still the physical
security of its territory, especially the return of Taiwan, rather than direct
involvement in the Korean War.

Preparation of Public Opinion for Intervention

With the balance of power on the battlefront shifting gradually in favor of South Korea and the United States, China’s leaders became more worried about the impact of the U.S. intervention. On July 6, a front-page editorial in the People’s Daily openly warned that the presence of U.S. military forces in Korea meant that the Korean people’s victory, although certain, “could be a bit slower” and that “the Korean people had to prepare for a prolonged and more arduous warfare.” 18

The deep-rooted worries that Pyongyang could lose the initiative in the war precipitated China’s military deployment to cope with the Korean conflict. On July 7, a CCP conference decided to establish the Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA), which “proved to be a pivotal step toward China’s entry into the war.”19

In mid-July, the CCP leadership initiated the “Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea,” aiming to “fit the entire country to a war orbit,”20 although no direct commitment to relieve the North Korean difficulties was implied in the propaganda. This movement began in July and continued in various forms into August.

In accordance with the movement, a semi-official organization, “The Chinese People’s Committee of the Movement to Fight against U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and Korea,” was established on July 10. The main task of the committee was to coordinate and promote a nationwide anti-American imperialism propaganda movement. On July 14, the committee announced that the week from July 17 to 23 would be a “Special Week for the Movement of Protesting the U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and Korea.” 21

The purpose of this particular movement, according to the announcement of the committee, was to “educate the people all over the country to understand thoroughly the crimes that U.S. imperialists had committed in their aggression towards Asian countries and their destruction of the world peace, and that U.S. imperialists were totally defeatable.” 22

The People’s Daily actively participated in conditioning the public by uncovering the “real face” of the United States and by updated reporting of the progress of the movement in China. “Beating American arrogance” became its central propaganda theme in this period. People’s Daily
emphasized that the United States had long engaged in both political and economic aggression against China; that the United States had been hostile to the Chinese revolution; that the United States, as a declining capitalist country, was in reality not as powerful as it seemed to be; and that a confrontation between China and the United States was inevitable. On July 26, for example, the *People’s Daily* answered the inquiry of why U.S. forces invaded Korea as follows: “… to change the whole Korea into U.S. colony and to use it as a passageway of its aggression on the borders of China and the Soviet Union.”

Despite generalized exhortations to render “wholehearted support” to Pyongyang’s cause, the *People’s Daily* seldom spelled out the implications of such support. Most of the time the support seemed to be only moral since nowhere did the paper hint at the necessity for Chinese military assistance to North Korea, although the military deployment was under way secretly.

Compared with its peak in the July campaign, the *People’s Daily*’s coverage of the Korean War fell dramatically in August, except for the celebrations of the fifth anniversary of North Korea’s “liberation.” Particularly striking was its failure to exploit U.S. General Douglas MacArthur’s visit to Taiwan on July 31 to sharpen the image of “the American imperialist.” The news of the trip was suppressed for four days before the *People’s Daily* finally broke its silence on the matter on August 5 with an editorial. Under the headline “Warn MacArthur,” the editorial quoted part of the MacArthur-Chiang communiqué as evidence of an “American military invasion of Taiwan.” It also compared the inevitable “failure” of American’s policy in Taiwan with Japan’s ultimate failure of invading China.

Overall, the “resist American Invasion of Taiwan and Korea” campaign was apparently not intended to directly mobilize the populace for immediate military intervention in the war, but to prepare the climate of opinion for possible involvement at a later time and to arouse hatred for the United States. The *People’s Daily*’s propaganda between July and mid-August suggested that military intervention, “particularly war with the United States, would have been undertaken with considerable reluctance on the part of both the regime and the people.”

In late August, an incident provided ample gist for China’s
propaganda. On August 27, the government first charged that American planes had flown over China’s border. According to the People’s Daily, U.S. aircraft “strayed across the Yalu River, machine-gunned the rail terminal and adjoining facilities” at the airfield of Talitzu and Antung. The incidents reportedly killed three persons and wounded twenty-one, as well as caused minor damage to rolling stock. Within a few days, U.S. authorities conceded the possibility of a “mistake” and offered compensation. This point was not reflected in the People’s Daily. Moreover, on August 29, the paper charged a second border violation by U.S. pilots who allegedly fired on Chinese fishing boats in the Yalu River, killing four and wounding seven.

