The Atlanta Review of Journalism History

Volume 5
Fall 2004

Leonard Ray Teel  Faculty Advisor
and General Editor
Stacy Schmitt  Managing Editor
Katie Hawkins  Associate Editor
Jason Smith  Consulting Editor
Frances Masamba  Consulting Editor

Cover Design by John Daigle

Printed by Printed Communications, Inc.
Tucker, GA

All correspondence should be directed to:
The Atlanta Review of Journalism History
Attention: Dr. Leonard Ray Teel
Center for International Media Education
Department of Communication
Georgia State University
One Park Place South, Room 821
Atlanta, GA 30303-3087
joulrt@langate.gsu.edu
CONTENTS

LEONARD RAY TEEL, Advisor and General Editor
An Editorial Comment iv
Acknowledgements vi

JOSEPH VALENZANO 1
The Forgotten Heroes: Three Newspapers’ Coverage of the Cincinnati Reds, Gambling, and the 1919 World Series

Joe M. Valenzano III is a third year doctoral student at Georgia State University. He recently completed his comprehensive exams and is in the process of preparing his dissertation prospectus. He holds an M.A. in Communication from the University of Maine-Orono and a B.A. in Psychology and Political Science from Providence College. He has also been an assistant baseball coach at Bryant College and the University of Maine-Orono, as well as an administrative assistant at Georgia State University.

GREG READ 55
Photography and Reform: Lewis Hine’s Crusade Against Child Labor, 1908-1918

Greg Read currently attends Georgia State University and works as a multimedia producer for Turner Sports Interactive. In the future, he has plans to start his own online media business or to work as a full-time photojournalist. His paper was presented at last year’s American Journalism Historians Association Southeast Symposium in Panama City, Florida.

ANDREA O’ROURKE 81
The Role of the Press in Involuntary Sterilization of Carrie Buck and the Eugenics Movement: 1910-1935

Andrea O’Rourke graduated from Georgia State University in January 2004 with a degree in print journalism. She is originally from Croatia, where she lived most of her life. O’Rourke is currently working as a freelance magazine writer in Atlanta. Her paper was presented at The Joint Meeting of the American Journalism Historians Association and the AEJMC History Division at Columbia University in March 2004.

BUTLER CAIN 111
Considering Communications History Perspectives Since 1974

Butler Cain is the News Director of Alabama Public Radio in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. He is a member of the Alabama Associated Press Broadcasters Association Board of Directors and is Alabama’s RTNDA representative. He is pursuing a Ph.D. in Mass Communication History at the University of Alabama.
AN EDITORIAL COMMENT

Three of the historical studies in this issue focus on domestic concerns in the United States in the early years of the Twentieth Century. The authors examine specific cases to discover the role of the press in exposing scandal, alleviating misery and promoting ideologies. The fourth essay considers the very practice of writing media history through the dialogue of the past three decades.

The authors, while students, engaged in the practices of professional historians. Beginning with their general interests – in sportswriting, in photojournalism, in press and propaganda – they focused on specific events, issues and time frames. After surveying what had already been written, they immersed themselves in original sources – of the time under study, newspapers, magazines, documents, photographs. Each can testify that hour upon hour they came to understand better the people and situations in that time a century ago. Joseph Valenzano could then write sensibly about what it was like being a sportswriter at the 1919 World Series. Greg Read could follow the trail of Lewis Hine as he traveled to cotton mills and taking hundreds of portraits of children laboring among textile machines. Andrea O’Rourke’s immersion in led her into the mindset of a eugenics movement that promoted sexual sterilization laws.

The closing essay serves a primer in historiography, the conversation that historians have with each other. In Butler Cain’s essay you meet several of the nation’s historians who have contributed to the dialogue in media history: James W. Carey, Hazel Dicken-Garcia, Margaret “Peggy” Blanchard, Wm. David Sloan, Michael Emery, Marion Marzolf, David Weaver, William Huntzicker, Timothy Gleason, Maurine Beasley, Catherine Mitchell, David Nord, Joseph McKerns, John Nerone, Marvin Olasky, Jack Lule, Jean Ward, Hanno Hart and Bonnie Brennan.

The Atlanta Review of Journalism History is proud to be the forum for this showcase of original research and probing discussion.

Leonard Ray Teel
Fall 2004
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Atlanta Review of Journalism History is a production of the Journalism History Society of Georgia State University and is made possible through the concerted efforts of the authors, editors, readers and our supporters. We thank first those authors who did the primary work of research and writing. As students, they forged their essays in classrooms but carried them far beyond, to competitive conferences in the South and North. After submitting their work to the Review, the authors made certain revisions suggested by the Review’s Editorial Board.

The Review staff thanks those eight Editorial Board members for devoting time and talent to thoughtful reading this issue’s essays. We acknowledge the work of four new readers: Dr. Frank Fee of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Dr. Terry Lueck of the University of Akron, Dr. Debbie van Tuyl of Augusta State University, and Dr. Megan Lamme of the University of Florida. We are grateful for the continued work of Dr. William Huntzicker of St. Cloud State University, Dr. Wallace B. Eberhard, professor emeritus of the Henry W. Grady College of Journalism, Dr. Fred Fedler in the School of Communication at the University of Central Florida, and Dr. Patrick Washburn of Ohio University.

Credit for the overall production itself goes to the Review’s staff, led by Stacy Schmitt, the managing editor. Stacy coordinated the process from beginning to end: tracking manuscripts, arranging for Editorial Board readers, monitoring the progress of authors making revisions, and overseeing the editing of the page proofs. Stacy was assisted by Katie Hawkins, the Associate Editor, whose skill with software sent the Review camera-ready to the printer. As page proofs came back, the staff expanded to include several student proofreaders, among them Christopher Dunn, Hyunki Kim, Purva Shah, Megan Beall, Shaima Ragab, and Wael Kamal.

Finally, the Review staff is grateful also for the continued financial support granted by the College of Arts and Sciences and for the steady encouragement and support provided by the Department of Communication and its chair, Dr. Carol Winkler.
The Forgotten Heroes: Three Newspapers' Coverage of the Cincinnati Reds, Gambling, and the 1919 World Series

Joe Valenzano

Abstract

This essay examines newspaper coverage of the 1919 Major League Baseball World Series between the Chicago White Sox and the Cincinnati Reds in the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, *The New York Times*, and *Cincinnati Enquirer*. Most research into the infamous Black Sox scandal has focused on the White Sox, the organizational ramifications of the scandal, and a few notable individuals involved with the World Series like “Shoeless” Joe Jackson and columnist Ring Lardner. Discussion of the Reds, the team that actually won the World Series, is conspicuously absent from the literature. Accordingly, this essay addresses the question of how the Cincinnati Reds were characterized in these three major newspapers. The paper also focuses on what, if any, elements of the scandal reporters were aware of during the Series itself.

In the wake of World War I many Americans tried to come to grips with what it meant to be “American.” Labor strife, the first Red Scare, and rising ethnic tensions became symbols of un-Americanism, while businesses, employees, politicians and pop culture in general all played a role in defining Americanism. As Robin F. Bachin observed, “play and recreation became central elements in the fight to promote Americanism at home... Civic leaders looked to the organized play movement as a source for instilling patriotic values in working class ethnic youth in the cities.” Baseball, one of the most common forms of organized play and recreation in the country at the time, attempted to take economic advantage of its popularity by expanding its championship World Series from seven to nine games in 1919. What happened, however, was the opposite; and Major League Baseball soon became the center of scandal.

Arguably the most infamous scandal involving gambling and professional sports occurred in October 1919 during the sixteenth baseball World Series. During the Black Sox Scandal, reporters such as Jim Cruisenberry and the satiric and sarcastic Ring Lardner of the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Christy Matthewson of the *New York Times*, and columnist Hugh Fullerton of the *Chicago Herald and Examiner* claimed to have suspected something was amiss as early as the first game of the World Series. Despite these early suspicions, many prominent newspapers and sports magazines around the country dismissed the possibility of a thrown World Series and attacked the reporters who were spreading such stories, directing particular attention to Fullerton.

Throwing ballgames became an almost common pra-
tice in baseball during the early twentieth century, but the game’s leaders hid this fact from the paying public. Neither the owners nor the governing National Commission felt compelled to investigate out of fear of damaging “baseball’s virtuous image with the fans.”

Cincinnati Reds position player Hal Chase, whom Harold Seymour calls “the archetype of all crooked ballplayers,” was accused of throwing games on several occasions. On August 9, 1918, manager Christy Mathewson (who also covered the 1919 Series for New York newspapers) suspended Chase for “indifferent play.” Chase publicly admitted he was benched on accusations of betting on games and trying to persuade pitcher Pol Perritt of the Giants to throw a game. Magnates and owners reasoned that to publicize pronouncements regarding Chase and others would have damaged the game millions saw as illustrative of some of the best aspects of being an American.

Gamblers seemed quite interested in affecting the outcome of the 1919 World Series. They approached the National League champion Cincinnati Reds as well as the American League champion White Sox. Before the World Series began, Reds manager Pat Moran, on hearing rumors of a fix, asked pitcher Hod Eller if gamblers had approached him asking for him to throw games. Eller admitted they had, but informed Moran he declined the overture. Moran pitched him anyway, but watched him closely the entire Series, albeit unnecessarily.

Historians have generally agreed that the treatment the White Sox players received from their owner, Charles Comisky, constituted the main reason some agreed to throw the Series. Robert F. Burk went so far as to say that “Comisky deserved as much or more condemnation than his corrupt players” for his parsimonious policies and his concealment of suspicions to protect success at the gate. The Sox players had not received a raise from their bosses since 1915. The salary of Eddie Cicotte, the star pitcher for the White Sox, was $4,000 less than that of the star player for the Reds, Eddie Roush. Inflation caused by World War I contributed in making these salaries below the industry standard. In addition to the salary numbers, the White Sox were the only team whose owner charged his players for the laundering of their uniforms.

Popular versions of the 1919 World Series cast the White Sox as the overwhelming favorite. However, historians differ as to how strong a team the Reds were. Chicago had won the American League pennant by 3 ½ games over Cleveland, while Cincinnati won the National League 9 ½ games over the Giants. The Reds had won ten more games than the White Sox, and had a better team-earned run average. The Reds, however, only had one offensive threat in outfielder Ed Roush, while the Sox lineup was loaded with talented position players like Eddie Collins, Buck Weaver, and Joe Jackson. Despite the Reds’ higher win total, those who followed the White Sox all season like Lardner, Fullerton, and Cruisenberry, all felt that Chicago was a team without peer. Some historians, however, have held that the Reds would have beaten the White Sox even without the interference of gamblers.

Whether or not the Reds could have won the Series is a matter of conjecture now; but the gambling odds tended to support those who believed the Sox were superior. Lardner himself loved to gamble, and bet his extra earnings from the
season on the Sox to win the Series taking 5-1 odds. By the
time the Series started, the odds had dropped to even money
in some gambling corners, and rumors of a fix were rampant.
On September 30, 1919, Cruisenberry saw Abe Attell, a former
pitcher and consort of notorious gambler Arnold Rothstein, in
the lobby of a Chicago hotel seeking rather loudly for action
on the Reds. The intrigue had begun, and soon Comisky and
Gleason would join the writers in their suspicions.13 Unfortu-
nately, these suspicions would overshadow the story of the
world champion Cincinnati Reds; eventually relegating their
achievement to merely postscript in the story of eight crooked
ballplayers from Chicago. Despite their contemporary cover-
age at the time, the Reds have become but a footnote in his-
torical accounts. This footnote status ignores the import-
ance of their achievement as one of the earliest and most surprising
upsets in American professional sports history.

Research Questions
There has been no shortage of research on baseball,
and the Black Sox Scandal in particular. The scandal is cov-
ered in histories of the game, as well as in pieces where it is
the focus. But, the common thread among them all is the focus
on the trial and subsequent banishment of the eight players
involved (ringleaders Chick Gandil and Eddie Cicotte and
conspirators Claude “Lefty” Williams, Buck Weaver, Oscar
“Happy” Felsch, Swede Risberg, “Shoeless” Joe Jackson, and
Fred McMullin). Some scholars have discussed the legal and
historical ramifications of the rigged World Series as well.
Most, however, treat the games of the Series in passing or
through the reflections of one of those involved, such as Ring
Lardner.14 No one, though, has looked at how the actual cham-
ions were covered in the newspapers.

Articles of popular sports magazines and those writ-
en by the journalists involved in the uncovering of the scan-
dal (i.e., Lardner, Fullerton, Matthewson, and Cruisenberry)
have been the primary sources of historical information for
the 1919 World Series. There have been few attempts at re-
visiting the day-to-day coverage of the games themselves, par-
cularly in Cincinnati’s newspapers. Historians have con-
tended that publishers during the Series did not print stories of
a potential fix due to a dearth of hard evidence; but, the re-
porters themselves were well aware of what was going on.
With that in mind, Donald Elder, a biographer of Ring Lardner,
maintained that by “the end [of the Series] there was little doubt
in any reasonably enlightened mind that a conspiracy of gam-
bler and White Sox players had thrown the Series.”15 So,
this contradiction between the lack of mention in newspapers
of a potential scandal during the Series and the ardent belief
that there was a scandal by the time the games ended, begs the
question of what was reported in the newspapers regarding
the possible connection of gamblers and White Sox players.
Did they attempt to report their suspicions of gamblers’ in-
volve in the World Series while it was taking place, or did they
simply expose such information after the completion of
the Series?16

This research is guided by the following questions:

1) What indications of the potential scandal
were evident in the newspaper coverage of the
Series in baseball’s three major markets: Chi-
chicago—home of the American League Champion White Sox; Cincinnati—home of the National League Champion Reds; and New York City—the home of Arnold Rothstein and Abe Attell, major gamblers suspected of involvement in the 1919 Black Sox scandal?

2) How were the Cincinnati Reds portrayed in newspaper coverage? It is this question that will guide this essay’s attempt at promoting the importance of the upset victory achieved by the Reds which has been overshadowed by the Black Sox scandal.

To answer these questions, coverage in the Chicago Daily Tribune, Cincinnati Enquirer, and New York Times from October 1, 1919 through October 10, 1919 will be explored. These dates cover the morning of the first game of the Series through the day after the eighth and final game. All World Series coverage within these newspapers is included, as they were the subject of front page articles within each paper.

**September 30, 1919**

The excitement for the approaching Series was at a fever pitch. Comparisons between the teams could be found everywhere the day before the games began. Christy Mathewson, writing for The New York Times, predicted, “I think we are about to see one of the best contested World Series that has been played in several years.” The Reds’ pitching was superior to the staff of the White Sox, but the White Sox lineup was given the edge over the Reds. In terms of intangibles, the White Sox were given the nod, having won the world championship in 1917 and having had a tougher time winning their league. In each major city the White Sox were the favorites in the dope and betting talk, exemplified by this statement in The New York Times, “The baseball dope all points to a White Sox victory.”

Both managers were justifiably confident that their teams would win. Reds manager Pat Moran touted his pitchers, “I do not know when a team ever went into so great an event with so strong a string of first class hurlers.” When informed of the strength of the Reds’ pitching staff, White Sox skipper Kid Gleason responded, “We don’t care who pitches, the way my gang is going they haven’t any fear of any pitcher.” Both managers announced their Game One starters, with the Reds throwing southpaw Dutch Ruether in the hope of neutralizing left-handed sluggers Joe Jackson and Eddie Collins. The Sox announced that Eddie Cicotte who “did the bulk of the work in winning the pennant” would take the hill. Gleason said he “had a world of confidence in his ace” despite rumors about the health of Cicotte’s arm.

Gamblers also heard those rumors about Cicotte’s arm. As large amounts of money were wagered on the Series, the rumor of the American League Champion’s best pitcher’s injury reportedly affected the odds with the White Sox slipping to 5-to-6 favorites in the gambling capitol of New York. These rumors also encouraged Reds fans to lay action down on the game, though at worse odds than in New York in most cases. In New York, “bets have been made by Cincinnati fans at 7-to-10, 4-to-5 and there is one bet on record in which Cincinnati enthusiasm has been bold enough to offer even money
on the chances of Moran’s team." 24 Not many wagers took place in the Queen City of Cincinnati where “not a single wager of any considerable size had been registered.” 25 In Chicago, the line still had the Sox favored at odds ranging from 7-to-5, 3-to-2, to 2-to-1 to win the series, but Cicotte’s questionable arm had reduced the odds on Game One to 9-to-10. 26 The gambling was beginning to pick up, and the Reds, who “until September 29 appeared [to carry] little more than moral support into the Series with them,” saw signs of financial backing in the gambling communities in other cities that helped depress the odds. 27 So the underdog Reds prepared to embark on “the most important struggle they have ever undertaken.”