The People’s Daily’s treatment of the alleged air intrusions was intensive. On August 28, Minister Zhou’s condemnation and protest against the attacks appeared on the front page of the People’s Daily, accompanied by an editorial labeling this as “47,500 million people’s protest.” In the following days, a wave of mass rallies throughout the country sparked an unprecedented outburst of anti-American propaganda in which a war with the United States received repeated, explicit emphasis. The masses of the Chinese people were reportedly determined to fight for peace and ready to take up arms at any time against whoever dared to violate the territorial integrity of China. For example, People’s Liberation Army units in Beijing reported “furious anger at the news of attacks in the Northeast by U.S. planes.” An antiaircraft gunner echoed an infantryman’s statement, “We must teach them a lesson. … We are ready for action. We are ready to shoot down any planes that dare intrude into our territory.” A worker of Shijingshan Steel and Iron works said, “If the American imperialists dare start a war of aggression against us, I shall be the first to enlist.” Statements like the following were typical of the campaign: “American imperialists try to scare us with war. Honestly speaking we can never be scared by such a threat. … We, with 450 million people, are ready to deal a deadly blow to anyone who should dare to invade our territory.”

The People’s Daily cited the Washington Star on August 31, indicating that the attack was “premeditated by U.S. authority.” During this period, the People’s Daily also publicized U.S. Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews and General MacArthur’s statements on August 25 as “proof”
of American aggressive intent, dismissing the withdrawal of the two statements as “a cover-up.”

Judging from both its content and extent, this late-August propaganda could be regarded as “the first clear mobilization of Chinese public opinion for possible military action.” The Chinese people now had good reason to anticipate an immediate war with the United States. But prior to the U.N. Inchon landing on September 15, the CCP did not commit itself publicly to military action in Korea but couched this “voluntary mobilization” in purely defensive terms.

The People’s Daily then muted the war theme again after September 8. It transferred its attention from the U.S. threats to domestic issues. Similar to the period of early and mid-August before the alleged accidents, stories about the Korean War only occasionally appeared on the front page of the paper. It was observed that Beijing may be “awaiting developments on the battle front and in the U.N. General Assembly before moving into the next phase of strategy.”

The crucial U.N. landing at Inchon on September 15 was not mentioned by People’s Daily until September 19, again by citing Soviet Union’s official Tass News Agency, which further suggested Beijing’s dependence on Moscow’s interpretation of such significant events. An editorial in the People’s Daily the same day dismissed the Inchon landing as a sheer “gamble” and said that the “American imperialists’ stakes were destined to lose” because of the “low fighting spirit” and “distant reinforcement.”

Although the Inchon landing did not seem to affect China’s aloof posture, its aftermath did spur the government to increase its public commitment to Pyongyang both abroad, so as to deter U.N. troops from crossing the 38th Parallel, and at home, so as to prepare the public for action in case the deterrence failed.

On September 22, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman acknowledged MacArthur’s charge that China gave “substantial if not decisive military assistance” to North Korea by the return of ethnic Korean troops before the outbreak of the war. In justifying the troop transfer, the People’s Daily editorial titled “Support the patriotism of Korean people” declared that “the Chinese People neither accept nor fear this accusation,” adding that “it was the Korean people’s right and responsibility to go back
to protect and build their own country. No other country should interfere in it.”

Commenting on another alleged U.S. air attack over Antung in China on September 22, the People’s Daily concluded that “the American imperialists are attempting to extend their aggression against China.” The paper also reported Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s protest to U.N. on the alleged air intrusion, citing his warning that if the majority of states attending the United Nations General Assembly continue to play deaf and dumb to the aggression, they would not “escape the share in the responsibility for lighting up the war in the East.”

In both statements, there was no call for immediate military intervention, but they did “go beyond the earlier alerts that had discussed fighting the U.S. exclusively for the defense of Chinese territory.”

It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman’s original statement on September 22 apparently showed more commitment to assisting North Korea:

We clearly reaffirm that we will always stand on the side of the Korean people - just as the Korean people have stood on the side of the Chinese people during the past decades - and resolutely oppose the criminal acts of American imperialist aggressors against Korea and their intrigues for enlarging the war.

In another speech, delivered on September 30, Zhou also warned that “the Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists.” The absence of these official comments from People’s Daily indicated that they were intended for a foreign audience, aiming to demonstrate China’s willingness to assist North Korea and to deter U.N. forces from crossing the 38th Parallel.