**October 1, 1919**

The first game of the Series did not go the way White Sox fans would have liked, surprising some sportswriters and energizing the Reds’ fan base. With rumors of arm trouble surrounding him, Eddie Cicotte of the White Sox received a “disastrous drubbing” from the the National League champion Reds that sent Cincinnati fans into a “delirious spasm of pop-eyed enthusiasm.” 28 The fourth inning proved to be the downfall for the White Sox as Cicotte was tagged for five two-out runs by the “vicious” Reds offense on the way to a 9-1 rout. 29 The Sox were so thoroughly manhandled in this game that New York Times columnist and former major league pitcher Christy Mathewson remarked, “The White Sox are supposed to be a great ball club but no team to my knowledge was ever defeated by so large a score in an opening game of the World Series when each contender was trying its best.” 30 On the other hand, Bob Beiser, covering the series for the Cincinnati Enquirer, thought more credit was due to the Reds players since the White Sox were, “flagged down to almost nothing by the snappy, bewildering, sidearm shoots of the slim Walter Ruether, crushed by the immense hitting power of Pat Moran’s champions, overawed by the brilliant defensive work of Eddie Roush and flabbergasted by the speedy and foxy baserunners of the National League.” 31

White Sox partisans and sportswriters offered up analyses for the poor showing by the Sox and in particular, Eddie Cicotte. Jim Crusinberry of the Chicago Daily Tribune claimed the loss was “the best thing to happen” because it would eliminate any “overconfidence” the Sox had entering the series. 32 Others pointed to the questionable health of Cicotte’s arm, arguing that it must not have “been right” if he was hit as hard as the Reds hit him. 33 Mathewson pointed out that White Sox manager Kid Gleason must not have thought his pitcher’s arm was hurt because early in the game the Sox tried to bunt for a run, indicating Gleason felt it would be a well-pitched low-scoring affair. 34 Despite Gleason’s apparent confidence, the rumors of Cicotte’s arm strength still influenced the gambling odds. 35

Throughout the day, gamblers were actively placing bets on the outcome of the series as well as Game One. Variable odds popped up everywhere, and Crusinberry used them to describe the magnitude of the Game One upset. “When an 8-to-5 favorite in a World’s Series is beaten by a score of 9-to-1 something is wrong.” 36 The odds Crusinberry referred to, however, shifted in the favor of the Reds after their victory. In New York, Cincinnati, Chicago and Denver, the Reds had anywhere from a 7-to-5, to a 7-to-10 favorite to win the Se-
eries.  Many bet that the Reds would win the best of nine Series in six games.  Game Two became a split proposition for bettors, signifying increasing respect for the Reds while maintaining confidence that Chicago’s second starter, “Lefty” Williams could right the ship.

The managers for both teams expressed confidence they were going to eventually win.  Moran, the author of “Cincinnati’s joy party” for winning Game One, said he “expects to win the series,” but did not want his “boys to be overconfident.”

His leadership of the Reds had inspired many fans’ “confidence [that] was once part hope, part real conviction [to] now see it as just how many games.”  Gleason acknowledged he saw lots of mistakes from his team in Game One that needed to be fixed in order to win the series.  With only one game on the books, both managers could have eventually been proven right.

Some historians argue that after Game One sportswriters became even more suspicious, and that even Gleason and Comisky questioned the effort of their White Sox ballclub.  Robin Bachin stated, “Fullerton and Lardner suspected scandal as early as the opening game.”

According to Lardner, biographer Jonathan Yardley admitted that he “had confronted Cicotte in his hotel room after the game and asked him: ‘What was wrong? I was betting on you today.’ Cicotte…gave Ring a lie and skirted the issue. But by now Ring knew for sure.”

Donald Elder also recorded the same incident in a similar biography of Lardner. Several historians additionally recounted an incident where Comisky, on hearing about a potential fix from Gleason, woke up National Commission chairman Ban Johnson to tell him about the impropriety. Johnson reportedly responded, “That’s the yelp of a beaten cur!” and went back to sleep.  Gleason and Comisky, historians believe, remained suspicious throughout the Series. These suspicions, however, only indirectly and sporadically appeared in the papers.

October 2, 1919

The Reds continued to build their lead in the Series with a decisive 4-2 win in the second game.  This win was made possible not through the Reds’ “vicious batting attack,” but rather through the wildness of White Sox starter “Lefty” Williams.  Williams threw 28 pitches in an “almost criminal” fourth inning where he walked three Reds and each one scored.  Those “alleged slugging wonders from the Windy City” tallied ten hits, and if it was not for an errant throw in the sixth the Sox would not have scored.  In fact, Cincinnati center fielder Ed Roush made a “shoestring” catch on a Happy Felsch line drive to end the inning and keep the White Sox from inflicting further damage.

White Sox first baseman Chick Gandil, who had previously hit Reds starting pitcher Slim Sallee hard, failed to come through all game.  In the end, the Reds’ “ultra-sensational highway robbery” of Game Two gave them a commanding early advantage in the World Series.

This second consecutive victory for the Cincinnati underdogs, sparked again by a run-scoring fourth inning, caused a huge stir in baseball circles.  There was “hardly a baseball writer in the land, except those of the local newspapers, [who] had a shred of reputation left” after a “month long chorus of anti-Red prophecies.”  Ring Lardner of the Chicago Daily Tribune quipped that “Gleason wants the fourth
inning” cut from all future games. In actuality, Gleason called the result “almost the limit of tough luck,” and believed the Reds “will never win that fifth one unless they continue to have that phenomenal luck.” His Reds counterpart conceded that people would call his team lucky, but “we won just the same.” Whether it was luck, or something else, the odds on the underdog-turned-favorite Reds continued to improve.

Donald Elder pointed to the headline for Lardner’s article on the second loss as evidence he knew the games were being won. It ran, “It’s a big scandal! Ring discovers cause of defeat.” The opening line reported his satiric scandal as taking place “when the American League turned against itself and beat the White Sox out of the second game of the present horror.” Taken in context with the accounts of his conversation with Cicotte, it appears as if Lardner did suspect something. Lardner insinuates that the American League champion White Sox threw the second game when he wrote they “turned against” themselves. Though he did not overtly accuse them of throwing the game, his sarcastic use of the term “scandal” along with his questions to Cicotte regarding the games being on the level, leads one to consider that Lardner believed, but could not prove, something was amiss.

After the two White Sox aces were left “mauled and beaten” on the field, Jack Ryder wrote, “so the despised and underrated Reds have two clean cut victories under their belts...where, oh where, are the odds that were so freely being offered only 48 brief hours ago?” Though he argued “they were gone forever,” there were still confident White Sox fans with loose purse strings to be found. The Reds had anywhere from 9-to-5 to 5-to-3 favorites to win the series going into Game Three, but the games now shifted to Chicago where the White Sox had been dominant all season. This shift was evident in the confidence of the Chicago band, the Woodland Bards, who, though down $33,000 so far, still bet on the Sox to win in their hometown.

The two consecutive victories to open the Series made believers out of more than just the gamblers. Matthews pointed out that “today’s game did one thing. It convinced the Cincinnati fans that they have a real ball club.” Cincinnati became a “gloating city” after the win, but there was not as much celebration in the streets as the previous night. In New York, fans rooted hard for the White Sox “if for no other reason than the common decency to encourage the underdog.” Clearly, the 2-0 series lead for Cincinnati had eradicated any prior notion of the White Sox’ superiority entering the World Series, and Game Three was even labeled a “crisis” for Chicago.

October 3, 1919

Behind the “superb” pitching performance of “diminutive” Dickie Kerr, the Chicago White Sox finally won a game, 3-0. The “humiliating whitewash” led Chicago fans to believe the “impudence” of the “arrogant Cincinnati Reds” had been “fittingly rebuked.” The only “let up in spirit” by the Sox occurred when Chick Gandil did not go hard to third on a sacrifice bunt attempt, thus allowing the Reds to get out of the jam and prevent a rout. The White Sox shut down the Reds in such a fashion that Cincinnati only managed to get one runner into scoring position. This “reversal of hitting” was an “intense surprise” to the Reds fans, but they acknowledged
that so far in this series being the home team had been very helpful.69

Kerr’s work instilled confidence in his manager and fans, who, amazingly, did not fill the stands for Game Three. Gleason was confident that the Sox would sweep the games in Chicago because, as one Cincinnati writer put it, he “has found someone who can stop the…hard hitters in the Reds lineup.” For his part, Moran was “thoroughly disappointed” but “not at all discouraged” by the outcome.69 Sox fans, who came 5,000 seats shy from filling Comisky Park because “they thought they would not be able to get in,” (an unattributed piece) felt renewed confidence in their club following the victory.70 Lardner, however, remained pessimistic, writing that the only reason the Sox won was because he did not wager on them.71

Despite Lardner’s lack of wagering on the game, the levels of betting rose, and that illustrated the renewed belief by Chicago faithfults that their beloved White Sox would be victorious. Following the game, odds on the Reds victory leveled off in the range of 3-to-2 and 5-to-4, with several wagers in the range of $2,000-$3,000 recorded with the latter odds. Professional gamblers, however, did not share these odds and “seemed to lean even more strongly to the side of the Reds than did the genuine sportsmen of Cincinnati,” when “plying their vocation” in the city’s hotel lobbies. Other bets had the Reds anywhere from 5-to-2 favorites to even money to win game four, and the White Sox as 1-to-5 favorites to win four straight.72 Game Three did more than reintroduce the chances of the White Sox to win the World Series, it reinvigorated the gamblers.

October 4, 1919

The Reds responded to their first loss with “an abundance of aggressiveness” which led to a 2-0 win in Game Four and a commanding three games to one lead in the Series. Cincinnati starter Jimmy Ring pitched “invincible ball,” overcoming a lack of run support he had been “jinxed” with all year.73 Chicago’s ace, Eddie Cicotte threw better than his previous start, setting down the Reds in order every inning but the fifth, but he suffered the loss thanks to poor defensive play by Joe Jackson in the fifth. Jackson played shallow when Reds slugger Greasy Neale came to the plate and lofted a double over his head. On the ensuing relay, Cicotte cut the ball off allowing the second of two runs to score.74 Even one Cincinnati sportswriter conceded Cicotte was the “victim of bum luck.”75 The Sox offense had four chances to score in the game, but they were “absolutely helpless” against “the best right harder in the National League.”76 One thing was for certain however; Cicotte proved there was nothing wrong with his arm.

After the game Gleason continued to assert his team’s superiority, while Moran remained confident his team could pull off the upset. The writers seemed more inclined to side with the Reds skipper’s interpretation. Gleason claimed the Reds “shouldn’t have scored on Cicotte in forty innings,” and there was “no occasion” for him to cut off the relay that allowed the second Cincinnati run to score.77 Moran continued to maintain his belief in his club, saying he was “very sure all along that we would win the series and win it rather easily.”78 Christy Matthewson tossed the arguments about luck aside, saying, “There was no luck in today’s victory…I think the cockiness and confidence of the Reds from the start has aston-
ished the Sox prima donnas.\textsuperscript{79} One writer in Cincinnati went so far as to say Moran’s club “won the world’s championship” with their third victory.\textsuperscript{80} The Reds were now in the proverbial driver’s seat, but some still felt it might not be entirely due to their talent.

Betting on the next game was small due to the impending inclement weather that the newspapers warned might cause a delay or postponement, but reporters still mentioned the close relationship of gambling and the World Series.\textsuperscript{81} By the end of Game Four the World Series had seen heavier gambling action than any other, and as the \textit{New York Times} noted, “gossip or scandal might sometime[s] develop” in these situations. The money flowing in “did not appear to be Cincinnati money, for the followers of the Reds appeared chary of backing their choices at anything like natural odds.” Despite the rumors of a fix that had been surrounding the games, and the movement of the odds to the Reds favor, one article in the \textit{New York Times} maintained, that “the difficulty of fixing a baseball game aside from the honesty of the players and the almost sure detection even if it were possible to find one black sheep, is so great as to be almost negligible.”\textsuperscript{82} Any reporting of impropriety however, focused on the betting and not the questionable performance of the Chicago club. When it came to the games the “happy and distinguished” Reds were the story, and the rumors of gambling were just rumors.\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{October 5, 1919}

The covering of the field with a tarp did not do enough to keep the field in playing condition for the fifth game. Fans were “bitterly disappointed” at the postponement, but there was nothing that could be done when the umpires walked the field late Sunday morning.\textsuperscript{84} They called the idea of playing the game “the height of folly,” and so arguments ensued from the unscheduled off day as to who benefited more.\textsuperscript{85} Each manager seemed to agree that his team would have won the game if it had been played. White Sox manager Kid Gleason used the off day to again assert his confidence in the Sox, but Cincinnati partisans did not receive his comments well. He called the Reds “the luckiest team I ever saw in my life,” and maintained that the Sox were the better team.\textsuperscript{86} His comments came across as “whining” to the Cincinnati press, where \textit{Cincinnati Enquirer} reporter Jack Ryder stated, “the plain truth is the Reds pitchers have been far too powerful for the White Sox, and the Red machine has played faster and more intelligent baseball.”\textsuperscript{87} Reds’ manager Pat Moran repeated his underdog mantra, saying, “Many critics have underestimated our ball club.”\textsuperscript{88} Cincinnati had, in fact, scored fifteen runs while the Sox had only been able to plate one earned run in the four contests thus far.

Gambling continued despite the rain, with the Reds favored in most circles at 4-to-1 to win the Series. Three Cincinnati businessmen took those odds and placed $12,000 to $3,000 on the Reds.\textsuperscript{89} In New York, Sox fans who took the rain as a good omen sought, and received, even money on the fifth game.\textsuperscript{90} \textit{New York Times} columnist Christy Matthewson, however, remained steadfast in his belief that the Sox were being outclassed, writing that “if I had a bet on the White Sox, which I haven’t, I would try to get out from under it.”\textsuperscript{91} It appeared that the Sox were becoming the underdog, even with Mother Nature seemingly on their side.
October 6, 1919

With the weather subsiding the next day, the Reds continued their mastery over the White Sox with a 5-0 "humbling" of the "once chesty American Leaguers" in Game Five. Hod Eller, the fifth different starter for the National League champion Cubs, "pitched one of the greatest games ever won in a World Series," according to his manager. Earlier in the day Eller slipped at the hotel and hit his elbow, but thanks to the "heroic efforts" by the team's trainer Eller was able to toe the rubber and hurl his nine strike-out gem against the "amateur" White Sox sluggers. The American League champion White Sox had only one opportunity to score, but failed to capitalize on the early wildness of Eller.

Instead, the Reds' "violent concentrated attack" broke "through the ragged and weakening White Sox...with their customary force and vigor." At the plate, they dominated Sox starter "Lefty" Williams, who drew the "thankless task" of facing Eller, breaking the game open in the sixth inning when every Red "grabbed for the bats and began swinging, getting ready for the annihilation which was to follow." After two plays that should have been made were missed in the top of the sixth, White Sox catcher Ray Schalk was ejected for arguing with, and bumping, an umpire over a call at the plate. Schalk, though, was really more upset with the errors made by Jackson, Felsch and Risberg than he was the call at the plate.

In any event, Jack Ryder said Schalk's ejection illustrated the "complete unnerving" of the Chicago club.

Gleason shared Schalk's frustrations, but apathy became the pervading feeling in Chicago after their club fell behind four games to one. The Sox manager summed up his team's status by saying, "I don't know what's the matter, but I do know that something is wrong with my gang. The bunch I had fighting in August for the pennant would have trimmed this Cincinnati bunch without a struggle. The bunch I have now couldn't beat a high school team." Eller's victory "ended" the city of Chicago's interest in the Series, and with the next two games to be played in Redland the Series itself may very well have ended.

Even in New York, fans at Times Square watching the reports of the game come in felt that "the baseball classic was practically over."

The Reds manager echoed his city's belief that his team was a cinch to win. After the game Moran claimed, "It's all over but the shouting." Moran also took a subtle shot at the continuing characterizations of his team as "lucky" coming from his counterpart, saying "They didn't think I had a great ball team, but I guess now everybody thinks they are." These sentiments were shared by the Cincinnati Enquirer, as evidenced by their "all but labeling" of the Reds as the recipients of the $5,325.32 winning player's share of the World Series gate receipts.

Betting on the outcome of the Series all but ended after the fifth game. In Chicago, "utter indifference" characterized the mood of the gamblers as fewer bets were placed, even on the outcome of the next game. One gambler sarcastically commented that it "looks to me as if Moran could pitch himself and stop these birds." The seventh game drew 7-to-5 and 8-to-5 odds on the Reds in Cincinnati, while getting even money in a few quarters of Chicago. The gambling community, much like the city of Chicago, wrote the White Sox off.
October 7, 1919

To the shock of many, the Reds fell in Game Six to the White Sox 5-4 in 10 innings. It looked bleak for the Sox early on as the Reds came out to an apparently “absolutely insurmountable” 4-0 lead after the first four innings, hitting Sox starter Dickie Kerr hard. Fans “took it for granted” that the Reds would win, after all Game One winner, Dutch Ruether, was on the hill. With the game tied in the eighth, Reds center fielder Eddie Roush made a diving grab on a Swede Risberg line drive, preventing two runs from scoring. The Sox won the game in the tenth inning putting “a lot of confidence back into the rather discouraged White Sox.” The largest crowd ever to attend a game at Redland was not “disheartened,” however, they were more disappointed in what happened to Ruether than in the loss itself.

The game bolstered Gleason’s confident talk, but did not change Moran’s positive outlook. Gleason said his players “hit their winning stride,” and that the World Series “just started.” Gleason sounded optimistic, claiming he would “feel alright” no matter what happened from then on “because the boys played at least one good game.” Meanwhile, Moran, whose “ragged and nervous” Reds played a “careless, wild, and ineffectual” game, admitted he thought his players were “unnerved” at the prospects of winning the championship so easily. I.E. Sanborn of the Chicago Daily Tribune seemed to agree with Gleason that the Sox had turned a corner: “there was not a man on the Sox team who did not prove in one way or another that he was willing to break his neck to win today’s game for there was not a man among them who did not know what some folks were saying about them.” What “they were saying” was that the White Sox had sold out to the gamblers and were throwing the World Series, but Sanborn couched it as “dangerous gossip being circulated by disgruntled gamblers.”

The gambling rumors had reached the players, managers, owners, and even the gamblers, and the actions of each reflected that circulation. The performance of his players so far led Gleason to “watch every move [his] batters made,” and state he would start Cicotte only if he felt the right hander “was right.” By “right” Gleason could have been referring to either the health of his arm, his trust that Cicotte was on the level, or both.

The gamblers, meanwhile, started to place heavy bets on the Sox again, with a large sum being placed on Chicago from a group in Manhattan. The odds on the winner for the next game had shrunk from a line favoring the Reds to even money; and, the Sox had their odds of winning it all slightly increase to 1-to-7. This heightened activity led one former NL official to state he had “never seen so much betting,” and even spawned a rumor in Cincinnati that the Reds threw Game Six in order to allow for more money to be made at the gate with Game Seven. The gamblers, it seemed, agreed with Gleason that the series had just gotten interesting.

October 8, 1919

The White Sox once again staved off elimination in Game Seven with their second consecutive victory over the Reds by a score of 4-1. Reds starter Slim Sallee was “pounded viciously” and Eddie Cicotte, making his third start of the series, proved he was “too good to lose three straight to any-
one.” The Reds actually stopped the game twice and accused C: cotte of doctoring the baseball, but their appeals were denied by the umpires. These frustrations were evident on the field as well, where “the Reds did the poorest fielding of any game of the series, and comported themselves with an uncertainty and shakiness that were characteristic of the White Sox [in the early games].” The Sox started their scoring in the first by taking a 1-0 lead, and “then and there [fans and reporters] decided it was time to make train accommodations for Chicago.” In the end it was the four errors that led to the loss, and speculation that the problem with the Reds “[was] that they have not realized they need to win a fifth game.” It was a sentiment, it seemed, that also may have permeated their fans.

Reds fans seemingly gave up on their team after the previous day’s loss, and the 14,000 that showed up could only muster “a pathetic cheer from the sparsely populated stands.” Reporters speculated that there were three main causes for this “appalling falling off of attendance” when the home team was one win shy of a world championship: 1) disgust at the Reds’ performance the day before; 2) poor method of selling tickets; and 3) fans “refused to show up” for an eighth game of a Series that should have never been expanded to nine games. In a matter of two games the Reds’ lead had dwindled to one game, and their fans’ mood shifted from “hysteria” to “violent indigestion.”

Reporters and fans now lobbed criticism, once reserved for Gleason, at Reds skipper Moran. The rising fear that championship fireworks “may never be staged” in the Queen City led many to label Moran “a bum leader after all.” The “de-

jected looking” Reds manager, once the toast of the city, took up Gleason’s former mantra of luck, saying, “I am sure that our streak of bad playing and tough luck is over.” Moran also maintained that despite the poor play of his club, “at no time have we looked as bad as the Sox did in the first game of the Series.” Even so, many roundly criticized him for not starting Adolfo Luque instead of Sallee.

Gleason, on the other hand, exuded a confidence not seen since before the Series started. The White Sox skipper went so far as to say that he “didn’t see a chance for the Reds to win another game, [because] this isn’t the same ball club that was playing for me in the first three or four games.” Gleason also reiterated his comments from the day before, saying his ball players “were themselves for the first time in the Series. They are right.” The Cincinnati Enquirer agreed, as Bob Beiser wrote, “[the] Reds did not play the kind of ball they displayed in both contests in Chicago” and as a result the Sox “deserved” to win.

Confidence in the Reds was eroding on all sides, even the gambling world. The Sox, who had not enjoyed favorite status since game two, now could be found as 7-to-10 favorites to win game eight. The Reds, despite clinging to a one game advantage, fell all the way to 2 ½ -to-1 favorites. It appeared Reds players and supporters “made a tragic mistake in regarding the Chicago club as a cooked goose.” With a slim one game lead in the Series, and Game Nine to be played back in Cincinnati, all hope for the Reds was not lost even if the White Sox were returning to form.
October 9, 1919

The eighth and final game of the Series saw “Pat Moran’s bold and resourceful” Reds drub the Chicago White Sox 10-5 in a “slow tedious game.” The Reds wasted no time, and no effort, “[winning] it early and [winning] it often,” with a “ferocious rush” that made the White Sox “fold up like an umbrella.” The Reds plated four runs in the first inning, knocking White Sox starter “Lefty” Williams out after recording just one out. By the end of the first inning, “there was little doubt in the minds of the 30,000 rooters present that the Reds were to be the world’s champions within a few short hours.” By the end of the game every member of the Reds’ starting lineup had at least one hit and six of them rapped two apiece. Reds starter Hod Eller was “kind enough to allow the beaten Sox what little consolation they could get in the eighth,” in the form of four runs, but by then the game was over.

It did not take long for Gleason, owner Charles Comisky and a bevy of fans to focus on their team’s performance. Gleason gave a backhanded compliment to the Reds, saying, “The Reds beat the greatest ball team that ever went into a World Series...but it wasn’t the real White Sox. They played baseball for me on a couple or three of the eight days.” Gleason admitted he thought his boys were not right after Game Two, but maintained that the Reds “had no business” beating his White Sox. Comisky agreed that his American League Champion White Sox team was better, “Cincinnati had the better ball team this week. I still think I had the greatest ball team which ever went to the World Series.” Fans leaving the game were “certain something happened to their ball club” that had torn through the American League. Chicago Daily Tribune sportswriter Jim Cruisenberry continued focusing on the poor play of the Sox, “There was more discussion about the playing of the White Sox than about the peace treaty after the last game. Stories were out that the Sox had not put forth their best effort. Stories were out that the big gamblers had got to [the White Sox].” Chicago residents were more than disappointed; they were downright angry with their baseball team.

Meanwhile, in Cincinnati, the Reds were the talk of the town, and Pat Moran, derided just one day ago, was being called a “leader of remarkable generalship.” Moran said the White Sox “were not quitters,” but that they were “outclassed” by his club. Though vastly outnumbered at the game, Reds fans were still able to express their “great jubilation” at the sight of their team’s first world championship in fifty years, and the first National League champions in five years. “A half-century of Cincinnati baseball hopes were pinned on Eller” and he did not disappoint, leading the Reds back home as “conquering heroes.” Christy Matthewson noted that though the Sox were the favorites, “the dopesters failed to take into consideration the fact that a new constellation of stars rises every once in awhile,” and these Reds may very well be those stars. The mayor of Cincinnati rewarded the “hard and wearing work” of “the new champions” and their “fierce and indomitable attack” with a parade and city-wide half holiday on October 10th in celebration of their victory.

Just before the start of Game Eight odds had shifted slightly, and the Reds were slight favorites in some circles. Some odds had them at 10-to-9 and 21-to-20 favorites, slightly
better than even money. Chicago money was increasingly difficult to find because, the *Cincinnati Enquirer* speculated, “even the most rabid White Sox rooters feared the power of the club and few believed that the Sox could make it three straight.” Rumors that the Reds purposely lost game seven were swiftly dismissed as “silly talk” in Cincinnati, despite the larger rumors of White Sox misdeeds circulating in Chicago.\(^{147}\) All told, over two million dollars changed hands during the Series, the largest amount in any series to date by far.\(^{148}\)

**Conclusions**

Within a few weeks of the end of the 1919 World Series, the rumors of a fix had sparked several investigations to uncover the truth. White Sox owner Charles Comiskey even offered a reward for up to $20,000 for any information regarding the fix. However, despite overtures from his own player, Joe Jackson, and one gambler, he declined to hear the potential evidence being offered. Comiskey, like the rest of baseball’s owners, decided it best to let the story die. It was not until a July afternoon in 1920 that the silence surrounding the 1919 World Series began to break when Abe Attell bragged about his involvement in fixing the games at a local Dinty Moore’s restaurant in front of Jim Cruisenberry and Ring Lardner of the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, as well as Kid Gleason, the White Sox manager. On September 27, 1920 six days after a grand jury probe was opened in Cook County, Illinois, an associate of Attell’s, Billy Maharg, revealed all about the gamblers’ involvement in the Series in a Philadelphia magazine, *The North American*. The now infamous scandal of how the American League champion Chicago White Sox threw the 1919 World Series began.\(^{149}\)

The 1919 World Series contained a tremendous story that is remembered for a sad episode. The scandal that grew afterwards was hinted at only a few times during the Series. The only overt accusation about throwing games had been levied against the *Reds*, not the White Sox after their Game Six loss. In the immediate aftermath of the Series, the Reds were the talk of the town, and fans celebrated throughout the Queen City.

Gambling, rampant in baseball at the time, also colored the pages of each city’s newspaper. The oddsmakers were an ongoing story even before the Series began, with the heavily favored White Sox seen as an overwhelming favorite to win their second world championship in three years. Before the first pitch those odds began to drop, and when the Sox lost the first two games they were quickly moved to underdog status. The Reds then became the favorites, and remained so until game six when the White Sox suddenly played like they had down the pennant stretch. After the second consecutive victory for the Sox in Game Seven, they once again enjoyed favored status with the gambling odds, but it did not last long as they lost the eighth game and the Series in humiliating fashion.

During the Series the poor play of the Sox attracted attention, particularly from Ring Lardner of the *Chicago Daily Tribune* and Christy Matthewson of the *New York Times*. Matthewson, who had previously dealt with the corrupt Hal Chase, commented on the surprisingly poor play of the Sox after their first loss. Lardner made his suspicions known in a sarcastic column after the second game when he suggested
that the real scandal was over the announcement of players’ names. Kid Gleason, who maintained throughout the World Series that something was not right with his ball team, echoed the reporters’ suspicions when he and owner Charles Comisky approached National Commission Chairman Ban Johnson with the rumors. That discussion was not reported in the papers. In fact, very little discussion of a potential gambling scandal took place in the papers.

The only potential scandal that was overtly discussed in the papers followed Game Six. The Reds, having dominated the Sox for the first five games needed one win in their own backyard to clinch the title. The expanded format of the World Series, however, presented an opportunity for the Reds to make more money from having to play an additional seventh game. When the Reds lost Game Six in extra innings, many fans speculated that the Reds threw Game Six so they could enjoy a larger take from the gate. After losing the following day as well, Reds fans backed off on these assertions. When Cincinnati concluded the Series two days later, such accusations were patently dismissed.

The fact that very little discussion on the possible influence of gamblers on the outcome of the Series lends credence to the arguments of Victor Luhrs and others who maintain that the Reds would have won the Series even without the alleged improprieties of the eight White Sox players. Without the mention of scandalous behavior in the papers, the public was led to believe that the Reds simply outplayed the American League champion White Sox. When the trial verdict and ban from baseball were handed down two years later, the Reds successes became seen as a result of the White Sox not playing to win rather than a testament to their skill. They were no longer champions, but rather unwitting accomplices to the deceitful White Sox, whose poor play at the time was primarily the focus of the Chicago newspaper.

During the Series the Chicago Daily Tribune focused on the poor play by the White Sox, the Cincinnati Enquirer trumpeted their heroes, and The New York Times struck a balance between the two. The Enquirer consistently portrayed the Reds as underdogs, and became increasingly frustrated over Kid Gleason’s assertion that the Reds were “lucky.” The Queen City thoroughly relished their first championship in over fifty years, while the White Sox and their supporters sought an explanation as to how such a defeat could occur. The day after the last game the Chicago Daily Tribune contained more discussion of suspicion over the performance of the White Sox than at any other moment during the World Series. Only a token tip of the hat to the Reds was offered within its pages. The New York Times made mention of Gleason and the fans’ suspicions, but still gave proper credit to the new world champions.

Soon, the scandal broke and the limelight shifted from the upstart Reds to the tainted White Sox. The Reds and their achievements would fade into history, drowned out by the actions of eight Chicago White Sox. The fact that the 1919 Reds ended a fifty-year championship drought for their franchise is forgotten, as is the miraculous catch of Eddie Roush in Game Two, Hod Eller’s nine strike out performance in Game Five, Jimmy Ring’s shutout, and the .357 batting average of Greasy Neale. Instead, those highlights have been replaced by the poor performances and unethical behavior of Eddie Cicotte,
“Lefty” Williams, Swede Risberg, and “Chick” Gandil. The Reds’ underdog victory could have been seen as an exemplar of the Americanism baseball purportedly trumpeted, but instead the scandal that emerged turned the World Series that Cincinnati won into a black stain on the National Pastime.

Endnotes


2 In his article “The year they fixed the World Series,” James Kirby (1988) called the Black Sox Scandal “organized baseball’s Watergate.” See the ABA Journal 74 (2), p. 65. Two years following the 1919 World Series eight members of the American League champion Chicago White Sox were banned for life from Major League Baseball by newly appointed Commissioner Kennesaw Mountain Landis for conspiring to throw the 1919 World Series. They were, however, acquitted of the charges in a Cook County Court.


4 “Practically every authoritative baseball publication dismissed the allegations as false, fabricated by poor losers who understood little about the games basic chemistry,” Murdock. Ban Johnson, p. 189.

5 They had been common since 1903 when the American League and National League essentially ended their “war.” See David Goldman (1997). Shocking, lurid and true!. Biography (1) 10, p. 14; Voigt, D.Q.
Kennesaw Mountain Landis’ decision to banish the conspirators from baseball for life. It, and Luhrs’ book are the only two that effectively treat the entire episode from start to finish. Other discussions of the scandal appear as, at best, chapters in books such as Seymour’s, but more often a few pages of discussion on the trial in 1920. For examples of these such studies, see Norman L. Rosenberg (1987). Here comes the judge: The origins of baseball’s commissioner system and American legal culture. Journal of Popular Culture 20, (4), pp. 129-146; Rossi, The national game; Voigt. American baseball volume II. One other interesting question explored by some scholars is whether or not “Shoeless” Joe Jackson actually threw the Series. They have done this conducting statistical analyses of his performance. For one such study seeJay Bennett (1993). Did Shoeless Joe Jackson throw the 1919 World Series? The American Statistician 47 (4), pp. 241-250.


14 Though they never officially aired their suspicions to the press, and publishers themselves would have been reluctant to run evidence. See Asinoff. Eight men out; Donald Elder (1956). Ring Lardner: Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., Inc., p. 159; Murdock. Ban Johnson; Nathan. Saying it’s so.

15 To date, Asinoff’s piece is the most complete history of the scandal and covers it from the start of the pennant race in 1919 to Judge


7 Seymour Baseball: The golden age, pp. 289-292.

8 Voigt. American baseball.

9 For more information on this story see Voigt, p. 125.


11 For a description of these practices by Comisky, as well as the impact of cultural and economic forces on professional baseball see Bachin. “At the nexus of labor”, p. 948; Burk. Never just a game, pp. 236-240; Goldman. “Shocking” p. 14. Goldman also points out that Comisky benched pitcher Eddie Cicotte with a month left in the season because he had 29 wins. With one more win Cicotte would have earned a $10,000 bonus.

"Ruether to oppose Cicotte." (October 1, 1919).


Cruisenberry (October 1, 1919). "Kid says Sox will win sure, and Moran says same of Reds." Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 17.

Harvey T. Woodruff (October 1, 1919). "Gleason’s back winning ponies on Latonia card: Bettors for Moran’s crew in big Series chary about wagering." Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 16; "Ruether to oppose Cicotte." (October 1, 1919).

Odds are represented so that the first number signifies the amount wagered, and the second the amount won by a bet of that amount if the team selected wins. So in this instance, a bet of $5 on the Sox would pay $6 if they won.

"Gothamites dig up some bets on Reds: Rumor of Cicotte’s sore arm starts real money a flutter and odds shift." (October 1, 1919). New York Times, p. 13; "Ruether to oppose." (October 1, 1919).

Ryder (October 1, 1919).

"Sox rule 7 to 5 choice in Cincinnati." (October 1, 1919). Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 17.


I.E. Sanborn (October 2, 1919). "Reds drive Cicotte to dugout; Ruether holds for helpless: Five run assault in fourth inning cinches game." Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 21, 22.