The Justification and Mobilization of the Entry

The timing of the Chinese government’s reaction to U.N. developments indicates that the U.N. General Assembly’s endorsement of “all appropriate steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea”
and the U.S. First Cavalry Division’s crossing over the 38th Parallel on October 7 were the final acts determining China’s entry into the war. On October 8, in the name of chairman of the Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Commission, Mao issued the order to send Chinese troops to Korea.

On October 9, the People’s Daily admitted that the war was “in a new state” in its front-page editorial. The editorial singled out Zhou’s September 30 statement for attention, noting “so far as the situation is concerned with respect to China’s neighbor, Korea, the Chinese people have made public their position.” The paper attacked the General Assembly’s resolution as proof “that the American-British aggressive bloc has precariously expanded the sphere of the aggressive war in the Far East, in other words, the threat of aggression against the People’s Republic of China is more pronounced. Everyone in this country should watch this development attentively.”

A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on October 10 amplified the warnings. “The Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea. … The American war of invasion has been a serious menace to the security of China from its very start.” The People’s Daily reproduced this statement under the headline “War to China’s borders.” This opened the first stage in the mobilization of the Chinese populace for the war through the public media. Within a week, the first Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River secretly.

For two weeks, the Korean War theme once again almost disappeared from the People’s Daily’s front page. This lull in coverage from October 12 to 25 was possibly intended to conceal military movements to reduce the likelihood of a United States counterblow in the deployment stage of the Chinese troops. In this period, Mao ordered the entire country, especially the public media, to adopt a policy of “only act and no talk” (Zhi Zuo Bu Shuo). Mao ordered that “no open propaganda about what we are doing should appear in our newspapers” and that “only high-ranking cadres of the party will be notified of the actions undertaken.”

After the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) had finished deployment and readied for war on October 25, a new extensive campaign began in China for the justification and mobilization of the military
intervention. On October 26, the Chinese People’s Committee in Defense of World Peace and Against American Aggression was formed in Beijing to spearhead the mass propaganda campaign that was to last for the duration of the war. Unlike the earlier alert, however, this new campaign contained frequent, explicit references to defending Korea, as well as to protecting the motherland, but in the disguise of “spontaneous” expressions of opinion.

In less than a week, people in every major city of China reportedly held public meetings at which thousands pledged to defend the motherland and volunteered to “fight the American imperialists in Korea.” On October 27, the People’s Daily carried a front-page headline, “American troops invading Korea Approach our Borders.” The paper published letters from students offering to volunteer for the war, as well as stories about meetings of civic and educational groups on the same subject.

Not until the beginning of November did the characteristics of the propaganda campaign change. The justification and mobilization then entered its second stage. On November 2, the People’s Daily made its first reference to such “volunteers,” although a subsequent DPRK communiqué acknowledged their presence at the front since October 25. Despite the battlefront lull, the People’s Daily saturated its pages with war propaganda in its most discursive treatment of the conflict since June 25. The initial editorial following CPV action in Korea declared: “The voluntary aid of Chinese patriots … will bring the possibility of turning the tide of war, annihilating and repulsing the unconsolidated American troops, and forcing the aggressors to accept a just and peaceful solution of the Korea issue.”

Throughout its propaganda in November 1950, the People’s Daily insisted that the war was likely to be a long one. “The imperialists have only begun to be battered, and they will continue to carry out atrocities. Therefore we must continue to conduct firm counterattacks against them.” This was perhaps a preventive measure to forestall any setbacks in the domestic morale that might follow from reverses at the front.

In addition to conceding the possibility of a prolonged war, the People’s Daily dealt with the prospect of atomic attacks against civilians, reassuring the audience both about the probability of atomic warfare and about the effects of atomic bombs should they be used. It carried
many introduction articles about atomic bombs, arguing that the bombs might “influence the process of a war but could not decide the fate of a war.” On November 11, the paper provided a Hiroshima bombing eyewitness’s account of that experience. He denied the rumor that atomic bombs will result in sterility and described some measures for protection against atomic blasts, reassuring people that “atomic bombs are not as terrible as U.S. imperialists boasted.” The People’s Daily also referred to Soviet atomic capability, implying that the latter “smashed U.S. atomic intimidation.”