Bob Beiser (October 2, 1919). "White Sox fielders forced to do marathon chasing mighty swats of Moran’s sluggers." Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 6, 7.
pitches in 8 innings while Sallee used 88 in 9.” (October 3, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 11.
49 Ryder (October 3, 1919).
51 “American League scribes waver in hopes for White Sox; Missing of corners by Lefty is blamed for defeat of Windy City team.” (October 3, 1919). *Cincinnati Enquirer*, p. 7.
52 Sanborn (October 3, 1919). “Williams wild, passes giving Reds victory; Great support of Sallee is big aid to Moran’s team.” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 21.
53 “Redland is calmer in second victory; Cincinnati fans believed all the time that Moran’s team would win.” (October 3, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 12.
55 Cruisenberry (October 3, 1919); “Notes of the game.” (October 3, 1919). *Cincinnati Enquirer*, p. 6, 8.
57 Lardner. (October 3, 1919). “It’s big scandal!” Lardner’s scandal was the announcement of the wrong names for White Sox players at Cincinnati.
58 Ryder (October 3, 1919).
61 Matthewson, C. (October 3, 1919).
62 “Redland is calmer.” (October 3, 1919); Woodruff (October 3, 1919). “Carnival riot sweeps Cincy, ‘Bury’ the Sox; Celebrants parade city behind brass bands: Hose camp contrast.” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 21, 22.
64 Woodruff (October 3, 1919).
67 Cruisenberry (October 4, 1919).
70 “5,000 Sox park seats unfilled; fans scared off.” (October 4, 1919). *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 17.
71 Lardner. (October 4, 1919). “Lardner turns tide for Sox; quits betting: Ring asks credit where credit is due: reports in pure Cubanola.” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 17, 18.
73 Ryder (October 5, 1919). “Ring whitewashes Sox, giving Reds 3-o-1
lead; Cicotte
suffers his second defeat of Series: Gleason’s star wobbles.” Cincinnati
Enquirer, p. 1, 19; Woodruff, H.T. (October 5, 1919). “Jim Ring’s jinx
driven to cover by superb work: Evil genius of ‘19 season seems to
transfer self to Sox.” Chicago Daily Tribune, p. II-1, 2.
74 “Cincinnati takes fourth game of Series by 2 to 0: Jimmy Ring holds
Chicago team to three hits and is brilliantly supported.” (October 5,
“Cicotte loses, but ‘arm gone’ pipe burns out.” Chicago Daily Tribune,
p. II-1, 2.
75 Charles Dryden (October 5, 1919). “One Ring: Quite enough to
stage a knockout for the White Sox.” Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 20.
76 Beiser (October 5, 1919). “Game by innings: Jimmy Ring easily sets
back the mighty White Sox sluggers.” Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 19, 20;
Sanborn (October 5, 1919). “Cicotte’s boots turn slab duel to Reds’
favor.” Chicago Daily Tribune, p. II-1.
77 Cruisenberry (October 5, 1919).
78 “Notes of the game.” (October 5, 1919). Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 19,
20.
79 Matthews (October 5, 1919). “No luck in Reds victory—Matty:
In only one inning, the sixth, did American Leaguers hit ball hard.” New
80 Johnny Evers (October 5, 1919). “Give Reds flag, dope by Evers after
81 “All night fans driven away by heavy downpour.” (October 5, 1919).
82 “Record betting cause of alarm, starts scandal: Heavy wagering brings
unpleasant comment.” (October 5, 1919). Chicago Daily Tribune, p. II-
2.
83 “Notes of the game.” (October 5, 1919). Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 19,
20.
84 “Rain st Chicago halts the Series: Fifth contest to be played at
Comisky Park today—Eller to oppose Williams.” (October 6, 1919).
85 Ryder (October 6, 1919). “Downpours bawl many thousands of fans;
Give Sox left-handers another day of rest; Fifth game to be played at
Chicago today.” Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 1, 8.
86 “Rain at Chicago.” (October 6, 1919); Cruisenberry (October 6,
1919). “Reds with 3-1 lead find day of loafing is not ‘hard to take.’”
Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 23.
87 Ryder (October 6, 1919); “Reds score 15 runs in four games while
Chicago Sox gather only six.” (October 6, 1919). Cincinnati Enquirer,
p. 8.
88 “Rain at Chicago.” (October 6, 1919)
89 Ibid.
90 “Sox supporters cheer up: New York rooters for Chicago offer even
91 Matthews (October 6, 1919). “Strategy boards at work on Series:
White Sox on the run and need plenty of assistance says Christy
92 Ryder (October 7, 1919). “Eller humbles White Sox, pitching
shutout, practically clinching big Series for Cincinnati: Reds easily land
game bunching three of their four hits in the sixth for four tallies.”
Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 1, 8; Sanborn, I.E. (October 7, 1919).
“Gleason’s machine goes to pieces in fifth of series: ‘Hod’ toys with Sox,
fanning six men in a row for a record.” Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 22.
93 “Analysis shows how ‘Hod’ Eller tamed the Sox: Sends practically
every ball across plate; fans six straight.” (October 7, 1919). Chicago
Daily Tribune, p. 23.
94 Ryder (October 7, 1919); Sanborn, I.E. (October 7, 1919).
95 “Cincinnati again beats White Sox: Reds bench hits in sixth inning and
win fifth World Series game by 5 to 0.” (October 7, 1919). New York
Times, p. 1, 15; Ryder, J. (October 7, 1919).
96 Beiser (October 7, 1919). “Game by innings: Supposed heavy
sluggers of White Sox are easy for Eller.” Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 8, 9;
“Cincinnati again beats White Sox.” (October 7, 1919).
97 “Cincinnati again beats White Sox.” (October 7, 1919); “Schalk will
play today unless Hermann kicks.” (October 7, 1919). Chicago Daily
Tribune, p. 22; Sanborn (October 7, 1919).
98 Ryder (October 7, 1919).
99 Cruisenberry (October 7, 1919). “What is wrong with White Sox?

100 Sanborn (October 7, 1919).


103 Cruisenberry (October 7, 1919).


107 “Series betting ends.” (October 7, 1919).


109 “White Sox rally and defeat Reds.” (October 8, 1919).


111 “White Sox rally and defeat Reds.” (October 8, 1919); “Redland fans are not discouraged: Confident today’s game will decide World’s Series in favor of Cincinnati.” (October 8, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 16.


113 Cruisenberry (October 8, 1919). “Sudden change in Sox causes woe in Cincy: They all thought they’d celebrate last night, now it’s different.” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 17, 18.


115 “Notes of the game.” (October 8, 1919); Ryder (October 8, 1919). Sanborn (October 8, 1919). “Lead of 4 runs is overcome to beat Reds: Dick Kerr hurls to finish; Ruether is knocked off slab.” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 17, 18.

116 Cruisenberry (October 8, 1919).

117 “Lose $60,000 on game: Big sum wagered by Cincinnati businessmen on Reds to win.” (October 8, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 15.


119 “Lose $60,000 on game.” (October 8, 1919).

120 Ryder (October 9, 1919). “Cicotte keeps Sox in Series, trimming Cincinnati 4 to 1; Gameness of little hurler after two defeats sets back Moran’s men.” *Cincinnati Enquirer*, p. 1, 6.

121 “White Sox again beat Cincinnati score is 4 to 1: Knock Slim Sallee out of box and win the seventh game of World Series.” (October 9, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 1, 11.


124 Matthewson (October 9, 1919). “Change in attack beneficial to Sox: Gleason’s men take a swing at every good ball served to them says Matty.” *New York Times*, p. 11.

125 “Inning by inning of the seventh game: Shane Collins scores first two Sox runs, both on singles by Joe Jackson.” (October 9, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 11; “White Sox again beat Cincinnati.” (October 9, 1919).

126 Ryder (October 9, 1919); “Smallest crowd of series sees seventh battle.” (October 9, 1919). *Cincinnati Enquirer*, p. 22.

127 “White Sox again beat Cincinnati.” (October 9, 1919).

128 Cruisenberry (October 9, 1919). “Cincinnati prepares to dress up in mourning robes: All was gay and merry a short while back, now life is empty.” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 21, 22.

129 “Notes of the game.” (October 9, 1919). *Cincinnati Enquirer*, p. 6; “White Sox again beat Cincinnati.” (October 9, 1919).

130 Ibid. and “Notes of the game.” (October 9, 1919). Chicago Daily
Moran’s men have ability to produce hits when they mean runs, says Matty.” New York Times, p. 14.

131 Cruisenberry (October 9, 1919); “‘Sox are right’—Gleason: Predicts defeat of Eller today—‘Reds will come back’ says Moran.” (October 9, 1919). New York Times, p. 11.


133 “‘Sox are right’—Gleason.” (October 9, 1919); “7 to 10 on today’s game: New York fans make White Sox favorites to even up the Series.” (October 9, 1919). New York Times, p. 11.

134 “White Sox again beat.” (October 9, 1919).


136 “Eighth and last game by details: Reds lose no time, but pile up four runs in the very first stanza.” (October 10, 1919). New York Times, p. 14; Ryder (October 10, 1919).

137 Ryder (October 10, 1919).


141 Cruisenberry (October 10, 1919).

142 “Reds defeat Sox in eighth game.” (October 10, 1919).

143 “Sox were outclassed.” (October 10, 1919).


145 Matthewson (October 10, 1919). “Punch of Reds is deciding factor:
Bibliography

“7 to 10 on today’s game: New York fans make White Sox favorites to even up the Series.” (October 9, 1919). New York Times, p. 11.


“5,000 Sox park seats unfilled; fans scared off.” (October 4, 1919). Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 17.

“$2,000,000 changes hands in Gotham Series betting.” (October 10, 1919). Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 19.


Beiser, B. (October 7, 1919). “Game by innings: Supposed heavy sluggers of White Sox are easy for Eller.” Cincinnati Enquirer, p 8, 9.


“Cincinnati takes fourth game of Series by 2 to 0: Jimmy Ring holds Chicago team to three hits and is brilliantly supported.” (October 5, 1919). New York Times, p. II-1.


Cruiseenberry, J. (October 6, 1919). “Reds with 3-1 lead find day of loafing is not ‘hard to take.” Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 23.

Cruisenberry, J. (October 8, 1919). “Sudden change in Sox causes woe in Cincy: They all thought they’d celebrate last night, now it’s different.” Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 17, 18.

Cruisenberry, J. (October 9, 1919). “Cincinnati prepares to dress up in mourning robes: All was gay and merry a short while back, now life is empty.” Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 21, 22.


Eckersall, W. (October 3, 1919). “Chicago ‘wise ones’ are putting their money on the Redlegs: Sharps are laying 5 to 3 that Cincinnati will be champions of world.” Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 8.


“Half holiday today is proclaimed by Mayor: Reception for winning Reds to be held at Fountain Square this morning.” (October 10, 1919). Cincinnati Enquirer, p. 7.


“Inning by inning of the seventh game: Shane Collins scores first two Sox runs, both on singles by Joe Jackson.” (October 9, 1919). New York Times, p. 11.


Matthewson, C. (October 1, 1919). “Pitching is most important factor: Real test for managers rests in naming boxmen and making changes, says Matty; Cicotte may not be fit.” *New York Times,* p. 13.


Matthewson, C. (October 5, 1919). “‘No luck in Reds victory’—Matty: In only one inning, the sixth, did American Leaguers hit ball hard.” *New York Times,* p. II-1.


Matthewson, C. (October 9, 1919). “Change in attack beneficial to Sox: Gleason’s men take a swing at every good ball served to them says Matty.” *New York Times,* p. 11.


“Notes of the game.” (October 3, 1919). *Cincinnati Enquirer,* p. 6, 8.


“Notes of the game.” (October 9, 1919). *Chicago Daily Tribune,* p. 22.

“Notes of the game.” (October 9, 1919). *Cincinnati Enquirer,* p. 6.


“Red money appears.” (October 1, 1919). *Chicago Daily Tribune,* p. 16.


“Redland calmer is calmer in second victory: Cincinnati fans believed all the time that Moran’s team would win.” (October 3, 1919). *New York Times,* p. 12.

“Redland fans are not discouraged: Confident today’s game will decide World’s Series in favor of Cincinnati.” (October 8, 1919). *New York Times,* p. 16.


“Red money appears.” (October 1, 1919). *Chicago Daily Tribune,* p. 16.

“Reds rout White Sox in opening game of series: National Leaguers drive Eddie Cicotte from box in fourth and win, 9 to 1.”

“Reds score 15 runs: In four games while Chicago Sox gather only six.”


“Ruether to oppose Cicotte in the opener: Moran announces that left-hander will pitch against White Sox today.” (October 1, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 13.


Ryder, J. (October 6, 1919). “Downpours balk many thousands of fans; Give Sox left-handers another day of rest; Fifth game to be played at Chicago today.” *Cincinnati Enquirer*, p. 1, 8.


Sanborn, I.E. (October 8, 1919). “Lead of 4 runs is overcome to beat Reds; Dick Kerr hurts to finish; Ruether is knocked off slab.” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 17, 18.

“Schalk will play today unless Hermann kicks.” (October 7, 1919). *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 22.


“‘Sox are right’—Gleason: Predicts defeat of Eller today—‘Reds will come back’ says Moran.” (October 9, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 11.

“Sox rule 7 to 5 choice in Cincinnati.” (October 1, 1919). *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 17.


“Sox were outclassed.” (October 10, 1919). *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. 20.


“White Sox again beat Cincinnati score is 4 to 1: Knock Slim Sallee out of box and win the seventh game of World Series.” (October 9, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 1, 11.


“White Sox rally and defeat Reds: National leaguers are four runs ahead in fifth inning, but lose in the tenth. 5 to 4.” (October 8, 1919). *New York Times*, p. 1.


Woodruff, H.T. (October 5, 1919). “Jim Ring’s jinx driven to cover by superb work: Evil genius of ’19 season seems to transfer self to Sox.” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, p. II-1, 2.
Photography and Reform: Lewis Hine’s Crusade

Against Child Labor, 1908-1918.

Greg Read

From 1908 to 1918 Lewis Hine photographed children at work as a staff photographer for the National Child Labor Committee, an organization based in New York City determined to eliminate child labor throughout the nation. Seeking to offer a more persuasive means of understanding the plight of child laborers, the NCLC decided to use photography extensively to reveal the actual state of child labor. In 1908 the NCLC hired Hine to do field studies and photograph the working conditions of the children who toiled in cotton mills, seafood canneries, coal mines, cotton fields, and on the streets. Through his exhaustive work for the NCLC, Hine became one of the pioneers of using photography as a significant and compelling tool of persuasion during the Progressive era of the early 20th Century.

Starting in 1901, Hine worked as a geography and nature study teacher at the Ethical Culture School in New York City, which served as a progressive institution for Eastern European immigrants. While working there, he also began to photograph activities at the school, further improving his artistic abilities. In 1904, he made his first trip to Ellis Island to chronicle immigrants arriving there. Because an attitude of disdain and fear of immigrants pervaded the thoughts of many Americans, Hine believed that the new arrivals deserved the utmost sympathy and respect. He believed that his photographs could influence society’s opinions. His pictures became the only documentation of the new immigrants in New York, prompting the city’s social reformers to use them in their publications.

Several years later, Hine left teaching to become a full-time photographer. Dr. Felix Adler, president of the NCLC, was also the founder and director of the school where Hine taught. After hearing about Hine’s work with the New York immigrants, Adler met with him in 1907. During this occasion, Hine proposed that the NCLC use his photographic services. After this meeting, Hine wrote a friend about his prospects:

He brought up the question whether it were a safe financial venture which I didn’t argue with him. I was mightily relieved to see he did not oppose the charge but said he could see no other reasons to deter me. Said it might be a good plan to “talk it over with Mr. Lovejoy (NCLC’s general secretary) and get his point of view.” Now I think it best to make the break. Have had the satisfaction of leading the game so far and see no necessity for waiting to be squeezed out.

During the summer of the following year, when the NCLC decided it wanted to use new ways to publicize and dramatize the problem of child labor, the committee hired Hine as its staff photographer. As such, Hine became one of the nation’s first photographers to depict the plight of the poor and the denigrated.
Like many reformer organizations of the early 1900s, the NCLC relied extensively on verifiable facts. The committee knew that to wear away public indifference, it needed persistent propaganda. They produced their findings in magazines and journals such as *Charities and the Commons*, the nation’s leading social work publication, and in the committee’s own newly created quarterly, *The Child Labor Bulletin*. The NCLC never quit searching for new ways to publicize the problem of child labor. Around 1906, the NCLC decided to use photography extensively as a means to sway public opinion in documenting the plight of working children. It eventually hired Hine to take those pictures.\(^9\)

Hine’s first assignment with the NCLC took him to North and South Carolina in late 1908 to photograph the child labor conditions in the state’s cotton mills. As the main industry in the Carolinas, these cotton mills relied heavily on children.

A general conception in society was that children in the mills did very light work. While there was some truth to this, a lot of the jobs performed by the children required working long hours and provided no appropriate trade skills. Many children worked long days and evenings in noisy and humid mills around very dangerous spinning looms. There they toiled as spinners, doffers, and sweepers. Their work was routine, demanding, and unhealthy as the air in the mills was saturated with lint. Their work also kept them from getting even a basic education.\(^10\)

While in the Carolinas, Hine discovered violations of prevailing laws after investigating 19 mills. He found a number of underage workers. One mill in Charlotte, North Caro-

lina employed children under 13, which was the State’s age limit for factory workers.\(^11\) In his photographs of mill workers, Hine noted that a number of the youths had already worked there for several years.\(^12\) In the first article of his published works in *Charities and the Commons* in January 1909, Hine observed to writer A.J. Mc Kelway how many cotton mills skirted around the State’s laws:

In Chester, S.C., an overseer told me frankly that manufacturers all over the South evade the child labor law by letting children who are under age “help” older brothers and sisters. The names of the younger ones do not appear on the company’s books and the pay goes to the older child who is above twelve years (the age limit in South Carolina).\(^13\)

Hine also discovered that educational opportunities for the young workers were almost nonexistent at many mills. At a mill Hine visited in Chester, S.C., he found that there was no schoolhouse accessible to the children. In Dillon, S.C., he heard a number of complaints from some of the adult workers about the general working conditions there. They reported low wages, long hours, pressures of work, and the use of young children.\(^14\) These witnesses told Hine that:

The children themselves overstate their ages, their parents have misstated their ages so long. Illiteracy seems to prevail
here. Many boys and women could not even spell their own names. The mill schoolhouse is a shed-like structure and very small. One boy of ten had worked there for three years and who is now earning 30 cents a day.\textsuperscript{15}

Hine’s ability to get this essential information while investigating the cotton mills resulted from his enduring resourcefulness. By using any means necessary, he entered the cotton mills during any hour of the day to interview many of the working children, often times well past midnight. He would often have to resort to taking notes of the children’s ages and heights while his hands were in his pockets to keep the supervisors from becoming suspicious of his activities. He took pictures of the child workers by convincing the supervisors that he was shooting for a postcard company. If he could not enter the factory, he stayed outside until closing time when he took pictures of the children leaving work.\textsuperscript{16} Throughout 1909 to 1910, Hine continued to find similar child labor conditions and violations of state law in cotton mills in Georgia and Alabama.

In Macon, Georgia he noted the grim future facing many of the families of mill workers. He recorded in one of his pictures of a mill working family that the nineteen-year-old father “began working at 9 years. Makes $1.50 a day now and says he probably can’t get any more as a weaver. Many of them marry young.”\textsuperscript{17} Both Hine and McKelway voiced their plea to end child labor in publications that ran their investigations in these states. McKelway questioned in Charities and the Commons what the public intended to do about the problem:

What are the legislators going to do about it? The fate of thousands of children is in their hands. They can, if they will, abolish child labor in these states, compel the children to attend school, raise their standard of legislation to that of the rest of the civilized world, and enforce their laws by providing for adequate factory inspection.

McKelway continued his article by criticizing the plight of the young laborers:

There can be no doubt that the present laws, shamefully low in their requirements, are violated openly, and when violation of law means destruction of childhood, law should be enforced regardless of the feeling of very respectable gentlemen who create a demand for child labor in mills, which ignorant and indifferent parents supply. The children are helpless, and their appeal for protection must be addressed to those who make and execute the laws.\textsuperscript{18}

Much like the conditions in the states where the cotton mills were the main industry, the rest of the nation continued to exploit children, either legally or illegally, for measly wages and permitted them to work under harsh and demoralizing con-
ditions. The 1900 census made clear the extent of child labor in the United States revealing that 1,750,178 children, or 18.2 percent of the children between the ages of 10 and 15, were employed. However, the census failed to account for the number of working children under the age of 10 who often performed the same dangerous and degrading work as their older co-workers. Because of the incomplete count of child workers, social reformers conservatively estimated that the total number exceeded 2 million.  

During Hine’s work in the South, southern reformers began to take notice of the plight of child laborers in their region. In March 1909, 200 hundred people from various Southern states, including the governors of Mississippi and Louisiana, met in New Orleans for the inaugural of the Southern States Child Labor Conference. Absent were those who believed that child labor laws in their states were adequate and needed no revision. However, Louisiana’s governor, Jared Sanders, after seeing reports from Hine and the NCLC, urged Southern states’ representatives to “enact uniform child labor laws for the betterment and protection of our womanhood and childhood.”

Between investigations into the cotton mills in the South, Hine also provided information and pictures of children involved in the street trades in St. Louis, as well as other cities on the East Coast. From 1909 through 1912, Hine worked the streets where children labored as newsies, messengers, and bootblacks at all the hours of the day. It became more of a challenge to invoke sympathy toward these children since a strong sentiment favored this type of work for them as fostering an element of independence as “little merchants.” Hine attempted to contradict those notions of innocent occupations by underscoring the real dangers these children faced. While these children worked (some as young as five) they were often in an environment in which they battled physical danger from heavy car and trolley traffic. They also worked in conditions which kept them from maintaining regular eating and sleep habits. Many took up smoking, drinking, and gambling. A lot of the messenger boys became involved with drugs and prostitution while working in the red-light districts where their jobs took them.

In a report to the NCLC on the street trades, Hine provided this example of a street worker:

> The street trades, after they have been divested of the false sentimentalism that has surrounded them for so long, stand before us as “dangerous occupations”, if the boys are not properly supervised and directed in their work. For example, Richard Pierce, 14 years of age, nine months in service, works from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. Smokes. Visits houses of prostitution.

While it continued to compile and publish its accounts on child labor, the NCLC decided to expose the appalling conditions in the fish canneries situated mainly along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Since this industry used a lot of immigrant labor, Hine focused on these families and their children in his photos and reports. On the promise of higher wages, the can-
neries sought Middle European and Italian immigrants from Eastern cities and herded them by train or boat to live and work in the canneries during the harvest season which lasted until the fall.

Hine witnessed firsthand the harsh realities of the canning work. Beginning at 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning, whole families, including children as young as three years old, worked in the shucking sheds. Opening the sharp, tough oyster shells, workers’ hands and fingers often bled. Plucking shrimp became an even more odious task as the raw shrimp emitted a corrosive liquid that ate through workers clothes and shoes. The workers endured these conditions to collect the meat, which was weighed every day to determine their pay. In a report to the NCLC on the working conditions at a cannery in Biloxi, Mississippi, Hine said:

They were working on shrimps, which are very cold as they are kept iced. It was a cold day and the wind was blowing through the shed to some extent. It is marvelous how they stand this kind of work. Small children like Maud and Grace Daly seem condemned to work in the canneries. Behind five year-old immigrant shrimp picker Manuel lies a mountain of child-labor oyster shells which serves as a monument of mute testimony to the patient toil of little fingers.

Hine produced a huge amount of photographic evidence in just a couple of years, which greatly benefited the NCLC. By late 1909 Hine had taken more than 800 pictures and traveled thousands of miles for the NCLC to document the child textile mill workers in the South, the seafood canneries in the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and the street workers in the nation’s largest cities. Along with his photographs, Hine offered the NCLC hundreds of detailed reports, which often contained his strong emotions of what he witnessed. These notes also included his conversations with the child workers, their parents, the mill owners, and public officials. At an exhibit of Hine’s work at an NCLC conference in Birmingham, Alabama, a journalist covering the event reported on Hine’s effectiveness at depicting the drudgery of child labor:

There has been no more convincing proof of the absolute necessity of the child labor laws and the immediate need of such an enforcement than by these pictures, showing the suffering, the degradation, the immoral influences, the utter lack of anything that is wholesome in the lives of these poor little wage earners. They speak for more eloquently than any work.

That convincing proof grew out of Hine’s confidence in the power of photography in working for social reform. He also shared the outrage that the NCLC held on the issue of child labor; which showed in his photographic work and in
statements he made during some of his public lectures on the issue. During a speech before a meeting of the National Conference of Charities and Correction during the early part of his tenure with the NCLC, Hine commented on his work:

The photograph possesses an added realism of its own ... For this reason the average person believes implicitly that the photograph cannot falsify. A photograph is often more effective than the reality would have been, because, in the picture, the non-essential and conflicting interests have been eliminated. The photograph has an added realism of its own, what a lever we have for the social uplift.\(^{29}\)

At the same convention, Hine also indicated how deeply committed he was to the issue of child labor reform:

Perhaps you are weary of child labor pictures. Well, so are the rest of us, but we propose to make you and the whole country so sick and tired of the whole business that when the time for action comes, child-labor pictures will be records of the past.\(^{30}\)

The work of Hine and the NCLC slowly began to come to fruition. By 1912 all the Southern states had enacted laws setting a minimum age and the number of hours children could work. The laws still did not live up to those from states in the rest of the nation because they favored the manufacturers in the textile states of Georgia and the Carolinas. Also, many Southern states failed to enforce even the lax codes on the books.\(^{31}\) Later that same year, the NCLC helped to advance the creation of a United States Children’s Bureau as part of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Children’s Bureau became active in investigating the working conditions of child laborers, along with mobilizing public opinion against child labor.\(^{32}\)

Although the NCLC had some success in changing various states’ laws, and in getting the attention of the federal government to take action against child labor, Hine continued to work revealing other areas where child labor thrived. In the fall of 1913, Hine traveled to Texas to report on the children engaged in picking cotton. In the cotton fields, child workers performed the same tiresome labor as their parents. Doing this backbreaking work exposed the children to the hot sun or a driving, chilling rain. The act of picking cotton required them to bend and stoop for long hours performing a dull, repetitive chore.\(^{33}\)

Hine found in his investigations that these children had no other fulfillment in their lives. In a February 7, 1914 article entitled “Children or Cotton? Raising the Question of Cotton Picking in Texas,” Hine observed how field work turned the child cotton pickers into tiny machines:

The motions are simple and easily learned. After that it is a question of nimble fingers and endurance. Pick,
pick, pick, pick, drop into the bag, a step forward. Pick, pick, drop into the bag, step forward; one hundred bolls a minute, six thousand an hour, seventy-five thousand a day. This for six days in the week, five months in the year, under a relentless sun. To such a life and such a future a quarter of a million children are condemned in the one state of Texas so long as this condition is tolerated. No wonder a school superintendent told me: “Cotton is a curse to the Texas children.”

His article further reported some of the ages of the children and the conditions under which they worked along with accompanying photos. He witnessed children as young as four years old picking cotton throughout the entire day under a very hot sun. They labored well after the sun set, leaving the evening work to older children around six or seven.

In order to humanize many of the children he witnessed, Hine often directly interviewed many of the workers he encountered. This account provided an example on how he personalized one of the young female cotton pickers:

Millie, aged four, was picking eight pounds a day when I saw her, and Mellie, her sister, five years old, thirty pounds a day. Ruby, a seven-year-old girl on another farm stopped picking long enough to say, as I stood by her, “I works from sun-up to sun-down, an’ picks thirty-five pounds a day.”

He later reported that more than half of the cotton farmers in the state migrated to other farms every two or three years in search of better conditions. They endured serious debt while paying high mortgages. The families also had high illiteracy rates. The dependence on the sole cotton crop kept them in this vicious circle. In order for the families to make ends meet, they resorted to using their young children as laborers on the cotton farms. Because of the long working hours, many of the children lost any opportunity to obtain an education. He ended his article by proclaiming that this work turned the children into machines who suffered a grinding and degrading existence. His article ended with his demand to improve the conditions for the children:

Therefore it is that I place first and foremost in any program of change the restriction of child labor. Children must be left free to go to school. The school year must be lengthened and attendance required through the entire term. This is obviously and immediately necessary. Patriotism demands that we save the children, lay the foundation for the farmer of tomorrow by a longer period of childhood, better preparation for work, better training for life.
Hine continued to voice his disgust with child labor in other publications. In the May 1914 edition of *The Child Labor Bulletin*, (one of the publications of the NCLC) Hine expanded on what he wrote in the February 7, 1914 edition of *The Survey*. The article, "The High Cost of Child Labor," summarized his experiences in the field where he witnessed firsthand what the child laborers were enduring from the canneries in Maine to the fields of Texas. He described the children who first began to work as having "happy hearts and faces, for work is fun at first." Later he described them as becoming a "human junk pile, before their lives are fairly well started." His article later asked rhetorically what the cost of child labor is on society:

What are we doing when we place this industrial mortgage of premature toil on the shoulders of the little ones? How can they pay? Too often the mortgage is foreclosed and the cost falls on society. Whatever industry saves by child labor, society pays over and over. This is because child labor works in a vicious cycle. In the first place, children have an inadequate preparation for life. This poor start and constant toil keep the worker from improving his condition...All through the country we find a growing conviction among manufacturers and communities as well, that child-made goods are not worth the price. None of the interested parties are benefited. For the child it is a delusion from every point of view. For industry it is a fallacy - wasteful, unprofitable, and inefficient. For society it is a menace - wrecking lives, breaking homes, and ruining citizens. WE CANNOT AFFORD CHILD LABOR. IT COSTS TOO MUCH.  

Throughout 1914 the demands to end child labor increased. The NCLC reported that their ten years of work was beginning to have an effect on many state laws. In a November 13, 1914 article covering the NCLC's tenth anniversary conference, the *New York Times* compared the number of states that had child labor laws in 1904 to the number of states that enacted legislation over the past year. In 1904, there were 13 states which had a straight 14-year age limit for all factory workers. The laws also accommodated the use of factory inspectors to enforce the laws. By 1914, 34 states had enacted laws with the same age limit and required factory inspections. During the fall of 1914, the U.S. House Committee on Labor also began drafting legislation for a federal child labor law.  

Beginning in 1915, Hine spent most of his time lecturing to child labor opponents while continuing to report from the field. He took advantage of every speaking engagement to present the real life factors behind his photographs and reports. While addressing an NCLC meeting in Asheville, North Carolina in January 1915, Hine attacked the labor conditions in that state, which had yet to deal with the problem.
There has been a marked improvement in the general situation during the last five years, but very young children are working today in North Carolina mills. I found two little sisters spinning whose grandmother told me they were only six and seven years old. I found two boys under twelve whose hands had been mutilated in the mill. And I found any number of ten- and eleven-year-old children working an eleven-hour day (during the school term) at tasks involving eyestrain and muscle strain. Is it any wonder, therefore, that I found a whole family of which not one could write his name?  

Hine’s address to the committee in North Carolina drew a quick response from the state’s textile mill representatives, including the editor of the Southern Textile Bulletin, the cotton mills’ trade publication. The editor, David Clark, disputed the committee’s findings and said that the conditions reported were exaggerated giving an impression that the conditions represent the entire industry. He also asserted that a lot of Northern states still had not eliminated much of their child labor problems and he commented on Hine’s pictures:

The pictures which your committee has published as representative of conditions in the southern textile mills show thin, emaciated children that look too weak to stand. But I am willing to wager that children in the mill districts, boy for boy, can lick any other class of boys in America. I have never seen a statement issued by the Child Labor Committee that did not exaggerate conditions and tell half truths. They take isolated cases and create the impression that they are representative.

A number of representatives from the U.S. Senate also attended that meeting, which resulted in the introduction of the Palmer-Owen Child Labor Bill two months later. While Congress debated the bill in Washington, Hine continued his trek across the nation to compile still more photographic evidence. In March 1916, Hine returned to the canneries of the Atlantic and the Gulf Coasts. This time, however, he took an interest in the educational opportunities available for the canny children. He found that although most of the canneries had local schools available, the majority of the children did not attend them during the day. He found that some of the children, especially in the Atlantic Coast, did have some parochial schools which the children attended at night. But the Gulf Coast had only a very small percentage of the working children actually attending any school; and the inspection of the canneries was very lax.