In sum, the first three weeks of November saw Chinese propaganda mobilizing the populace for a prolonged war in Korea. Amidst the exhortations to “volunteers” were frank statements of the uncertainties ahead, including the possibility of atomic attacks against China. Following the massive CPV counteroffensive in late November, the balance of power on the battlefield gradually changed. Correspondingly, the propaganda of the People’s Daily evolved into a new stage, which is beyond the scope of this inquiry.

This analysis of the People’s Daily’s early coverage of Korean War demonstrates that in the Chinese communist system, the People’s Daily mainly served as a tool of propaganda, justification, mobilization and ideology control. In some cases, it reported the opposite of what really happened. The unfavorable news were either mentioned lightly or totally suppressed. The paper did not inform the audience what happened, but told them what the government wanted them to know.
1 A large number of books and articles have explored this topic, attempting to put the Chinese intervention into context. Among them, the most important ones include: Allen S. Whiting, *China crosses the Yalu: The Decision To Enter the Korean War* (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1960); Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis & Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Chen Jian, *China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the SinoAmerican Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).


4 For example, Deng Tuo, the chief editor and director of the *People’s Daily* for 10 years after 1949, kept sending central leaders the drafts of editorials, see Wu, “Command Communication,” p.204.

5 “Syngman Rhee urgently connives the civil war,” *People’s Daily*, June 19, 1950, p.4.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Of course the claim was false. As suggested by Goncharov (*Uncertain Partners*, p.150 ), “South Korea used the turmoil and guerrilla struggles in the South and the continuing border skirmishes along the 38th parallel as a pretext.” Yoo Sung Chul, head of the KPA Operations Directate once said, “Even after Kim Il Sung dies, you won’t be able to find any legal document about an attack; it was a counteroffensive…. It was a fake, disinformation to cover ourselves.” (Goncharov et al., *Uncertain Partners*, p.150).


10 In recent years, Chinese media tend to be ambiguous about the cause of the Korean War. For example, the website of the *Liberation Army Daily*, the official newspaper of Chinese People’s Liberation Army, now answers the question “how did the Korean civil war break out?” in
these terms: “(After 1945) the situation on the Korean peninsula was one of two antagonistic governments each with its own sphere of rule. Thereafter, a fierce struggle broke out between them on how to achieve unification. From January 1949 to June 1950, there occurred more than 2,000 incidents of North-South conflict on the 38th Parallel. These armed clashes grew in intensity until full-scale warfare broke out on June 25, 1950.” Available online at: http://www.pladaily.com.cn/item/kmyc50/100wd/kmyc002_kmyc.htm

For details, see Goncharov et al., *Uncertain Partners*, chapter 5.

In 1945, a civil war erupted between the Communists and the Nationalists in China. In 1949, the Nationalists were defeated and fled to Taiwan. The Communists won control of the entire country and founded the People’s Republic of China.


Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, p.54.


Chen, *China’s Road to the Korean War*, p.218.


Ibid.


On July 23, CCP issued the “Orders to Defend the Northeast Borders.” After that, large-scale military redeployment started.


The Yalu River forms part of the border between China and DPRK.


On August 25, Mathews called for “instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace.” On the same day, MacArthur said Taiwan is part of “the island chain” from which U.S. “can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivoskok to Singapore.” Both of the statements were withdrawn as unofficial.

“U.S. Secretary of the Navy Matthews clamors a war.” People’s Daily, August 31, 1950, p.4.

On September 15, the American X Corps succeeded in landing at Inchon. The North Korean forces, forced to turn from the offensive to the defensive, in a few days began to disintegrate.


Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p.106.

Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, p. 93.

Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, p. 114.

Chen, *China’s Road to the Korean War*, p. 186.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


There are some discrepancies concerning the exact date of the first Chinese troops’ entry into Korea. Some sources said it was October 14, others said October 16.

China’s entry into the war took Washington by surprise. U.S. leaders ignored clues about Beijing’s military redeployment and political mobilization for entering the war. The CIA concluded as late as October 12, four days after Mao issued the formal orders to send Chinese troops to Korea: “Despite statements by Chou [Zhou] Enlai, troops movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities and border violations, there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea,” see Chen, *China’s Road to the Korean War*, p. 170.

Chen, *China’s Road to the Korean War*, p. 209.

Ibid.


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