As Hine worked to reveal the laxity in the states’ enforcement of their child labor laws, Congress began steps to create a national child labor law. The Owen-Keating Child
Labor Bill of 1916 would ensure that no one under 16 could be employed in mines or quarries, and that children under 14 could not be employed in mills, factories, canneries, and other manufacturing companies for more than eight hours a day, or six days a week, or at night.\(^4\) When the bill made its way to the Senate in July, a number of senators from the South opposed the bill because their respective states still employed a lot of child laborers. Their main rational was that the states, not the federal government, should regulate any labor conditions.\(^4\) An editorial in the July 22, 1916 edition of the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* reflected this opposition in light of the fact that President Woodrow Wilson strongly supported the bill:

> Any presidential interference to bring about the passage of the measure is certain to arouse the bitterest opposition from many congressmen who have been earnest supporters of the president in practically all his policies, but who are prepared to denounce in the most violent manner executive interference with what is distinctively a legislative matter, who resent the centralizing provisions of the proposed bill and the sacrifice it makes of state rights...If Congress claims authority over certain factories and industries because there are young children employed in them, it can easily extend its jurisdiction over nearly every industry and interest...The true remedy for the evil of child labor lies in the states themselves.\(^4\)

Despite the opposition of the Southern states, the Senate passed the legislation on August 9, 1916,\(^5\) and President Wilson signed the bill a month later.\(^6\) Even though the NCLC saw the passage of a national child labor law, it moved on to other problems facing child laborers: more powerful state legislation, school attendance, improved educational opportunities, and the effects of migratory work.\(^7\) Hine, however, began to slow down his field reporting and photography for the NCLC. It was also using less and less photography by the end of 1916. Because of its shift in emphasis in how it wanted to present the future of child labor, the committee decided to cut Hine's salary. This resulted in Hine making the decision to leave the NCLC to work on other photographic projects.\(^8\)

Between 1908 and 1918, Lewis Hine logged tens of thousands of miles and took thousands of photographs for the NCLC. His sole mission during his tenure with the committee was to provide a means to persuade the nation that the child labor practices damaged children physically, intellectually, and emotionally. Through his work as a social documentary photographer, he succeeded in his mission for better conditions for the working children because of his ability to register the facts clearly with so many circumstances, settings, and groups of people while letting the humanity of his subjects tell the story of child labor.\(^9\) His work proved that photography could go beyond being a record of events, thereby serving as a powerful tool for social change. The camera, he believed, needed to show situations that called for organized help, and the pho-
Photographs served as a persuasive, truthful means of communication. Owen Lovejoy, the chairman of the NCLC, in a later interview remarked on Hine's photographic talents:

The work Hine did for this reform was more responsible than all other efforts in bringing the need to public attention. The evils were intellectually but not emotionally recognized until his skill, vision, and artistic finesse focuses the camera intelligently on these social problems.
NCLC Publications, March 1912, p. 3.
29 Kemp, Photographs of Child Labor, p. 10.
30 “Highlights of Child Labor Conference,” Birmingham Age-Herald,
March 11, 1911, p. 49.
Social Uplift,” in Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities
32 Ibid., p. 344.
33 Kemp, Photographs of Child Labor, p. 11.
34 Goldberg, Lewis W. Hine: Children at Work, p. 19.
35 Curtis, Photography and Reform, p. 41.
36 Hine, “Children or Cotton? Raising the Question of Cotton Picking in
37 Ibid., p. 589.
38 Ibid., p. 592.
39 Ibid., p. 590.
40 Ibid., p. 582.
York, May 1914, p. 63.
42 Ibid., p. 66-67.
47 Trattner, Crusade for the Children, p. 125.
48 Kemp, Photographs of Child Labor, p. 23.
49 “Forbid Child Labor Is Preacher’s Plea,” New York Times, January 24,
1916, p.11.
p. 6.
53 Curtis, Photography and Reform, p. 43.
54 Goldberg, Lewis W. Hine: Children At Work, p. 16.
55 Bethune, Beverly M., American Journalism, volume 11, number 3.
56 “The Interpretive Photography of Lewis W. Hine,” PM Weekly, August
25, 1946, p.36.
Bibliography

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


Goldberg, Vicki, Lewis W. Hine: Children At Work, New York: Prestel, 1999
The Role of the Press in Involuntary Sterilization of Carrie Buck and the Eugenics Movement: 1910-1935

Andrea O’Rourke

Abstract

The beginning of the 20th century marked radical changes in societal thinking. Social Darwinism and early heredity studies triggered a steady growth within the eugenics movement that through the heavy use of media and propaganda, promoted breeding of superior people. In the United States the eugenics movement also promoted sexual sterilization of people from supposedly weaker genetic pools. Carrie Buck, a young woman whose mental inadequacy remains to be proven, became a test case for the first sexual sterilization law to be brought up and approved by the United States Supreme Court. The press at the time largely supported what then seemed to be a scientifically and morally sound surgical procedure. Carrie Buck remained anonymous to the masses of her era.

Academia has researched an ample amount of material available on the topic of eugenics and sexual sterilization of people who were at the time considered mentally disabled. However, through the research the author has not discovered any previous study that has examined the link between the media of the time and the eugenics movement or particularly the press coverage of the sexual sterilization of Carrie Buck. Therefore, the perspective this paper takes in examining the relationship between the eugenics movement and the press of the time appears to be unique.

The method used for this work consisted of a systematic research of relevant books and through library indexes to identifying relevant magazine and newspaper articles. The author had limited resources and had used the cited articles based on their availability. The books were generally used as a source for background information about Carrie Buck’s life, the eugenics movement, and the problem of sterilization of people with mental disabilities. All of that information served as a valuable backdrop to the main study. The press coverage of the eugenics movement seems unique.

The study can easily be replicated, however, with more being done to thoroughly investigate the topic. Further research of this topic is needed to fully address the issue and to compare the findings with this paper. Since the manuscript is about Virginia, the Richmond Times-Dispatch and the Charlottesville Progress (the most prominent newspapers in the state), it also needs to be examined carefully. Because of their unavailability, the author was not able to include that research into the work.
Introduction

At the age of three, Carrie Buck was adopted by the Dobbs. Even though the house they lived in was much more comfortable than anything she had ever experienced, she never really felt like an equal family member; rather, she remembered the long hours of daily endless work. The Dobbs really just performed an “act of kindness”1 when they adopted her. They thought they saved little Carrie from her loose immoral mother. Carrie was always aware that the Dobbs were not her real parents; she called them “the Dobbs.”2

Carrie’s mother, Emma Buck was not popular among the citizens of Charlottesville, Virginia. Her husband, Frank Buck, died in an accident, although according to the gossip, he left Emma. Rumor also had it that Carrie was Emma’s illegitimate child. Nevertheless, Emma was left alone to take care of herself and her daughter. Having no income, she decided to prostitute herself to make a living. Poverty stricken and living an immoral life, Emma lost her daughter as Carrie was put up for adoption to be protected from the harmful influence of her mother. Even though Carrie was placed in foster care, she did not get a new family, but rather a job.

At the Dobbs’ house she was a hardworking servant, and despite the days she spent in school (which she thoroughly enjoyed) she assumed an inferior position in the household. She was often suspected of her mother’s reputation and took the blame for her wrongdoing.

At the age of 17, Carrie got pregnant. The Dobbs insisted that she be taken away to the Central Virginia Training Center. Carrie’s pregnancy was proof to the Dobbs, and to many others, that she had inherited her mother’s “bad” genes.

The Dobbs claimed that a good family and a solid socioeconomic status could not save this girl from her predetermination to adultery, an immoral life, and mental inadequacy. According to Carrie, she did not get pregnant because she was “loose,” but because she was raped by a nephew of the Dobbs family. That being the case, the Dobbs had plenty of motivation to get rid of Carrie and save themselves from the shame and scandal that might have followed such a revelation.

J.T. Dobbs, who worked as a town peace officer, filed the necessary papers for Carrie to be submitted to the institution for epileptics and the feeble-minded. He did the same as he had for Emma Buck just several years prior to that. The popular consensus at the time was that moral inadequacy equaled mental inadequacy. Society did not need to be burdened with immorals, those contaminated with bad genes, the impoverished, alcoholics, the mentally retarded, beggars, and especially loose women who would procreate and produce more of these “low-class” people. So, Carrie Buck was taken away immediately after delivering her baby girl, Vivian.

In the clinic, Carrie became an easy test case for Virginia’s sexual sterilization law to pass the Supreme Court. Even though many women in the clinic were already sterilized under the excuse that they had some pelvic disease, Carrie’s case was the one brought to Virginia’s court and finally to the United States Supreme Court. On May 2nd, 1927, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Virginia bill of eugenic sterilization. Eight months later Carrie was sterilized.
Background

The idea of sterilizing mentally or genetically inferior people developed from the eugenics school of teaching. Eugenics became prevalent in the first part of the 20th century as a dominant school of thought across academic circles in the United States, and across the world as well. The basic idea of eugenics stemmed from the notion that the genetic pool of people determined the quality of their life. The United States was one of the countries, along with Germany, that chose to focus on the so-called negative eugenics, which dealt with eliminating or stopping the defective genes from reproducing. In other words, the eugenics movement promoted sexual sterilization as a means of fixing social problems such as pauperism, criminality, prostitution, adultery, begging and various other social ills of the time. Interestingly, the pioneer in eugenics was Great Britain; which, employed a positive approach to eugenics. It focused on educating and encouraging people with “good genes” to intermix and have children.

The eugenics movement in the United States blossomed in the first three decades of the 20th century thanks to the socioeconomic and political atmosphere. Following the Civil War, industry developed and large-scale migration from rural to urban areas began. Immediately before, and after World War I, large numbers of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe flooded the East Coast of the states. Labor exploitation coupled with a fast growing working class posed a threat to the declining numbers of the country’s elite. The social programs did not do enough; therefore, government at the State level became more involved to try to eliminate people with unwanted behavior from society. This idea was strengthened by the so-called notion of “Social Darwinism,” where the “fittest” survive. The general belief was that if a society were to prevent just one case of a social degenerate, then the same society would immediately save thousands of dollars. However, the standard for determining who would be a candidate for sterilization was not easy to determine.3

Harry Laughlin, the director of the Eugenics Records Center who wrote the model for state sterilization laws declared:

All persons in the State who, because of degenerate or defective hereditary qualities are potential parents of socially inadequate offspring, regardless of whether such persons be in the population at large or inmates of custodial institutions, regardless also of the personality, sex, age, marital condition, race, or possessions of such person.4

This became the basic framework of the eugenics movement. The director of the eugenics research also added that the state’s motive was “purely eugenic, that is, to prevent certain degenerate human stock from reproducing its kind.”5 The emphasis was placed on the welfare of the society and the potential threat the society faced unless the degenerates’ reproduction was restricted. Discussions on individual freedom, right to privacy, or even a clear definition of what makes one genetically inferior were overshadowed by the urge to better the quality of society’s life.
Virginia Sterilization Law

The Virginia Sterilization Bill of 1924 was brought in front of the Supreme Court in order for sterilization to be approved as a legal practice. Many states had sterilization statutes before Virginia, including: Indiana, Washington, California, Connecticut, New Jersey, Iowa, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Michigan, Kansas, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Oregon, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Montana, Delaware, Idaho, Minnesota, Utah and Maine. In fact, 23 states of the Union, and one Canadian province, had enacted sterilization statutes. The Virginia Bill stated that a superintendent of an institution for the mentally retarded could initiate a petition for sterilization of any inmate.%

The Role of Media in Society’s Point of View

The first quarter of the 20th century in the United States marked changes of a national as well as global scope. At that point, the American public became increasingly aware of international politics. The First World War, the earlier Civil War, and the ensuing industrial and academic developments that followed, triggered in people a greater desire to find pleasures in connecting with the world and trying to feel a part of that world.

The New York Times, as well as the Atlanta Constitution, focused greatly on international politics. The economic state of the country was another favorite topic of discussion. Fashion, beauty products and clothing advertisements covered pages of every edition of these daily newspapers. The women were offered food supplements that promised to help them gain weight, because, “no one looks at a skinny woman,” as one of the advertisements from 1927 stated in the Atlanta Constitution. Judging by the media, people altogether were occupied with trying to improve their standard of living.

The media overall adopted the popular belief of the new scientists and reported accordingly. It appears as though criticism of eugenics thought in the American press were few. In fact, in the press sample examined, the reporters were more likely to report on the eugenics development enthusiastically, and, to have a positive tone in their articles, particularly during times of hardship when the country was experiencing difficulties of one sort or another. An example comes from an article titled “Superior Classes’ Urged to Procreate: Must Have More Numerous Progeny, Professor Tells Eugenists.” Another article from 1913 published in American Magazine warned readers that the “village girls who had illegitimate children” might be medically, pedagogically, psychologically, or sociologically “feebleminded.”

The sociology of the time emphasized the importance of an individual as being part of the greater framework of society. The more individualist beliefs were part of the 19th century, in the era prior to modernization, multinational capitalism and urbanization. People then did not need to deal with their common societal problems. In contemporary times, living had taken a more complex turn. Society and individuals had become more interdependent; one needed to act for the sake of the society at large. It was the mutual dependence between the persons and the society that was seen. The public in fact was bombarded with lectures on eugenics. Ethical, women’s and health groups together with philosophical societies all staged lectures for the public. Even the YMCA par-
ticipated in this.\textsuperscript{10} Often the lectures were incorporated into entertaining shows that demonstrated the dangers of the mentally retarded or simply put on contests for electing the parents for “fit” babies.\textsuperscript{11}

However, the first decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in the United States were marked with the study of degeneration and preservation of the “germplasm.” In much the same way that Nazi Germany wanted to preserve the elite class of people and eliminate the lower class, the American (the British as well) academic circles fiercely propagated the need to sterilize the social misfits in order to save the Nation. One of the advocates of sterilization of unfit population, Martin Barr, said:

What in the beginning was a philanthropic purpose pure and simple, having as its object the most needy and therefore naturally directed toward paupers and idiots now assumes the proportions of a socialistic reform as a matter of self-preservation, a necessity to preserve the nation from the encroachments of imbecility, of crime, and of all the fateful heredities of a highly nervous age.\textsuperscript{12}

In fact, sterilization was not seen as a controversial subject, but rather an expected rational measure. Individual rights were not discussed. The notion of individual rights did not exist in this era. Carrie Buck was not seen as a person with rights, but as a piece of the larger societal puzzle. The Western State Hospital of Virginia, where Carrie Buck and her mother lived, received a report from

Joseph DeJarnette. In the report he wrote:

In the case of the farmer in breeding his hogs, horses, cows, sheep, etc, he selects a thoroughbred, and even in farm and garden products he selects the best seed to produce from, but when it comes to our own race any sort of seed seems to be good enough, and the rights of the syphilitic, epileptic, imbecile, drunkard and unfit generally to reproduce must be allowed, for otherwise we are encroaching upon the so-called inalienable rights of man.\textsuperscript{13}

Eugenics Work and Their Influence on the Media

“To be a good animal is the first requisite to success in life, and to be a Nation of good animals is the first condition to National prosperity,”\textsuperscript{14} said Herbert Spencer applying evolutionary theory to sociology. Spencer helped promote his ideas among the academic and philosophical circles of people. Many eugenics advocates held prominent positions in societies and promoted this framework of thinking to political as well as popular levels. Virginia sterilization law was pushed by state senator Aubrey Strode (publicly known as a social reformer) and Albert Priddy, who was at the time superintendent at the Virginia Colony of the Epileptic and Feeble-Minded.\textsuperscript{15}

One of the most prominent and influential persons among eugenics advocates was Harry Hamilton Laughlin. Laughlin was the superintendent of the Records Office of Eugenics. Besides travelling, lecturing and fund raising, he also
wrote books and articles on eugenic sterilization, genetics, and immigration restrictions of ‘socially inadequate’ Southern and Eastern European immigrants. He was the editor and the main writer for the *Eugenical News*, a monthly magazine that targeted the general public from 1916. Interestingly, he designed the state’s eugenic model of sterilization laws that ended up being used by over 30 states, including Germany.17

**Reporting on Eugenics**

*Harpers* magazine reported on eugenics from a scientific perspective. Often the writers were biologists trying to prove the premises of the eugenics theory. The principles of heredity studied in laboratories were often used as a base to portray what the future of the United States would look like if eugenics birth control was not used. For example, “Every Roumanian infected with infantile paralysis, every Indian with smallpox, every rat with plague, diminishes the probable length of my life.”18

*Harpers* tended to publish pro-eugenics articles with the emphasis on controlling the immigration flood. The sterilization of mentally challenged people was not seen as an urgent or necessary step. Even though it agreed that ‘feeblemindedness’ was strongly inherited, it was thought that the “segregation or massacre”19 of the feeble-minded would not stamp out that condition. The most controversial subject debated in *Harpers* was stopping the influx of unintelligent immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. These immigrants were seen as responsible for societal problems in America. Another biologist drew this conclusion:

Another evidence of the fact that our former policy of the “open door” to all comers has debased our human stock is seen in the great number of foreign-born persons in our custodial institutions. In 1922 about one-eight of the total population of the United States was foreign-born; this one-eighth furnished one-third of all the insane in our asylums, one-quarter of all the paupers in our almshouses, and one-sixth of all the prisoners in our jails and penitentiaries.20

The authors of *Harpers* proposed selective breeding, choosing only the “finest stock” for the American melting pot.21 Otherwise, the United States was to disappear culturally and nationally, just like ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome.22 The main reason for the gradual annihilation of American society was the subordination of social duties to personal freedom. In other words, had the individuals in the society been willing to sacrifice their personal freedom for the good of the society, than it would have been possible to develop a superior country that would not join in the “ghostly procession”23 of the former great civilizations.

The openly racist *Literary Digest* encouraged establishment of the caste system.24 The caste system was seen as a patriotic act that could save the Nation from its destruction by the inferiors’ gene pool. The reporting, very much similar to *Harpers*, was cluttered with biological examples of how even animals do not mate randomly. The *Literary Digest* message was openly blunt, “the ability to retain superiority
(…) is a primary necessity in racial progress, and the mating of like with like is a natural law too deep-seated and too-well established to be set-aside by political systems.”

McClure's magazine adopted a personal note when reporting on eugenics. Rather than debating on the good of the society, like Harpers, McClure wrote about “tips” for finding an appropriate mate. Openly supportive of marrying within a class (even supporting marriage of first cousins) and avoiding mates with a history of mental deficiency, writers for McClure proposed investigation of family health history. Writing for laymen, McClure's advised that “choosing a wife scientifically is much like picking mushrooms – the expert can do safely much that looks risky to the unlearned.”

The New York Times discussed the eugenics philosophy in various ways. In this newspaper, reporters and readers wrote letters to the editor, unlike in magazines, where scientists wrote the majority of the articles. The bulk of the paper’s coverage of eugenics could be divided into several topics: church and eugenics, eugenics as an international movement, positive and negative eugenics, and occasional questioning of the eugenics philosophy. Despite its extensive coverage of eugenics, the paper did not publish any discussion on the case of Carrie Buck.

The New York Times clearly distinguished between the so-called positive and negative eugenics. The positive eugenics propagated encouragement of procreation of the superior class, while the negative eugenics focused on sterilization or birth control of the inferior or the “unfit.” The major problem of the time was that the educated, i.e. superior, tended to have small families or no family, while the inferior tended to overproduce. Many articles argued that the eugenics movement of the time unnecessarily focused on negative eugenics. However, the majority of the articles supported controlled procreation of mentally ill.

Church played an important role in propagating sterilization. This was part of a larger international eugenics movement in which bishops took active roles in the “advocation of repressive measures against breeding the unfit.” By taking this stand, churches not only advocated the creation of the perfect Kingdom of God on Earth, but also put their members among the superior and fitter class of people. Missionaries' sons excelled as students in prestigious universities such as Harvard and Yale, the New York Times reported.

Some mild questioning of the eugenics philosophy appeared among the array of pro-eugenics articles in the New York Times. The majority of those arguments dealt with the old debate of nature versus nurture; i.e., what role the environment plays in a person's biologically inherited make-up. One of the most prominent articles opposing eugenics was published on a front page. Harvard University decided not to establish a eugenics course that would teach the treatment of defectives by surgical procedures.

Despite the number of articles linking emotional insanity to crime and the destruction of the Nation, some rare articles represented the mentally ill. In one instance, an article reported on the growing numbers of mentally ill children who were enrolling in schools. In another instance, the mistreatment of mentally ill children at an institution was exposed. However, even on these rare occasions where the rights of the “unfortunate” were addressed, no article men-
tioned personal rights to reproduce. Carrie Buck remained an anonymous figure even during the years of her trial.

**Buck vs. Bell**

The Carrie Buck case was first heard in the Circuit Court. After that, it was carried to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, after which, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Carrie Buck was described in the Supreme Court as a low-grade moron. The Superintendent at the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-minded, Albert Priddy, described Carrie as a person of 18 years of chronological age with a mental age of 9 years. Carrie’s mother, Emma Buck was said to be 7 years and 11 months of mental age. “These people belong to the shiftless, ignorant and worthless class of anti-social whites of the South.” The Supreme Court upheld the Virginia Statute in every feature.

Carrie Buck’s defense was based first on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. However, even though it guaranteed protection to all people in front of the law, the Equal Protection Clause traditionally was applied to cases of racial discrimination. To defend Carrie Buck was a difficult task because the leaders standing behind the Virginia’s sterilization law were the prominent, reputable state senator Aubrey Strode and Albert Priddy, the superintendent at the Virginia Colony for the Epileptic and Feeble-minded. Strode and Priddy were close friends and both known as social reformers.

**Buck v. Bell Framed by the Media**

“It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” These were the words Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes used in delivering the Court’s decision.

Holmes shared his opinion with many reporters as well. *The New York Times*, in its article from May 3, 1927 immediately following the Court decision, highlighted Virginia’s Sterilization Law as having the right to protect society while operating on the “feeble-minded.” The article focused on the forceful words of Justice Holmes, who was a supporter of eugenics. Holmes’ character seemed to be the center of attention, even to the extent that the reporter did not investigate the case closely, nor did he check the facts. The article did not point at any controversies about involuntary sterilization. In fact, Carrie Buck was not the focus of the press discussion. She was treated as a feeble-minded person at the time – with no respect nor rights of a regular civilian. However, this reporter was not alone in such coverage.

A similar article was published the same day in the *Atlanta Constitution*. Still focusing on Justice Holmes’ comments, this article stated that “compulsory surgical sterilization of insane, feeble-minded and epileptics has been approved.” Similarly, as in the previously stated article from the *New York Times*, the information given has not been verified. Carrie Buck was not diagnosed as insane, epileptic, or feeble-minded. It was actually during this case that the court tried to determine whether Carrie was feeble-minded. This too was not clearly determined. It was suggested that she was likely to get into illicit sexual relationships, and the fact that she had
had a baby made the court decide she was morally inadequate and therefore mentally inadequate.

Furthermore, both of the articles stated that Carrie was a daughter of a feeble-minded mother and that, in turn, Carrie was now the mother of a feeble-minded daughter. Vivian’s school report cards, on the other hand, showed that the girl was an “honor roll” student. What was the evidence of Carrie Buck being feeble-minded? One of the attributions stated in the courtroom listed “a rather badly formed face.” Proper investigation would have also revealed that the Virginia mental health agency records showed that the sterilization law was written in order to protect a doctor who was being threatened to be brought upon charges of his free-will involuntary sterilizations performed upon the people in the clinic.

The emphasis on the coverage of this Court decision was the justification of sterilization of the mentally retarded. The sterilization of these people was seen as their debt, or their personal sacrifice to society. The Atlanta Constitution wrote:

Men must die for the state, said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who was dangerously wounded in the Civil War, and the lesser sacrifice called for in sterilization may properly be required for protection of the public welfare. If the state requires persons to be vaccinated so that disease will not be spread through the community, it may also, he said, deprive imbeciles of the power to flood society with feeble-minded offspring.

Unlike the New York Times and the Atlanta Constitution, the majority of the press (or of the sample available for research) did not cover the Buck v. Bell case. Even more so, most of the press examined did not report on the Supreme Court upholding of the Virginia sterilization statute. Carrie Buck was a poor anonymous person at the time. She served well as the guinea pig to legalize sterilization of the genetically inferior class. The popular press, newspapers and magazines all across the country did not even find this event worth reporting.

However, there was a group of people that felt it was important to spread the good word around. The eugenics activists were fierce propagandists during the first decades of the 20th century. Very often they tried to reach the public through the mass media by writing editorials and publishing papers targeted at the general public on eugenics. Usually those efforts proved to be unsuccessful. Therefore, eugenics supporters focused their preaching on the academic circles through the academic journals. For the general public, they organized fairs and shows which, in a subtle fashion, played on the emotions of the public. They made the people feel as if they were a part of the noble class by playing games such as picking the “fittest parents.”

The Criticism of Eugenics and Sterilization
Even though small, some published criticism of sterilization existed. The criticism did not come from the popular press but rather was triggered amongst the scientists. In 1928, Dr. Abraham Myerson, a professor of neurology at Tufts College Medical School, started publishing attacks on scientific
rationale that supported the sterilization of the feeble-minded. He proved that feeble-minded people are equally likely to be born in just about any socioeconomic group. Also, the American Neurological Association appointed Dr. Myerson to research sterilization patterns. His investigation resulted in a 132-page report that crushed the entire eugenics rationale. He proved that the mentally ill were not on the rise in the United States (as was often reported to scare the public), but rather that hospital facilities were improving and accepting more senile, old people. He further proved that there was "no sound scientific basis for sterilization on account of immorality."  

Few of the eugenics and sterilization opponents attacked the propaganda published by the pro-sterilization leaders. The American Mercury, for example, published one of the rare examples of opposition to the eugenics argument. In his article "The Biology of Superiority," Raymond Pearl refuted the discussions of the eugenics movement, i.e. the reasons why Carrie Buck was sterilized. One of the eugenics' thesis was that the superior class needed to be encouraged to procreate more in order to spread 'good blood' and ensure the solid future of the world. The social degenerates, therefore, needed to be stopped from having children and producing more mental retard. Pearl based his reasoning on scientific experiments, some of which he conducted personally and others that were performed by genetic scientists, or were a product of the genetic breeding of animals in the agricultural industry.

Pearl refuted the basic notions of eugenics on several grounds. He said that superior breeds did not always have superior progeny. He furthermore highlighted that the origin of superior breeds (he used the term "breeds" because his ex-

amples involved animals) did not need to be superior. He deliberated on the notion of inferiority. Being superior or inferior, according to Pearl, could change within a lifetime. An Italian living in his own country might have been part of a noble family, cultured with a long tradition. However, once he immigrated to the United States, he became one of the inferiors. This had nothing to do with biology or genetics.

Summarizing, Pearl said that eugenics advocates based their theory on quasi-scientific grounds.

The great founder of the science of eugenics as it exists today did his splendid work without the benefit of the exact knowledge of the mechanism of inheritance which has accumulated during the last quarter of a century. The fallacy of "like-produces-like" was furthermore destroyed by Pearl's findings that 90 percent of "highly eminent [people] were produced by entirely mediocre people."

Through 1934, the Scientific American, a journal that was initially started by a Jesuit lawyer-scientist, Father H. J. Landman, published four articles that debated sterilization. Later, in 1935, the Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry published Myerson's attack of Laughlin's model sterilization law. However, the voices of Myerson and Landman were faint beside the heavy propaganda of the opponents. Supposedly, the most radical among the propagandists was the author of The Case for Sterilization, Leon F. Whitney. He argued that for the sake of the country's future about ten million people in America needed to be sterilized. Together with Whitney, Albert Edward Wiggam was also a creator of heavy sterilization pro-
paganda. Besides writing books, he specialized in writing Sunday feature columns. 48

After Buck v. Bell

Buck v. Bell was not intensely covered by the popular press. However, the decision in this case triggered massive commotion among academic circles and their publications. According to some historical research, in just a decade after the case, over 60 articles on sterilization were published.49 The majority of them favored the procedure. Such articles appeared in regional journals such as the Virginia Medical Monthly, in the popular New England Journal of Medicine, as well as in the official publication of the American Association for the Study of the Feeble-Minded, the Journal of Psycho-Asthenics.50 These articles were so favorable of involuntary sterilization that they never questioned whether this procedure was socially and scientifically valid. Instead, they stressed the safety aspect of the procedures.

One of the most influential writers and lobbyist for supporting sterilization was a physician named Dr. Charles Fremont Dight from Minnesota. He was a member of the Eugenics Research Association and the American Eugenics Society and he started the Minnesota Eugenics Society. Dr. Dight, during the 1930s, regularly sponsored radio broadcasts arguing that thousands of persons needed to be sterilized. Persuasive in his speech, this doctor gained the support of some state officials.51

The eugenics movement also published its magazine, Eugenics. This magazine often stressed the importance physicians played during legislative processes. Physicians became public figures involved in advocating the eugenics position and in writing bills.

For example, “in January, 1931, Roswell Johnson, who wrote the “Legislation” column for Eugenics, surveyed the upcoming state legislative session and concluded that prospects for securing a new sterilization law were best in Georgia, where two physicians, Dr. Joseph P. Bowdoin of the State Board of Health and Dr. W. P. Pace, a member of the legislature and author of a proposed sterilization bill, were ready to push it.”52

Harvey Sharp, Harry Laughlin, and Edwin Gosney, contributed mostly to propagating sterilization to the public. Much of the published material was actually propaganda on behalf of eugenics leaders. Over the 50 years of their active (and overactive) involvement as leaders among eugenics, they were tirelessly “collecting data, issuing press releases, writing letters to editors, and producing and distributing pamphlets.”53 Laughlin, for example, wrote extensively in the Eugenical News, a monthly periodical he nearly single-handedly edited. In 1926 Laughlin wrote about 50 columns for the magazine. Between 1929 to 1931 he wrote over a hundred columns each year.54 Even though Eugenical News targeted the general public, it never really reached that kind of popularity. This resulted in eugenics reaching for some alternative form of propaganda.

Conclusion

Initially this was a fascinating subject for researching press coverage of a controversial issue in the early 20th century. However, the most astounding discovery was the lack of
coverage of the subject. The news essentially became the press’s lack of coverage of the issue and the absolute contrast that this might show against today’s press if the same issue were to arise.

The lack of coverage led to a number of observations. On one side, it can be pointed out that the press has adequately covered affairs in our modern multimedia world. The press has come a long way since the early part of the century. However, to evaluate the press of nearly 100 years ago, one must try to put himself or herself in the past and evaluate it. Probably, the only crime the press could be accused of is failing to notice the importance of the issue and the future impact of it. Still, one can question how much the press of that time was expected to be a watchful observant and a wise prophet.

Another observation that can be made is the similarity between this case and the rise of the Nazi’s. In the 1920s and early 30s, before Hitler came to power, German people voluntarily supported him in his radical views about inferior and superior races and the annihilation of entire ethnicities of people. It appears now, that nothing takes place in a vacuum. The prevailing attitudes of the time, like the Upholding of Virginia’s Sterilization Law, led to eventual involuntary sterilization of about 65,000 Americans.  

This case strongly reflects a much larger case of massive sterilization: 400,000 of them performed in Nazi Germany. In the 1920s and 30s, however, the media did not notice the importance, nor predict, the future implications of Carrie Buck’s case. The press, along with the general public, appeared to have been under the heavy influence of the eugenics propaganda portrayed from a scientific and legal perspective. The eugenics advocates accomplished their goal with a smart use of media, science and propaganda. As one of the 1920s critics of the eugenics movement, Raymond Pearl stated:

The propaganda phase has always gone along hand in hand with the purely scientific, from the very beginning of the development of eugenics. And in recent years the two phases have largely lost their original disparateness and have become almost inextricably confused, so that the literature of eugenics has largely become a mingled news of ill – grounded and uncritical sociology, economics, anthropology, politics, full of emotional appeals to class and race prejudices, solemnly put forth as science, and unfortunately accepted as such by the general public.  

Raymond’s remark supports the notion of just how powerful the propaganda of the time was in promoting the Eugenics Movement.
Endnotes

2 Smith, Nelson, The Sterilization of Carrie Buck, 2.
4 Harry L. Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States (Chicago: Psychopathic, Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 1922) 446.
5 Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization..., 446
7 “Superior Classes Urged to Procreate: Must Have More Numerous Progeny, Professor Tells Eugenists.” New York Call July 27, 1912.
10 Hasian, The Rhetoric..., 37
11 Hasian, The Rhetoric..., 43.
12 Hasian, The Rhetoric..., 27
13 Ibid.
14 Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization..., 504.
21 “The Future...”, 539.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 “Like Mates With Like.” Literary Digest...,78.
25 “Like Mates...”, 80.
27 Brewster, “When a Man...”, 497.
34 Laughlin, The Legal Status..., 17
36 Mr. Justice Holmes “Opinion of the Court” Buck vs. Bell, accessed through http://eugenicsarchive.org
38 The Atlanta Constitution, 3 May 1927, 15. “Sterilization Law Upheld by Court.”
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 The Atlanta Constitution, 3 May, 1927, 15. “Sterilization Law Upheld by Court.”
Bibliography

Books


Laughlin, Harry H. *The Legal Status of Eugenical Sterilization.* 1929


Newspapers

*The Atlanta Constitution.* May 2, 1927.

*New York Times,* January 7 1924; February 10, 1924; February 15, 1924; March 20, 1924; March 30, 1924; September 7, 1924.

*New York Times,* January 25, 1925; February 11, 1925; March 23, 1925; March 24, 1925; March 27, 1925; March 28, 1925; March 29, 1925.

*New York Times,* January 17, 1926; February 18, 1926; October 24, 1926.

*New York Times,* January 4, 1927; May 2, 1927; May 8, 1927; September 29, 1927; September 30, 1927.


*Picayune Times,* May 2, 1927.

Journal Articles


Magazines


“Like Mates With Like.” *Literary Digest,* October 1928, 78-80.


“To Halt the Imbecile’s Perilous Line.” *Literary Digest,* May 1927, 11.

Internet Sources


Considering Communication History Perspectives Since 1974

Butler Cain

A significant philosophical debate has occurred in the realm of journalism history. This debate concerns the very core of the discipline and could have implications that resonate for years. Journalism historians have been experimenting with their voices. It has not been a universal voice because practitioners have come from various academic fields and professions. Their writings and research have reflected their different philosophical ideas. Interpreting journalism history through a commonly accepted perspective has eluded communication historians. In fact, such an achievement may never be realized. This diversity of historical perspectives also has created a field in which the body of work sometimes raises more issues than it illuminates. Journalism historians recognize this and have thoroughly examined – and re-evaluated – their perspectives of communication history.

This research investigates journalism history practices and perspectives as they were discussed primarily in two journals of media history – American Journalism and Journalism History. James Carey’s 1974 article lamenting the state of journalism history re-focused attention on the issue and created a torrent of responses. Though factors can be recognized for bringing new philosophical approaches to the field, such as the influence of social, ethnic, and gender studies and the increasing popularity of journalism as a topic of historical study, Carey’s challenge can be credited with providing the momentum for vigorous debate. It revitalized discussion about the perspectives historians use when interpreting journalism history.

Historical Perspectives: A Review

America’s journalism history has tended traditionally toward biographies of newspaper people, general narratives, media performance studies, and case studies of events in the media.¹ This theme has been evident throughout the genre’s entire body of work, but it is by no means an exclusive viewpoint. Journalism historians have written their accounts through several theoretical perspectives. Michael Emery² and David Sloan³ have produced thorough works detailing these schools and the types of histories their followers produced. Sloan categorized them into professional, ideological, and cultural perspectives.⁴

Most historians of mass communication have come from the media profession, and they often bring those perspectives to their work. The Developmental school perspective viewed the history of journalism as a steady progression from its beginnings to present day practices. These historians attempted to explain and evaluate journalism’s past through its contributions to current professional standards. Historians of the Nationalist school adopted an ideological view. Their overarching theme in the history of civilization was the advancement of human liberty. The American press and its editors were influential and patriotic figures who contributed to the ideas of natural rights and the people’s preeminent role in government. This view was followed by the Romantic school,
which was similar to the Nationalist school but used a narrative style of writing and an emphasis on the role and influence of journalism’s great men.

Perhaps the most widely practiced ideological perspective has been the Progressive school. Historians of this school view history through the concept of ideological conflict. The press has been portrayed as the champion of freedom, liberty, democracy, and equality against the powerful forces of wealth and class. The media’s primary purpose is to crusade for liberal, social and economic causes while fighting for the common masses. Another school of thought, the Consensus viewpoint, began as a direct response to Progressive histories. Opposed to the Progressive point of view, Consensus historians argue that history has been marked primarily by broad agreement on fundamental principles. Disagreement does exist, but it takes place within a larger framework of agreement in beliefs such as democracy, freedom, and constitutional law. The Consensus school adheres to the idea that the press works best when it cooperates with other American institutions to solve problems and improve conditions.

Soon, another school emerged. New historians with different ideas began arguing that journalism history should focus not on journalism’s “great men” or its professional practices but on impersonal social forces that shape the industry. The fundamental premise of the Cultural school of history is that the media operate in a close interrelationship with their environment, and historians of this view pay particular attention to sociological forces, economics, and technology. Whereas other historians have assumed that the media had a major influence on society, Cultural historians are interested in the reverse effect – the impact of society on the media. The Symbolic Meaning school argues that journalism historians should be more concerned with finding and interpreting the way people in the past grasped reality. Research from this viewpoint, according to Sloan, has relied more heavily on theory than on historical documentation.

The list of perspectives does not end here. One of the distinguishing traits of journalism historians is their use of various historical perspectives. Margaret Blanchard observed that history department historians “have not let the type of categorization used in our field… become the central focus of their work as we have in our efforts to explore our organizational patterns.” Sloan acknowledged that the writing of journalism history has gone through several periods and perspectives, and some historians have combined approaches from more than one school. This tendency has allowed several historical viewpoints to emerge, some more widely accepted than others.

Reviving Theoretical Discussion

The adoption of new theories and methods among journalism historians seemed to be a slow process, sometimes taking decades to develop. But in the mid-1970s, things seemed to change rapidly. James Carey, in what would become a marker in the field of journalism history, wrote an essay in which he admonished his colleagues for producing substandard and inconsequential historical work. Carey’s introduction of a new perspective for interpreting journalism history is perhaps one of the field’s most cited and debated articles. It served as a
catalyst for an intense amount of academic self-examination. Journalism historians began openly reevaluating their established practices and then changing, or defending, them. The effects of Carey’s proposal still linger.

During the spring of 1974, the academic publication *Journalism History* marked its debut by publishing an article that resonated throughout the entire field. In “The Problem of Journalism History,” Carey described the discipline as “an embarrassment,” saying research had been dominated primarily by one paradigm of interpretation. According to Carey, this perspective viewed journalism history as the slow, steady expansion of freedom and knowledge from the political press to the commercial press. It included sensationalism and yellow journalism, followed by the move into muckraking and social responsibility. The problem with the interpretation, he concluded, was “simply that it is exhausted.”

He wrote that media historians needed to ventilate their studies through “fresh perspectives and new interpretations.” Carey suggested this ventilation might occur by developing a cultural history of journalism, calling the absence of such a perspective “the major deficiency in our teaching and research.” He described this brand of cultural history as “an attempt to construct the particular attitudes, emotions, motives and expectations of events” within the consciousness of the past. This was Carey’s challenge to journalism historians to move beyond the routine practices of collecting dates and facts and to begin interpreting events within the context of the times in which they occurred.

**Responding to the Challenge**

The response among journalism historians was almost immediate. Within a year, Carey’s article had become the focus of several other journal articles whose authors either supported Carey’s stand or questioned it. His challenge to reconfigure the interpretive approaches to journalism history seemed to awaken an issue that, until then, had been largely dormant. Historians took his cue and began incorporating their own perspectives or critically analyzing those already used within the field.

Marion Marzolf expanded Carey’s definition of history to include the study of the “ideas, values and shared beliefs about the profession and the expression of these values, beliefs and ideas through the creative output, or the report.” She suggested that the cultural history of journalism should include three interdependent components examined over time: the people in the profession, such as printers, editors and journalists; the creative output, or report; and the culture in which the profession develops. John Erickson argued that any attempt to work within such a perspective required “a reframing of the questions asked about the past practices and products of the journalistic enterprise.” The consideration of new data was not necessary, he said, but the inspection of data in new ways was crucial. Such historical analysis had been long ignored “in favor of the development of greater and more extensive narrative and biographical detail.”

Garth Jowett proposed that such facts had to move beyond being categorized and cataloged and be subjected to analysis upon a broad social and cultural matrix. Though David Weaver agreed that historians should strive to more accurately recreate the complexities of
any given time period, he cautioned that it “does not require abandoning a journalist point of view or a concern with journalists and their products.”14 He even implied that there could be room for quantitative methods within the field of journalism history.

Hazel Dicken-Garcia concluded that the decade-old media-society-effects conceptualization was effective at producing narratives and descriptive studies, but did very little for developing history theory.15 She suggested something new, calling it: the media-society-functions approach. This conceptualization would consider the histories of society and communications and would include the connectors between society and communications. Such an approach, she hoped, might produce a more scientific methodology and result in the development of more historical theories. In a discipline lacking in theory, she said, “it would seem less productive to approach data with a preconceived theory than to begin with data collection, followed by generating and testing hypotheses aimed at theory formulation.”16

Michael Emery proposed using a sociological frame of reference to interpret media history. Sociologists, he argued, become immersed in settings to determine and better understand the views and purposes of organizations. Journalism historians “often have a good grasp of what happened at a certain time by interpreting general history and news reports [but] often do not think of trying to determine what that reporter or editor may have been like.”17 Erickson had advocated a similar approach by drawing an analogy to cultural anthropologists who live in the communities they study. “Living” within historical documents, he argued, “may not be methodologically elegant, but it could perhaps lead to a more profound understanding of the way in which the press was a part of the culture it shared.”18

Historians have turned a critical eye toward several research subfields, as well. Histories of the American frontier press tended to be mere collections of facts and anecdotes.19 William Huntzicker advocated a change, suggesting the historical study of frontier journalism needed a conscious discussion of assumptions and the creation of new theories. The Progressive view of freedom of the press, the dominant perspective of this subfield since 1800, tended to focus on the issue as it related to the expansion of liberties.20 The typical histories portrayed the topic as the fight between liberal supporters of press freedom and an oppressive government seeking to curtail it. Though this view has some historical merit, Timothy Gleason suggested it was incomplete and inadequate. He advocated using historical approaches and methods that establish broader social, political, cultural, and economic contexts to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the subject.

Until recently, the history of women in journalism did not fit very well into any of the established categories of historical thought.21 Women were included in some journalism histories, but mostly as widows or daughters who took over the family business from their late husbands and fathers. According to Maurine Beasley, the history of American journalism was written primarily through the experiences of men. Women journalists had to struggle just to earn recognition, and it was not until the last quarter of the twentieth century that biographies and scholarship with a feminist slant became
popular. Advocates of the cultural history perspective also had begun applying a feminist perspective to the study of the women’s rights press. ②2

**Branching Out**

A common theme throughout this debate has been the perceived necessity for journalism historians to incorporate or outright adopt perspectives from other disciplines. The prevailing attitude is that good media historians “should be aware of various theoretical perspectives.” ②3 David Weaver seemed to encourage his colleagues by describing interdisciplinary programs as popular and respectable. He suggested that interdisciplinary cooperation and a willingness to try new methods were essential in helping journalism historians more accurately analyze past behavior. ②4 Advocates of a holistic approach emerged, championing views of journalism history within the larger framework of communications history. ②5 Michael Emery also suggested that historians should rely more heavily on intellectual ideas and literary scholarship from the broader field of American Studies.

In fact, American Studies offered an interesting interdisciplinary model for journalism historians to consider. Jean Ward noted that American Studies scholars, nearly since the beginning of their enterprise, had discussed theory and method for their field. ②6 However, such considerations were not universally welcomed because some researchers considered discussion of theory and method a waste of time. Method and theory, they thought, would emerge from practice. Hanno Hardt and Bonnie Brennen later supported that claim, describing theories as the products of historical practice that emerge as contemporary explanations of society. ②7 But Ward believed that the tensions exhibited among American Studies researchers concerning the issues of practice and theory would also be expressed in mass communication history. ②8 Marion Marzolf supported the assertion that regarding methods, theories and the nature of American Studies, much theoretical ground remained to be covered. ②9 There was no general agreement among scholars, and “there is as yet no solution to the essential problem – a philosophy or theory that unites humanities with the social sciences, behavior and action with cultural artifact and artistic representation.” The task before communication historians, she believed, was to study the content of the media in the past, the journalists or media professionals, and the fit between them and the cultural context and society in which they existed.

Even narrative theory was later recast in a new light. Jack Lule described it as primarily an interdisciplinary enterprise drawing upon scholarship in philosophy, literature, anthropology, linguistics, and history. ③0 At its most basic, narrative theory is concerned with the form and content of the story. But at its broadest, it investigates the extent to which the story is an essential aspect of being human. Narrative theory even offers something for journalism historians who are quantitatively inclined. Lule argued that this perspective can inform understanding of the primary source material with which journalism historians work, such as diaries, letters, and news accounts. The emphasis on developing a broad set of theoretical perspectives also began making its way into college and university classrooms. David Nord implored journalism history
graduate students to “master the theory and methodology of more than one discipline.” Such multidisciplinary mastery would provide the vantage for seeing the larger connections within, and outside of, the field.

**Problems with Progressivism**

Once in a while historians will question a grand narrative but rarely pick fights with devotees of another system. But there was a departure from this unspoken rule regarding the Progressive school. Despite the increased awareness of the need to diversify the theoretical perspectives of journalism history, some historians continued to produce what David Weaver described as “tunnel history,” narrowly focused works that contained no connections to the developments and processes in other areas of society. Joseph McKerns saw this as an indication that journalism history was experiencing a paradigm crisis. He declared in 1977 that “the time has come to end the dominance of Progressive journalism history and to examine and possibly utilize other interpretative approaches in research and study.” He lamented the perceived reluctance of journalism historians to broaden their perspectives beyond traditional approaches, namely the Progressive school of thought, when historians of other fields had already done so. He proposed that journalism is not simply linear, and the dominant ideas of society must be studied within the context of the times. Describing journalism history as a mosaic, McKerns suggested that it was “imperative that journalism historians begin to provide the additional pieces.”

Marvin Olasky decried the Progressive perspective for its weaknesses regarding religion. He argued that there had been a tendency among journalism historians to stand apart from America’s Christian heritage because Progressives increasingly considered Christianity to be a conservative ally of the upper class. As a result, the historical reaction was to consider Christianity a foe of the masses’ drive for equality. With rare exceptions, he said, Progressives have equated biblical Christianity “with the beast from twenty thousand fathoms.” Olasky emphasized an approach that combines spiritual, political, and economic freedom and recommended a complete departure from the Progressive paradigm.

However, that would prove to be incredibly difficult. The Progressive approach is pervasive among journalism historians because it is pervasive among professional journalists. Michael Emery identified a significant link between Progressivism and Journalism history “because many of those writing journalism history were trained to see the world in a certain way, in journalism schools and in newsrooms.” These individuals perceive a world dominated by conflict and powerful individuals. According to John Nerone, journalism historians also tend to think like their subjects. More than historians of other professions, journalism historians “think in terms of stories and facts, and favor a notion of history-writing as a form of journalism.” Nerone argued that most journalism history texts also are Progressive in storyline. They present a grand narrative of the press as the emergent champion of democracy. These texts also tend to use the freedom of the press narrative, with its account of the triumph of liberalism over authoritarianism, and the literacy narrative; which, associates increased reading with the rise of individuality, rationality, and democracy. Despite competition from other historical perspec-
tives and criticism from within the academic ranks, Progressive historians have actively argued in favor of preserving their approach.

Historical Perspectives in the Classroom

As journalism historians debated the merits and drawbacks of various historical perspectives, it was only natural that the issue would move beyond research to include discussions of how journalism history is taught. Historians have been frequently criticized for paying too little attention to theory.\textsuperscript{39} In fact, historians in general have expressed hesitation about using theory to explain the past; and, when it is used, it must be done carefully.\textsuperscript{40} In addition, there is no general consensus regarding which perspectives should be emphasized and which ones should be ignored. Teachers of journalism history began to recognize that another set of challenges awaited them in the classroom.

Developing Programs

The hard sciences provided the dominant models for research during the first half of the twentieth century, so the social and behavioral sciences began to adopt similar practices.\textsuperscript{41} During the World War Two era, the major impetus of theoretical study in mass communication moved toward the social and behavioral sciences. According to David Sloan, the "soft" science of history was commonly viewed as second rate; therefore, journalism instructors began using theory-based research to gain respectability in the academy. Such research "offered intellectual challenges and a means of gaining respectability for journalism professors in a university environment that previously had been none too kind to mere skills teachers."\textsuperscript{42} It was not necessarily an easy transition, however. Nerone argued that part of the craft culture of professional historians was a scorn for theory and theorists. Historians perceived themselves as blue-collar workers who mined archives and crafted narratives. According to John Nerone, historians thought of their work as concrete, and ridiculed the scholars of the abstract.

Another four decades passed before media history became a rapidly growing and evolving discipline.\textsuperscript{43} Noticeably absent from this increase in popularity was any significant discussion of what a journalism history graduate program should include. By the late 1980s, such programs were struggling to find direction. To gather insight, the American Journalism Historians Association conducted a nationwide survey of association members and directors of mass communication graduate programs. The results revealed there was no philosophical blueprint concerning what should be included in doctoral programs of media history. What evolved was the realization that there was a need for serious discussion concerning the content and construct of media history as a discipline.

Overcoming Confusion

James Potter considered historical analysis as the most difficult method to describe because it is usually regarded as either qualitative or quantitative, not a combination of the two.\textsuperscript{45} But its distinguishing characteristics include a reliance on primary and secondary sources for factual information and an expectation of interpretation. Historians use historical judgment to give meaning to their subjects. Potter concluded that
historical analysis is not the simple reporting of facts and occurrences that happened in the past. Historians also provide a wider context or deeper interpretation.

That description raises a pertinent and pointed question. What is the aim of historical scholarship? Maurine Beasley and Douglas Ward suggested that the academy is sending mixed signals when considering “factual” history and “theoretical” history. Beasley and Ward wrote that even if students majored in history as undergraduates, they may be perplexed when they begin to conduct graduate level research. Beasley and Ward argued it is difficult for students to realize that mastery of facts is no longer considered as important as the more imprecise search for “ideas” and “understanding.”

The many perspectives that characterize journalism history only add to the sense of uncertainty. The results of such varied evaluation “may be confusion among many students of journalism history, who tend to want historical ‘facts’ narrated without a hint that they can be open to differing explanations.” Sloan suggested that this range of interpretations in media history was actually fairly limited (in the mid-1980s) because mass media historians had traditionally shown little awareness of historical interpretation. Without such awareness, historians tended to fall into accepted views without knowing what their points of view were. That is precisely why a strong background in other perspectives is desired. Understanding historical interpretation allows historians to analyze critically, and Sloan suggested such an attitude would develop a diversity of insights that would make the study of history exciting.

Conclusion

The argument over what journalism history is—or should be—has been debated for years. When considering which historical perspectives should be practiced or taught, Margaret Blanchard noted that many journalism historians have offered solutions to a problem that is hard to define and harder yet to solve. A decade after “The Problem of Journalism History” was published, James Carey noticed a change in how journalism historians practiced their craft. There was no longer one point of view, fixed school of historiography, or single center of training that dominated historical accounts. Carey observed that journalism historians were drawing upon more diverse sources of inspiration, pursuing different purposes and methods, and conceiving of subject matters in alternative ways.

Blanchard discovered a new generation of journalism historians that was increasingly eager to apply new ideas and new approaches to journalism history research projects. These scholars saw great possibilities in melding theoretical constructs and research approaches, and she noted a growing trend among students to adopt such methodologies. Many have expressed interest in combining mass communications theory with mass communications history. And it is not just the newer generation that is adapting. Journalism historians seem more willing to use and accept perspectives and methods from other disciplines in an effort to produce richer and more substantive histories. Several factors may be credited for these changes. Journalism history programs at colleges and universities have established general standards of acceptable methodological ap-
proaches. There are more researchers concentrating on journalism history today, and other academic fields have influenced these historians. But perhaps just as important, journalism historians also have been openly evaluating their methods and perspectives by discussing them in academic journals and other publications. These discussions served to help unify the field, not around a single historical perspective, but around the goal of producing better history and historians.

Endnotes

1 Hazel Garcia, “‘What a Buzzel is This...about Kentuck?’” New Approaches and an Application,” *Journalism History* 3 (1976): 11-15, 19.
4 The following descriptions come from Sloan’s *Perspectives on Mass Communication History*.
8 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
15 Garcia, 12.
16 Ibid.
17 Emery, 43.
18 Erickson, 43.
24 Weaver, 44-47.
25 Emery, 38-43.
28 Ward, 17-19.
33 Weaver, 45.
35 Ibid.
37 Emery, 36.
42 Ibid., 7.
46 Beasley and Ward, 14.
48 Blanchard, 107-112.
50 Blanchard, 107-112.